If revolution in the Arab world, which has so far removed two regimes and threatens to oust many others, demonstrate anything that must be the failure of the Arab ruling elites to lead peaceful and incremental change.
Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the East European totalitarian regimes, Arab governments have been trying to delay — not to say prevent — a substantial change. They faced a dilemma with two major questions: how could they start a reform that would respond in a minimal way to the growing demands for political change without undermining the very foundations of their regimes? And how could Arab rulers manage the transition game while precluding the possibility of losing power to more organised social forces i.e. Islamists. Arab regimes found the answer in a combination of survival strategies.
For many Arab governments, survival strategies involved two components: political and economic. The goal of the political strategy was to allow a degree of participation sufficient to attract support from groups with an interest in political reform, such as intellectuals and professionals, without, at the same time, creating conditions that might empower these groups or give them the means to undermine the hegemony of the ruling elite.
This included giving the media wider margin of freedom, relaxing the restrictions on the establishment of new parties and allowing what one can call loyal opposition. Transparency and accountability remained red lines for majority of Arab regimes.
Political openness was accompanied by limited economic liberalisation. Its goal was to promote a degree of economic change sufficient to attract foreign investment, reduce debt payments, and create jobs for the young and increasingly educated generations. The challenge was to do all this without undermining the fundamental social and economic interests of the power elite. This included selling certain sectors of the public services — usually those that the state could no longer shoulder — and promoting a dualistic approach by which joint ventures with private foreign and domestic actors were promoted in a coexistence with a subsidised public sector. Like the political survival strategy, these steps were intended to be painkillers.
These strategies bought Arab governments some time, but in the long run they produced the opposite effects. On the political front, Arab opposition groups —after decades of repression — exploited the limited political openness to challenge their regimes. Regimes responded by more repression. On the economic front, limited liberalisation increased the alienation of social groups traditionally outside the dominant or ruling elites.
Arab regimes have therefore failed in every aspect of state activities, whether this be in the realm of ensuring citizens’ rights, giving effective expression to popular sovereignty, fulfilling the developmental and welfare functions of the state, or indeed, even in the most basic task of successfully defending the territories of the state. Operating from a weak legitimacy base, Arab leaders have often lacked the political capital to generate effective policies that constitute the building blocks of a stable public order. Even in polities where conditions are favourable, policymaking and administration have been arbitrary, discontinuous and pursued in a milieu of large-scale official corruption. The frequent failure of Arab ruling elites to develop and implement socially beneficial policies has led to the erosion of their tenuous legitimacy and to a consequent increase in the use of force to maintain control.
The increasing level of coercion against the very people Arab regimes claimed to represent and protect could not alone keep them in power. Hence, to pacify the masses and maintain the status quo, sacred missions were created. In the name of liberating Palestine, achieving Arab unity, defending national security, keeping religious extremism at bay; authoritarianism, repression, and hereditary succession became all justified.
Indeed, resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is central for the stability and prosperity of the wider Middle East. But, as we all know, most Arab governments are not really concerned about the plight of the Palestinians. Making reform conditional upon resolving this question is, therefore, nothing but a pretext to prevent change.
Whenever Arab regimes come under domestic or external pressure for greater political participation they resort to similar tactics to preserve power. The results, as can be seen, are catastrophic: foreign intervention and domestic unrest. These tactics have become obsolete. Buying time and lying low until the storm passes are no longer useful strategies to survive too. If Arab regimes do not start genuine reforms, revolution will knock at their doors and there will be no time to regret.
Dr. Marwan Al Kabalan is a Lecturer in Media and International Relations, Damascus University, Syria.
