The most enduring Middle East alliance

The ongoing Israeli attack on Gaza has once again brought the Syrian-Iranian alliance into the limelight. Targeting Hamas is seen as part of a long-term US-Israeli design to weaken the region's most enduring alliance and ultimately break it.

Hamas has always been regarded in Western circles as a tool in the hands of both Syria and Iran and has subsequently been dismissed as a true representative of the Palestinian people.

Regardless of the flimsiness of this argument, the Syrian-Iranian alliance has constituted a puzzle for most Western observers right from the beginning. It stood out as an unusual exception to the volatile politics of the Middle East.

It has persisted for nearly 30 years despite major geo-strategic changes that have swept the region and the world. The alliance is also unique in terms of being maintained notwithstanding the ideological differences between the regimes of the two countries and scant disagreements over several regional issues.

It started to draw significant attention in Western circles only after the US invasion of Iraq and the rise of Iran's regional influence. In pursuit of better understanding of the complexities of this alliance, key questions have been asked: Is Syria's relation with Iran strategic or tactical? Is it a Catholic marriage or a marriage of convenience? Can Syria be nudged away from Tehran? Why should Syria give up its relations with Tehran and at what price? What are the incentives, costs and benefits?

These questions underline genuine interest in understanding the nature of the Syrian-Iranian alliance. They also implicate its significance in geo-strategic terms.

Ideological animosity

Syria's ideological animosity towards pre-revolutionary Iran was crucial to the establishment of the solid alliance. Yet mutual interests remain the key to understanding it.

The Iranian Revolution and Iran's anti-Western posture changed the balance of power in the Middle East and Syria was quick to seize the opportunity. In 1979, Syrian-Iraqi relations reached their lowest point. Baghdad accused Damascus of planning a coup against it, leading to the mobilisation of several military divisions along the borders.

The exit of Egypt from the Arab world after signing the Camp David accords with Israel rendered Syria vulnerable to external threats. From a Syrian perspective, Iran emerged as an excellent substitute for the loss of both Egypt and Iraq in the Arab-Israeli balance of power. The support of the religiously-oriented Iranian regime in the confrontation between the Syrian government and the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s was also instrumental. In addition, Iran proved useful in Leb-anon, especially after the Israeli invasion of 1982, the establishment of Hezbollah and the revival of the Shiite community.

As far as Iran was concerned, the Iraqi invasion of 1980 made Syria an exceptionally valuable ally for the embattled Iranian regime. Relations with Syria, from an Iranian perspective were extremely important to prevent the Iraq-Iran war from turning into an Arab-Persian conflict or a Sunni-Shiite divide. Syria closed the Iraqi Kirkuk-Banias oil pipeline, depriving Saddam Hussain of an important financial resource. Syria was compensated with cheap Iranian oil.

Had Syria chosen to stand by Iraq, it could not only have weakened Iran's position, but could also have closed the circle on the venerable revolutionary regime in Tehran. Instead, Syria presented itself as an indispensable intermediary channel between the Arab Gulf states and Iran. Damascus used this channel to enhance its military capabilities and achieve strategic parity with Israel, while supporting its economy by Arab Gulf and Iranian aid.

The Syrian-Iranian alliance began purely defensively, and for two decades it proved to be extremely useful for the two countries. Having been established on solid geo-strategic foundations, it was not shaken by the power transfer in Syria in 2000.

On the contrary, Syrian-Iranian relations were developed into a full-fledged alliance following the fall of Saddam Hussain's regime in Baghdad, signifying Syria's realisation of Iran's growing weight in the Middle East.

The US military presence in Iraq gave Syria one more reason to get closer to Tehran to abort US attempts to destabilise the regime in Damascus.

Similarly, in Tehran, Syria was viewed as a primary partner in the Arab-Israeli conflict, offering Iran a symbolic political role in the central cause of the region.

In Lebanon, Iran sought to secure Hezbollah's political and military presence in the south with Syrian approval. By the same token, the occupation of Iraq increased Syria's importance to Tehran, giving it vital access to most of the region's problems. Through Syria, Iran could use most of its regional cards as a bargaining chip concerning its nuclear program and threats by the US military.

The election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June 2005 contributed to enhancing the relationship between the two countries. Ahmadinejad's supportive statements compensated Syria for the lack of sympathy in the Arab world. Political, economic, military and other agreements were signed between the two countries and Iran became the largest foreign investor in Syria. The Lebanon war of July 2006 signified the importance of this alliance.

For the past few years, Western powers have used every possible means to convince Syria to abandon its regional ally. It did not work and it is unlikely to work.

As long as the two countries find themselves under pressure from the same source, their alliance will remain standing as it ever was. The Syrian-Iranian alliance is a classic one justified by threat perceptions more than commonalities, similar culture or values.

Dr Marwan Kabalan is a lecturer in Media and International Relations, Faculty of Political Science and Media, Damascus University, Syria.