Political Islam is making a dramatic comeback right across the greater Middle East. Some in the West will react with alarm at what they see as a dangerous geopolitical upset. Democrats, secularists, feminists, Christians and other religious minorities may fear that a rigid application of the Sharia will threaten their freedoms and their way of life. But these fears are almost certainly exaggerated, if not wholly unfounded, at least in most Arab countries.
The triumph at last Sunday’s elections of Tunisia’s leading Islamic party Al Nahda (Renaissance) is the latest example of the revival of political Islam in the Arab world. But it is also cause for reassurance. This moderate Islamic party should not be confused with hardline Salafis, who demand a return to the uncompromising values of early Islam.
Without an absolute majority in the new constituent assembly, Al Nahda cannot rule alone, nor does it intend to do so. It will seek to form a coalition to carry forward its programme of social justice, economic development and clean government. It has pledged not to erode or claw back the achievements of the past, notably democratic freedoms and women’s rights.
In Libya, however, the interim leader, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, has aroused fears by declaring that ‘any law violating the Sharia will be legally null and void.’ If this is implemented, it could have an impact on laws of personal status, for women in particular, in such matters as inheritance, divorce and polygamy. But what it will actually mean in practice has yet to be determined.
The revolutionary forces that stormed and captured Tripoli were led by an Islamist, Abdul Hakim Belhadj, battled-hardened in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Tracked by the CIA and Britain’s MI6, he was returned to Libya and tortured for seven years in Abu Salim prison. His attachment to Western interests should not be counted on.
Why have the revolutions of the Arab Spring brought political Islam to the fore? One reason is that, having suffered decades of persecution at the hands of Western-backed Arab autocrats, Islamists now benefit from a mantle of martyrdom. Hamid Jebali, Al Nahda’s secretary-general, spent 16 years in prison, including 10 in solitary confinement. Rashid Gannouchi, the party’s spiritual leader, spent 22 years in exile.
In Egypt, Syria, Libya, Algeria and elsewhere, members of Islamic movements have been hounded, jailed, killed and tortured in great numbers, or have simply fled abroad. In Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood has been outlawed since the 1980s. Membership is a capital offence. If there is a change of regime in Damascus, the Islamists, by far the best organised of the opposition movements, are bound to figure prominently.
Another reason for the emergence of political Islam is the poverty and deprivation of a large part of the electorate in most Arab countries, especially those with little or no oil income. Free elections have at last given this under-class a voice. The Islamic parties have long distinguished themselves by their welfare activities in favour of the underprivileged. Of all the political parties, they can justly claim to be closest to the common people.
The Tunisian revolution was not a middle class achievement but was, on the contrary, driven forward by young men and women on the margin of society, bitter at their own unrelenting misery and at the gross corruption of the former ruling elite, especially the plutocrats close to former president Zine Al Abidine Bin Ali and his wife.
There is a striking contrast in Tunisia between what the tourists see — the coastal hotels, restaurants, comfortable villas, well-tarred roads, efficient services and so forth — and the interior of the country, where jobs are scarce, running water a luxury denied to many, medical services virtually non-existent and government indifference a subject of angry complaint.
The same is true of Syria. The rural poor, which have suffered gravely from drought and government neglect, make up the massed ranks of the opposition, while the well-heeled merchant class of Damascus and Aleppo has so far remained loyal to the regime.
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood are expected to do well at next month’s elections. But, like Al Nahda in Tunisia, they do not aspire to rule alone. The task of satisfying the economic demands of the great majority of the population is simply too daunting. The Islamists have no ambition to assume the burden alone. They fully realise that there can be no economic miracle which will, overnight, produce the hundreds of thousands of jobs, affordable housing, student scholarships, low-cost medical services, and efficient public services which the population is clamouring for. Rebuilding the state institutions and the economy in all these countries will be a long and trying process, and many are bound to be disappointed.
Another winning asset of the Islamic movements, however, is that they express, more clearly than their rivals, the frustrated but largely unvoiced ambition of the masses to affirm their Muslim -Arab identity. Most Arabs, with the exception of small westernised elites, are God-fearing, socially conservative and attached to their traditional way of life. They are unhappy at attempts — which they attribute to outside powers — to impose on them a western model of society. Islamic parties are the champions of this aspiration — all the way from the Taliban in Afghanistan, to Hamas in Gaza and, in its own way, even to the moderate Al Nahda in Tunisia.
The so-called Arab Spring, therefore, is far more than a revolt against long-entrenched, corrupt and brutal dictators. It is also a rebellion against foreign values — and foreign military intervention. America’s destruction of Iraq and Israel’s oppression of the Palestinians arouse great anger. What the various Islamist movements have in common — whether in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen — is an ambition to satisfy the thirst of the populations for an Islamic version of social justice freed from foreign tutelage.
It needs to be stressed that each country’s experience will be different. Tunisia, where women are among the most emancipated of the Arab world, is not like Libya or Yemen, nor will it change radically when Islamist parties come to power. In countries heavily dependent on tourism like Egypt and Tunisia, wide-ranging compromises with the Sharia are bound to be made. Tourists will not be denied alcohol, belly-dancers or night-clubs.
In Turkey, Prime Minister Erdogan’s Islamic-coloured Freedom and Justice Party has had to compromise with the strong secular tradition of Kemal Ataturk, the republic’s founder. The result is Turkey’s special brand of democracy. Likewise, Tunisia’s large and educated middle class will be a force with which Al Nahda will have to accommodate. In most Arab countries, Islamists will be constrained by the counter-weight of long-established secularists and the need to satisfy foreign investors, donors, tourists and western governments.
The West wants to see democracy flourish in the Arab world, no doubt to protect its interests. But the locals want jobs, a better future for themselves and their families, a fairer distribution of the country’s resources, an end to corruption and police brutality. They want good governance and a respect for their traditions rather than western-style democracy or western interference.
Patrick Seale is a commentator and author of several books on Middle East affairs, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East and Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire.
