If a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU ever actually happens, Euro-sceptics will be undone by two flaws that run so deep as to be almost hard-wired.

The first is that they will spend the campaign enumerating all the labour laws and social protections that a sovereign Britain will be able to rescind — as if voters hate these things as much as they do.

The Euro-sceptics’ quandary is said to be that ordinary people share their dislike of the EU without according it the same salience — but in a referendum that is about Europe and nothing else, this hardly matters. The real awkwardness is that people share the Euro-sceptics’ dislike of the EU but justify it differently. They resent the immigration, yes, and perhaps the intrusion into matters of justice and human rights; but the idea that they long to live in a free-market laboratory has always been an ideological solipsism on the part of the right. Dreamily likening a post-EU Britain to Singapore or Hong Kong, as some already do, will put off many more voters than it tempts.

The second intellectual lapse sure to be brought out during a referendum campaign is even more basic. In an in-out referendum, what does Out mean? This is not an idle inquiry as to the consequences or lessons of a British exit, which nobody can know. The question is meant baldly: what actually constitutes Out?

At the present count, there are three definitions of exit touted by Euro-sceptics, which is two too many for anyone who craves certainty. The simplest and most extreme is total withdrawal from the EU and all the obligations that come with it. Because this entails departure from the world’s largest single market, it is unsettling to think about — and so Outers also talk up the idea of withdrawing only as far as the European Free Trade Association (Efta). Daniel Hannan, the Conservative MEP who outdoes all other Euro-sceptics for eloquence and vehemence, rightly identifies non-EU countries such as Switzerland and Norway as being among the richest and happiest on Earth.

But as Efta members, their (imperfect) access to the internal market comes with the burden of observing pretty much all EU regulations, over which they have no influence, as well as the free movement of persons. Unlike Britain, they even belong to the Schengen visa zone. At this point Euro-sceptics tend to say that the Swiss and Norwegians seem happy enough with their status. But the question is not why these countries tolerate what amounts to passive EU membership. The question is why any UK Euro-sceptic would entertain it?

Then there is the third and optimal model of exit. In this version, Britain retains access to the internal market but is exempted from most EU laws and free movement. This is really what many Tories mean by a “reformed” relationship with the EU. But even if such a relationship made conceptual sense — is a market without uniform product regulations technically a “single” market? — it is a political fantasy. No country has this status and, until the EU develops a sudden enthusiasm for being undercut on regulation within its own market, no country ever will. It is an option in the same way that living in Ruritania is an option.

Exposing corruption

But to stress: the Euro-sceptic problem is not the drawbacks inherent to these three versions of exit, but the very fact that there are three versions. Campaigns, whether for elections or referendums, expose ambiguity and confusion. Nothing has wounded Alex Salmond, the Scottish first minister, in his quest for independence more than doubts about what currency a sovereign Scotland would use — and how, if it is still the pound sterling controlled by the Bank of England, it could be said to constitute “independence”.

In any EU referendum, pro-Europeans can tell voters what In means — though admittedly, with the EU in institutional flux, not what In might mean a decade down the line. Euro-sceptics cannot say what Out means. On its own, this is fatal. The referendum will be decided by people who are at present unsure which way to vote. By definition, they are of practical temperament. They will not take a punt on an existential question such as EU membership without establishing the alternative.

In televised debates on the subject, Nigel Farage, leader of the populist UK Independence party, wowed many more viewers than Nick Clegg, the europhile deputy prime minister — an unpopular man making an unfashionable case.

But the former’s account of exit seems to include an extensive trading relationship with the EU, codified in formal agreements. He cited Iceland, another Efta country, as a model to emulate. What they lack in nuance, demagogues are supposed to make up for in clarity. Yet even plain-speaking Farage struggles to define EU exit other than as something different from what we have now.

This vagueness cannot survive the searching heat of a referendum campaign. To win, Euro-sceptics must choose the simplest model of exit and take their chances with it.

— Financial Times