Almost 20 months since the Syrian revolution broke out in March 2011, supporters of President Bashar Al Assad — inside and outside Syria — remain adamant that the regime can still carry out profound reforms were it given the opportunity to do so.
Advocates of this argument tend to ignore several key facts. First and foremost, the 35,000 lives which have so far been lost while the regime was trying to suffocate the revolution. One should also mention the three million people who have been rendered homeless and the tens of thousands of detainees, some of whose fates remain unknown.
Al Assad’s loyalists tend also to forget that the president had more than a decade to carry out reforms, but chose not to. All the excuses given to justify the lack of reforms are merely nonsense.
On this particular point, one is tempted to mention an interview Al Assad gave to the New York Times early in his presidency. As usual, the Syrian president was so comfortable talking about foreign policy issues, but stumbled when he was asked about his reform project in Syria.
In response to criticism about the slow pace of reform, Al Assad put the blame on what he called “Syrian mentality” and the lack of trained cadre to implement his vision on modernisation and development. “There are some obstacles related to the mentality ... The major problem that I am facing as somebody who is responsible in this country is the cadre; the efficient, trained people to do the reform; particularly the administrative reform”.
Indeed, Al Assad failed during the course of that interview to mention that the mentality he was complaining about had been fostered so vigorously by the regime he inherited from his father and that the lack of trained cadre was the result of the policies of exclusion and alienation which forced thousands of qualified Syrians to flee the country.
Regardless, Al Assad’s problem then and now has been structural. It is the legacy of a distorted one party system, which is dominated by shadowy institutions and extrajudicial procedures.
Like many other third world countries, Syria has two power structures: the official powerless one and the real one. In the official one, there are all the institutions of a modern state, such as the cabinet, parliament, the ruling party and the bureaucracy. In the real one there is small top brass making key decisions behind closed doors.
The influence of these people, who are often corrupt and accountable to no-one, is vast indeed. Most important is the fact that these same people are the ones who engineered Al Assad’s rise to power.
When Al Assad succeeded his father in July 2000, he found the economy and the political system mired with problems and decadence. He faced a classic dilemma: on the one hand, he needed to liberalise the economy and reform the political system in order to survive.
On the other hand, he wanted to keep the pillars of his regime intact. Hence, he had three options with risks and gains in mind. The first was to initiate a profound transformation, addressing the economic and political problems of the country in a true and innovative manner. The gains of this option were getting a badly needed legitimacy and rally the Syrian people around him.
The risks were antagonising the barons of the regime who might strike back against anyone daring to strip them of their privileges. The second option was to make some cosmetic changes and maintain the status quo. The risks here were losing the support of the people while keeping the barons happy.
The third option was a variation between the two, that is, to introduce some reforms on the economic front while keeping the political system closed. Unfortunately, Al Assad chose the third option and this has cost him dearly. People started to question his commitment to reform and his ability to deliver the promises he made. But, until he decided to face peaceful protests with bullets, Al Assad retained some popularity.
When the revolution broke out it was already apparent that the long-awaited reform would never materialise. Al Assad himself was a big disappointment even for some of his hard-core loyalists. His modernisation vision ended up with establishing a regime that owes its durability solely to repression and a narrow sectarian or tribal base of support.
Having made the life of his own people so difficult, it is not surprising that when some ask that Al Assad be given another chance, very few listen. Al Assad had all the time for reform. Now is the time for change.
Dr Marwan Kabalan is the dean of the Faculty of International Relations and Diplomacy at the University of Kalamoon, Damascus.
