The war started in 2004, but two years ago in 2007 the Qataris managed to negotiate a settlement between the rebels and government, which collapsed and could not be implemented. But the continuing fighting cannot be ignored and it is important that another serious attempt at mediation is mounted. Without a solution, the conflict will escalate and will dangerously further weaken the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh, which is already struggling to deal with well-entrenched Al Qaida groups in the country, and a growing secessionist movement in the south.
But any attempt to find a solution has to start from a realistic appreciation of what is driving the fighting, which has not been helped by a lot of loose rhetoric flying around. Al Houthi rebels are Shiite, and President Saleh has not hesitated to accuse Iran of supporting the movement, which has meant that the conflict has been seen as Iranian-backed Al Houthi fighting the Saudi-backed government. But this is a misleading picture of what is in fact a conflict based on local tribal and political divisions. Al Houthis themselves have vigorously denied any Iranian support, but even if they did get secret Iranian backing, they are far from the radical version of Shiite Islam that is promulgated by Tehran. Al Houthi are Zaydi Shiites, who are the bastion of the traditional, tribal population in north Yemen. Historically, the Zaydi were the supporters of the 1000-year-old royalist government which was toppled in 1962 by Egyptian-backed republicans, and since then they have seen their position increasingly marginalised. When Yemen was split they held substantial authority in North Yemen, but after reunification, they feel that they have lost out to competition both from secular southerners who remember their years of communist rule, and more recently to increasing number of more Salafi Sunni Muslims who take a more extreme view of their religion than the average Yemeni.
Own party
These political and tribal fears made the Zaydi community launch its own political party, Al Haq, in order to counter what they saw as increasing Salafi influence in the government, as promoted by the Islah party, which contains many hardline Sunni sympathisers and is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. But in 2004 dissatisfaction with Al Haq's progress led a leading Al Haq member of parliament, Hussain Badr Al Din Al Houthi, to denounce the republic and to declare that he would lead Yemen back to its royalist past, with himself as its leader.
This call to arms was more royalist and nationalist than religious, despite its Zaydi context. It only appealed to the traditionalist tribal people from the north of Yemen, and not to all Zaydis, many of whom are working within the government which is headed by President Saleh, who is of Zaydi origin. The rebellion did not ignite countrywide enthusiasm, but when Hussain was killed it did not stop. His brother Abdul Malik took over the leadership of the rebels and they have continued with greater and lesser degrees of violence over the years. As the fighting continues, it is drawing more and more tribal confederations into the conflict, on both the rebel and government sides. The culture of tribal alliances and feuds makes it easy for fighting to spread.
But the situation in Yemen is too dangerous to allow the war to become yet another of that country's long running tribal disputes.
Firstly, the danger of the appeal to the royalist past is too powerful for the government to ignore. But a second danger is more important. The mere fact that there is a continuing rebellion by conservative northern tribesmen, which the government cannot stop, is encouraging the more secular secessionists in the south, who do not like what they see as a northern-dominated government full of and headed by Zaydis.
The continuing violence in the country, and the failure of the government to impose law and order across the country, only makes more obvious Yemen's situation as a failing state, in which extremist groups, including Al Qaida, are able to find support in localised areas, and use these territories as bases from which to operate internationally.
The Yemeni government is well aware of the triple challenge it faces from Al Houthis, radical Sunni groups, and secular southerners. Despite its failings it needs help to deal with these serious issues, and finding a solution to the Al Houthi rebellion might be the place to start. The Qataris tried and almost succeeded two years ago, so at least there is a starting point from which someone can try again. A thankless task, until it succeeds.
