Rather than spending millions on military aircraft, Sana'a should ensure the fair distribution of scarce resources
At the heart of Yemen's tribal conflicts lie three inter-connected quarrels: a lucrative arms business that benefits the Sana'a establishment, a serious water crisis that drowns the poor, as well as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran that perpetuates conflict.
With the most recent escalation on the Saudi-Yemeni border, one wonders why such clashes almost always occur in developing countries, where the easiest targets are the poorest of the poor. In the event, will the Yemen Government extricate itself from tribal wars to better serve its hapless population, or condemn 25 million people to further destitution?
There is little doubt that many Al Houthi tribesmen engaged in hostile acts against Sana'a with paltry military supplies. Likewise, Yemen's financial resources are extremely inadequate, which is why it makes no sense for such an economically challenged state to waste millions on weapons.
For example, and even if Sana'a received steep discounts from Moscow, every MiG-29 in its Air Force cost between $25 and $30 million (Dh91.9 and Dh110.3 million, depending on electronics), and about $5 million to operate per year.
When one calculates what the 66 MiG-29s flying in mid-2009 actually mean in terms of a financial burden, one wonders how can anyone in Sana'a justify such expenditures for one of the poorest countries on earth? Why purchase another 32 such fighters and devote approximately $1 billion to the military each year, when neighbouring Saudi Arabia and Oman consider Yemen an ally? Shouldn't scarce resources be devoted to more urgent domestic needs?
In fact, recent reports out of Yemen highlight that an estimated 70 to 80 per cent of tribal confrontations may be due to resource shortages, especially water. According to Abdul Rahman Al Iryani, the Minister of Water and Environment who spoke to the Christian Science Monitor, rising militancy may trace some of its roots to neglect and the state's mismanagement of natural resources.
This was buttressed by an alarming World Bank essay, which concluded that the Yemen was "one of the most water-scarce countries in the world", an assessment confirmed by Sana'a University Geology Professor Khalid Al Thour, who predicted dry water wells in the capital city by 2015.
When extrapolated to the vast country, Al Thour lamented the concept that allowed "access to public water tanks … once every 45 days", which begins to give a vague idea of how dire conditions are.
Under the circumstances, how could 25 million human beings meet their basic needs without disastrous consequences? What are tribal leaders supposed to do when Sana'a does not limit excessive pumping or fails to divert scarce resources from water-hungry qat production? Is this not akin to a systematic neglect of the entire countryside by state authorities? Why should anyone be thus surprised that a relatively lawless environment persists?
Without a doubt, Al Houthi tribesmen are responsible for their actions too, and they committed a grave strategic error last week when some elements crossed the Saudi border in the Jebel Dukhan area. Whether Al Houthis were emboldened by Iran, as claimed by the Sana'a government, remains to be determined.
Still, it is now up to Riyadh to redirect its attention from a relatively easy military settlement, to a political solution with Sana'a. If the Al Houthis believed that crossing into the Kingdom was a mild excursion that would garner attention, they failed to note that the first rule of warfare is to limit oneself to a single front, rather than engage on multi-pronged assaults using hand daggers.
Given what's at stake, namely to avoid a regional proxy war against Tehran on behalf of foreign powers eager to replace the Arab Cold War with a contemporary Muslim version, Riyadh may wish to distance itself from regional confrontations. Rather, Saudi and Yemeni officials ought to rush in sorely needed economic assistance to affected areas, which will satisfy most indigenous opponents of the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime.
Simply stated, it is unconscionable to think that hundreds of thousands of folks could live in wretchedness next to rapidly modernising cities.
Ultimately, Sana'a must decide whether it wants to remain near the bottom of the global poverty totem pole, or emerge from the rut by diverting scarce resources to productive purposes. Its confrontations with the Al Houthis can be resolved because these tribesmen are part of the Yemeni nation.
While some Al Houthi leaders may be tempted to play with fire, perhaps by aligning themselves with a foreign power whose manipulative skills few can control, ultimately, such behaviour is a sign of weakness rather than strength — especially when one's own community is victimised.
Of course, Tehran is wrong to open a third front, this time on the Arabian Peninsula, after its problematic engagements in Southern Lebanon and Iraq. To better address this latest challenge, Riyadh may wish to concern itself with more than the Al Houthi military danger to preserve its territorial integrity, because bombing villages to smithereens is easy.
What is much harder to do is address the plight of the downtrodden that face gloomy futures. It is time for Riyadh to goad Sana'a into addressing poverty and meet whatever needs may exist in remote areas before a manageable crisis morphs into a generational dilemma.
Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.