Although opposition forces condition their participation in scheduled elections in all three countries on account of unprecedented gerrymandering and assorted illegalities, chances are good that bland and largely ineffective officials will reassert themselves in Beirut, Baghdad and Damascus. Few anticipate surprises with a compromise candidate to eventually be given the presidency in Lebanon, while the pro-Iranian Nouri Al Maliki is assured of yet another controversial term in Iraq and, of course, the hugely effective Bashar Al Assad guaranteed to win 97.2 per cent of the popular vote in Syria.
The Lebanon Model
Short of a bolt from the proverbial blue, no one will succeed Michel Sulaiman before his term expires on May 25, 2014, even if behind-the-scenes manoeuvres continue unabated. In fact, Beirut was poised to mimic its 2008 carnival when challenged politicians — whose financial, tribal and religious interests were only surpassed by extraordinary foreign allegiances — left the post vacant for six months. At the time, Shaikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani assembled Lebanon’s incompatible factions at a Doha venue, disbursed hundreds of millions of dollars and bought six years of relative peace. Eventually, Shaikh Hamad, who praised Hezbollah after the latter’s 2006 war with Israel and who was hailed as a hero when he toured Beirut’s devastated southern suburbs, saw his credibility wane after he condemned the party’s involvement in the Syrian civil war. No Arab leader wished to emulate the Qatari, which meant that the upcoming presidential vacuum could last longer than six months, perhaps even occur after parliamentary elections now scheduled for November 2014, although that was not guaranteed either.
The Iraqi Quagmire
For his part, and though unable to prevent severe internal clashes that threatened to start a full-scale civil war in Iraq, Al Maliki perceived yesterday’s parliamentary elections as a panacea to delay the collapse of authority in Mesopotamia. With an extremely poor record to address core socio-economic needs, Al Maliki relied on his weak military to end the recent brutality that befell the country, though he also counted on Iranian-trained Shiite militias to fend off Sunni insurgents. Under the circumstances, the idea that extremists turned to so-called Al Qaida groups was far less important than Al Maliki contended, since his policies encouraged the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isil). To now pretend that Isil fighters gained the upper hand because of foreign assistance skirts universally acknowledged facts. It was the affable premier’s failures to build a consensus around the country’s institutions that led Iraq to the brink of yet another disaster. Indeed, policies that favoured Iraqi Shiites naturally earned him scorn from the rest of the population, which only surprised him and his devoted acolytes.
Regrettably, as extremist elements gained influence among vital Iraqi Sunni tribes, and as Al Maliki sank Iraq further into the Syrian civil war by facilitating cross-country Iranian arms shipments, internecine clashes increased both in pace and intensity. Consequently, few Sunnis were likely to vote in Iraq, which meant that Al Maliki could just as well prepare for serious leadership challenges. Whether Al Maliki will now be able to withstand the coming political onslaught remains to be determined. Suffice it to say that he only had himself to blame given that Al Maliki reneged on oft-repeated promises made to tribal leaders. To now assume that millions of fresh dollars could easily bribe the latter was naive because most already lost face. Many exhausted whatever faith they had in his rulership too. Though Al Maliki may claim victory, the prime minister no longer ruled Iraq, as the country embarked on gradual institutional deteriorations, best illustrated by steady defections from the army.
The Syria Cauldron
Similar desertions in Syria, where the war raged in earnest, did not discourage Al Assad to formally announce his candidacy for the June 3 presidential elections. Even if western observers concluded that such polls were nothing short of a “farce” because voting in the middle of wartime-conditions would deny millions the right to express their choices, the mere fact that nearly half of the Syrian population could not cast a ballot was a secondary issue. What mattered was Al Assad’s steadfastness against “terrorists”. It did not matter whether more than 150,000 lives were lost, the country destroyed, the economy caught in a free-fall and the civil war transformed largely into a stalemate. What mattered was the dear leader’s determination and though some may conclude that his gesture was “utterly absurd,” Al Assad projected the kind of confidence that was only visible in Moscow, Beijing and Tehran.
In fact, those who believed that Al Assad, Al Maliki, or an eventual colourless Lebanese head-of-state, could guarantee stability in the three countries concerned are probably delusional. Russia and its acolytes, along with the US and its western supporters, may well conclude that Al Maliki can and will muzzle extremists and that the partial Syrian compliance to hand over a significant chemical weapons arsenal ought to limit criticisms of both regimes in Baghdad and Damascus. Still, to keep such leaders in power — as suggested by the former British prime minister Tony Blair, among others — amounts to intellectual, political and moral bankruptcy.
Naturally, it is up to the residents in all three countries to reject stale candidates, though prospects are rather poor. Only Lebanon stands a remote chance while Iraq and Syria are in for rude awakenings. Of course, mere elections seldom ensured democratisation, even if they took on theatrical shapes in Beirut, Baghdad and Damascus.
Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is the author of Legal and Political Reforms in Saudi Arabia (London: Routledge, 2013).
