Iran and the United States may have a possible deal over Iran's alleged militarisation of its peaceful nuclear programme. The solution to the long-running dispute involves exporting Iran's nuclear fuel to other countries, with Russia and France mentioned as possible candidates.
But the deal is definitely not in the bag and there is still a very long way to go, in large part because it is not obvious that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government wants to make a deal. In the international arena, Ahmadinejad has done well by positioning himself as the main opponent of the US' role as global policeman, and he will not want to give up his carefully crafted status as the leading spokesman for the Third World.
Therefore it was not really a surprise when Iran's state TV reported that although Ahmadinejad's government would agree to the "general framework" of the proposed plan, it also wanted "very important changes" to the UN-brokered deal. These objections were then made more specific by Iran's Press TV, which reported that Tehran would not agree to its entire stock of low-enriched uranium being sent abroad for processing, as hinted at by the proposed deal.
Iran might seek to stagger the process by sending its low-enriched uranium abroad in batches, rather than all in one go. This should not really be a problem for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the US and its international allies, and could become a matter of negotiation.
But the deal on offer only covers the existing stock of fuel, not future product, which means that in the long term there is still plenty of room for failure. Iran will still have its existing capacity to enrich uranium, and will be able to produce more every day. Every Iranian political leader, from those in the current government to the opposition, from the conservative religious to the more liberal, has insisted on Iran's right to have the full nuclear cycle intact on its territory and under its control. They will not want to give this up, nor will they agree to disband Iran's enrichment sites. One long-term solution would be for Iran to continue to maintain its sites, but at the same time to allow complete transparency and to sign the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allows IAEA inspectors access to anywhere at any time.
The current proposed deal requires Iran to transfer approximately 1,200 kilograms of its low-enriched uranium to Russia or France. And since Iran can produce about three kilograms of low-enriched uranium per day, it will be able to replace all of the transferred stock in just over a year. Of course, that gives all parties a year to work with, and a lot can happen in a year.
Ahmadinejad is facing increasing and continual pressure from his internal opponents as the political row over the disputed elections continues. The series of trials since the end of September, launched by Ahmadinejad's administration against defendants accused of inciting post-election unrest, have kept the political row alive. This has not helped Ahmadinejad very much, and has given the opportunity to his accused opponents of portraying him as persecuting them and misusing the state apparatus to support his personal position.
But far more damaging for Ahmadinejad's standing in the country is the way that his poor economic record is now being assaulted in the most direct way, with a clear implication of dishonesty and personal gain. A report by Iran's State Audit found an astonishing total of around $66 billion (Dh242.7 billion) was missing from the government's accounts, which is a huge amount of money and is equivalent to Iran's entire annual average oil revenue. This report was buried for some months, but it has just been publicised this week in Tehran by Farda, a newsletter linked to Tehran's mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who is one of Ahmadinejad's future rivals for the presidency.
Ahmadinejad is certainly under great pressure from his political opponents, and a lot depends on what he does next. If Ahmadinejad refuses the nuclear deal, he offers his opponents the chance to drag him down. If he agrees to the deal, he gives himself a chance to widen his narrowing political base, but he also weakens his hard-man position.
On the American side, any deal over Iran's fuel and nuclear programme will be seen as a victory for Barack Obama's administration, as he will have convinced Iran to give up maybe between 75 to 80 per cent of its stocks of low-enriched uranium. That will mean Iran will not be able to make a nuclear bomb in the immediate future, and Obama will be able to use this achievement to show his foreign policy can produce results, something that has been missing during his first year, perhaps understandably. But his Republican opposition has been taunting him with being all talk and no action, and he will relish the chance to snap back at them.
