With the G8 having approved extension of the Syrian civil war for at least another year, it was fair to wonder what would that hapless country look like in 2014 — short of a total collapse.
The question was not academic since it delved on the lives of millions, affected neighbouring countries and probably pre-determined additional mayhem for all concerned.
First, the plight of refugees that reached catastrophic proportions, with no end in sight. While the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that the number of registered Syrians seeking humanitarian assistance exceeded its estimate of 185,000 in mid-2012, the official figure crossed the 1.5 million a few weeks ago. Presumably, these folks were those receiving aid in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey, although some were also on UNHCR books in Egypt, Algeria and Armenia. A project conducted at the Migration Policy Centre [affiliated with the Italy-based European University Institute] asserted that the real number of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries was much higher — “perhaps double UNHCR statistics”.
Lest we forget, at least six million additional Syrians inside the country needed help too, with about four to five million internally displaced, most of whom suffered extreme hardships, given limited or no access to them. On an average, every minute of the day saw another two Syrians becoming refugees, fleeing death and destruction. We should, therefore, expect to add a million more refugees to those already in neighbouring countries by mid-2014, further breaking all records. Who planned to care for their basic survival needs and under what conditions? Should the Syrian government, regional powers and, of course, the international community not be preoccupied by this coming human Tsunami on top of current catastrophes?
Beyond the plight of refugees is the flight of the country’s working capital, now that the civil war has levelled the Syrian economy. After mid-2012, Damascus imposed severe restrictions on taking money outside the country, though most of the wealthy did not wait for the government order to act. Simply stated, bank deposits dried up as many anticipated the loss of the currency’s value and converted their assets into US dollars some time ago. It is worth noting that Lebanese bank deposits grew by an astonishing $50 billion (Dh183.9 billion) in 2011 and early 2012 — most of it coming from Syria.
Still, while a US dollar was worth about 47 Syrian pounds (Dh1.72) in March 2011, the exchange rate topped 220 Syrian pounds last week, which meant that the Syrian pound lost about 80 per cent of its value in two years. By 2014, and at current projections, an exchange rate of 400 Syrian pounds to the dollar can no longer be ruled out, especially now that Syrian bank notes — formerly supplied by Germany and Austria under normal central bank rules — were generously printed in Russia. In fact, as Damascus quadrupled the amount of printed notes compared to the end of 2010 on Russian advice, inflation was set to settle for the long haul, further threatening Syria’s future.
To say that agriculture, which represented 22 per cent of the economy, industry (25 per cent), retail (23 per cent), and tourism (12 per cent) were all severely affected by the civil war, would all be understatement, which leads one to wonder how Damascus balanced its budgets.
Indeed, since 80 per cent of the government’s budget of about 600 billion Syrian pounds in 2009 was raised from taxes — with the rest generated from oil revenues — and given current conditions, it must be assumed that tax collection was either frozen or in abeyance. Likewise, if Syrian oil exports to several European countries earned Damascus about $8 billion in 2011, they dwindled to less than $100 million in 2012 after revolutionary forces controlled oil fields. Where it not for imports from Lebanon, Syria would literally starve, although the strains of this aid affected Beirut at all levels. By 2014, the economic crisis could thus take on dramatic proportions, with the price of a butane cylinder, that was sold for 2,500 Syrian pounds in March 2013, when available, probably costing 4,000 Syrian pounds.
To be sure, Damascus had some cash reserves or enjoyed privileged access to lines of credit. Nevertheless, its $18 billion savings evaporated as the Syrian Centre for Policy Research estimated reserves to be $ 2 billion at the end of 2012, though the country’s solvency is a moot point at this stage of the ongoing war. In late 2012, the London-based Times newspaper reported that Tehran transferred nearly $10 billion to support the Bashar Al Assad regime that, if confirmed, would mean the country was bankrupt and was only able to stand on its feet because of massive Iranian aid. Various reports claimed that Iran extended an annual $1 billion line of credit to its ally, with more than half used to buy Russian weapons.
Regrettably, and no matter how much was wasted on the war, much more would be required to reconstruct Syria. Figures differed, though the Partnership Conference for Investment in Syria — organised by the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry, under the patronage of the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, estimated the amount at $60-$200 billion in November 2012. Actual figures would be significantly higher, because aerial bombardments tended to wipe out basic infrastructure indiscriminately, which meant that Syria needed at least 35 years to rebuild what was destroyed so far.
Undaunted, President Bashar Al Assad expressed his interest to submit to the will of the people in the presidential elections scheduled next year. On May 27, 2007, a referendum confirmed that Al Assad received 97.62 per cent of the vote, although few anticipated a similar return in 2014.
Still, the newly-elected Iranian head of state, Hassan Rouhani, has asserted that Al Assad enjoyed “the support of the general population” in Syria and therefore “must remain in power until elections are held” in 2014. Rouhani foresaw “free and fair elections, with the presence of foreign monitors,” which was comical to say the least, given the ongoing developments.
In as much as Syria was little more than an Iranian hostage, one wondered how Tehran intended to fulfil its political objectives, even if its putative victory stood on dead Syrians buried under an avalanche of rubble.
Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is an author, most recently of Legal and Political Reforms in Saudi Arabia (London: Routledge, 2013).
