Opinion | Columnists
Passing the baton
The elderly leaders of Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria seem likely to try and keep power in the family
- By Wolfram Lacher, Special to Gulf News
- Published: 00:00 December 26, 2009
- Image Credit: AP
- Libyan leader and Chairman of the African Union Muammar al-Gaddafi
The role played by Libyan ruler Muammar Gaddafi's son, Saif Al Islam, in gaining the release of the Lockerbie bomber Abdul Baset Ali Al Megrahi, and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's state visit to Washington accompanied by his son, Jamal, suggest that dynastic successions are underway in both countries.
They are not alone. Mubarak and Gaddafi, along with Tunisia's Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali and Abdul Aziz Bouteflika of Algeria, are among the world's oldest and longest-serving heads of state. All four face the ticklish problem of succession, and speculation has been mounting for some time of possible attempts to keep power in the family.
That solution is becoming pretty commonplace, from the Aliyevs of Azerbaijan to the Kims of North Korea to the Assads in Syria. Dynastic succession safeguards the immediate and frequently extensive interests of the ruling family as well as those of the wider political and business elite. But the possibility of near simultaneous successions in North Africa is striking nonetheless.
All four North African rulers have, to greater or lesser degrees, made themselves the centre of highly opaque power structures. Everything in their countries depends on the person and family rather than the office. Yet, despite these authoritarian leaders' apparently solid grip on power, ensuring that a relative takes over is not as simple as it seems. The problem boils down to overcoming possible resistance — from both the elite and the public — that could derail the handover or undermine the successor's authority.
Dealing with elite interests requires ingenuity. Lucrative business opportunities can be allocated to soothe the successor's political adversaries, while renegades can be targeted to discourage others — for example, by being stripped of property or dismissed from positions of influence.
Commercial interests
Where members of the ruling family hold direct commercial interests — as in Libya and Tunisia — the political transition is certain to cause collateral economic damage. For example, if Gaddafi's fourth son, Muatasim, emerges as the successor, he could take away Saif Al Islam's business holdings and ability to profit from foreign contracts. In Tunisia, a successor from the Trabelsi branch of the Ben Ali clan — linked to the president through his second wife, Leila Trabelsi — could target the extensive interests of families related to Ben Ali's daughters from a previous marriage.
Securing popular legitimacy requires equal dexterity, which has played an important role in preventing North African leaders and family members from openly admitting their preparations for dynastic successions.
In Egypt, where such preparations are the most obvious, Jamal and other senior figures have stubbornly denied his presidential ambitions. At the same time, room has been made for Jamal to build a public profile of his own through his senior role in the ruling party, and a constitutional framework has been put in place that will allow him to be elected in multi-candidate elections, thus establishing a façade of republican legitimacy.
The legitimacy question is particularly problematic if the ruler's biography or charisma is closely tied to the legitimacy of the regime. In Libya, the regime's founding myth is inextricably linked to Gaddafi's 1969 coup and his eclectic political theories. His departure would expose the anachronistic nature of the state's ideological foundation; family ties will do nothing to protect his successor from the resulting shock to the system.
The Algerian situation is similar. The regime's legitimacy is based on the war of independence, with all presidents to date having played important roles in it. But Bouteflika's most likely successors, including his brother, almost certainly will not have this tie.
The four rulers have deliberately played their succession cards close to their chests. Keeping everyone in suspense helps prevent the emergence of organised opposition to a dynastic succession. Moreover, they may worry that heirs apparent will seek to force them out of office prematurely.
— Project Syndicate, 2009
- Wolfram Lacher is a senior analyst covering North Africa at Control Risks, a global business risk consultancy.
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