Field Marshal Abdul Fatah Al Sissi will most likely lead Egypt and may soon be joined by General Khalifa Haftar in Libya and General Jean Qahwaji in Lebanon as the latter two get ready to make a bid for power in their respective countries. For its part, Algeria is, for all practical purposes, run by the military and both Iraq and Syria are confronted by similar realities. At their apex in the 1950s, the return of the generals in several Arab countries seems an increasingly likely outlook, even if the phenomenon stood against the spirit of the post-2010 Arab uprisings.
Regrettably, lack of freedom in leading Arab republics produced coups in Egypt that ushered in the Jamal Abdul Nasser team, drained Libya when Muammar Gaddafi overthrew King Idriss, burdened Syria as the Baath Party and the Al Assad family took charge, terrorised Iraq after Saddam Hussain usurped power, petrified Yemen when Ali Abdullah Saleh strangulated the country’s tribes and more or less permanently scarred Algeria once Houari Boumedienne turned against his own. History has not been kind to any of these men though in all fairness, none of them inherited the necessary institutions to build viable nation-states. Their critics will hammer that few such bodies were created or enhanced in those instances when they existed in rudimentary shapes, even though that would be a generous assessment. Importantly, military “heroes” were charismatic and immensely popular and when they lost wars against Israel or each other, most fell back on perfectly honed propaganda machines that created false but effective auras around their personas.
Of course, conditions are different in 2014, as few Arabs seem mesmerised by military officers, although some will dispute that premise. There are significant differentiations between then and now, led by the ease with which generals don civilian clothes as soon as they reach their respective presidential palaces, which reveal a chameleon-like readiness to blend in. Though few are fooled, most Arab citizens continue to perceive officers as charismatic and popular and able to engage their publics with relative ease, even if hesitancy dominates the first few years in office.
The second difference is the identity of the opposition because liberal/leftist voices that were the putative foes that frightened the 1950s and 1960s, were replaced by ferocious Islamist extremists who dominate the scene and who intend to stifle existing freedoms, limited as they are.
In Egypt, Al Sissi will now have the daunting task of completing the circle that saw Mohammad Mursi and the Muslim Brotherhood come to power through controversial elections, which were followed by mass protests that led to the latter’s ouster. Time will tell whether Egyptians will live through hope or fear, although the Field Marshal will probably do his level best to camouflage his authoritarianism with nationalist slogans. Naturally, Egyptians will applaud him for his effort, but few should be surprised when tensions return if no significant economic reforms produce clear results. Al Sissi is popular, but he, of all people, should take note that authoritarianism has failed to remedy Egypt’s intrinsic socio-economic ills. Ironically, this was former president Mursi’s cardinal sin after a year in office, as his countrymen recorded little or no benefits on what truly mattered the most.
Like his Egyptian counterpart, General Haftar must also focus on accountability and the rule of law if his own efforts are to bear fruit in Libya. Haftar, like Al Sissi, studied or lived long enough in the US to understand that one ought to learn from past mistakes and prevent unending crises from recurring. Three years after the revolution that toppled Gaddafi, Libyan militias continue to make their own law, which is why we now have fresh turmoil. It is precisely to avoid a complete collapse that Haftar positioned himself as a saviour, and while a strong man can restore some order and usher in stability, it is critical not to assume that such initiatives are sufficient.
Like most Egyptians, Libyans crave freedom in the post-revolutionary period and it remains to be determined whether the two military men understand how relatively open societies function. In fact, it may not be enough to simply articulate from a bully pulpit that the nation should forget existing differences for the greater good, because both Egypt and Libya remain sharply divided along many lines.
Similar divisions exist in Lebanon, where the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, Qahwaji, is poised to make a bid for power to end the current March 8/March 14 stalemates. Qahwaji’s task may well be the toughest of the three cases discussed here because he must accommodate two contradictory visions in the hopelessly divided country that has yet to settle on its permanent identity: A pro-democracy camp that insists on the right of the state to enjoy monopoly over raw power and an anti-democracy camp that demands interminable concessions for narrow sectarian gains.
Generals may help prevent extremists strengthen their significant footholds in several countries though it should be clear that one can only suppress dissent if alternatives are articulated and applied. Under such circumstances, and while the return of the generals may cushion the extremist blows that aim to change the entire area, it behoves authoritarian rulers to fathom how messy democracy can be even if it incorporated liberating tendencies. How well Al Sissi, Haftar and Qahwaji do to inculcate liberal-democracy and rescue their respective countries’ economies will help identify whether Egypt, Libya and Lebanon will evolve. The substitute is to simply remain hostage to internal demons that, left unattended, will necessitate harsh military rules.
Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is the author of Legal and Political Reforms in Saudi Arabia (London: Routledge, 2013).
