Except for unlikely bold decisions reached by attendees at the 23rd Arab League summit in Baghdad, it may be safe to anticipate yet another political failure, one that will highlight existing differences among wary rulers. In the aftermath of sui-generis uprisings in so many countries, most will now confront years, perhaps decades, of adjustments.
Many will pretend that meagre efforts will address popular concerns. All will return home empty-handed and, even worse, devoid of fresh ideas to mobilise their respective populations’ socio-economic powers to create wealth and enhance sorely needed liberties.
Though few seem to comprehend what ails their societies, political equilibriums will eventually emerge, even if the transitory period promises to be unsettling precisely because decades of neglect gave rise to these revolutions in the first place.
Beyond false assessments that minimised the tumultuous developments that swept several potentates from power, and which will most probably threaten several more, westernised analysts dismissed the Arab Spring phenomenon as an aberration, pointing to the rise of Islamist movements.
Allegedly, the latter pushed aside a younger generation of secularising democrats who wished to adapt to the times, dismissing gargantuan efforts to organise through modern social networks like Facebook and Twitter and concluding that such false methods in the hands of ephemeral forces were no match to immensely influential Islamists.
To illustrate their litanies, these Johnny-come-lately analysts referred to Egypt and Libya, certainly two important cases where Islamists literally defeated secularising democrats, as perfect examples why the Arab Spring failed.
Phenomenon
For odd and incomprehensible reasons, Islamists — no matter how one defined the phenomenon — were allegedly incapable of recognising existing multicultural features that defined their countries.
While extremists certainly rejected the ‘Other’ in certain Cairenese or Tripolitan circles, and while Islamists also won elections in Tunisia, Morocco and even in Kuwait, it was disingenuous to argue that religiously motivated pretenders could not be rational even if they did not mimic European enlightenment.
Still, and inasmuch as long-neglected and marginalised Islamist forces aspired to power, it was important to underscore two essential points that will explain whether they will threaten anyone but themselves: pledges to deliver on sorely needed economic policies and guaranteed liberties of expression for all.
These were critical issues because accession to power carried with it the burdens of responsibilities, which could not be swept under the proverbial cultural rug, and which Islamists are routinely accused of espousing.
In other words, Islamists in power will need to address economic and political questions fast if they, in turn, are not thrown out of office within a matter of a few years. Lest we forget, Mohammad Bu Azizi, the Tunisian street vendor with a college degree who sparked a revolution by setting himself on fire, did so chiefly for economic reasons.
Today, the Arab world faces incredible economic challenges, including the need to create around 100 million new jobs by 2025, when population figures will top the 500 million mark. In 2012, unemployment averages 20 per cent among 350 million Arabs, but unless 100 million new opportunities are created, the current unemployment rate will be optimistic. Beyond fervent religious prose, no Islamist can pretend to rule long, simply by feeding masses with divine provisions.
In fact, and ironically, Tunisian Islamists seem to have understood this challenge well, as the ruling Al Nahda party distanced itself from calls to enshrine the new constitution with Sharia. This wise decision, which highlighted ongoing internal debates to differentiate — not separate — between religious obligations and secular needs, marked a clear break between Al Nahda and ultraconservative Salafists whose economic concerns were secondary.
While time will determine whether Tunis will serve as a model for Cairo, Tripoli and others, chances are excellent that similar transformations would be quickly duplicated.
Naturally, conservatives will rebel, demonstrate, threaten, perhaps even carry out acts of violence, though all of these efforts will only betray hidden agendas.
Consequently, and no matter how hard most Islamists try, few will escape the need to go through painful transitions. To date, several countries avoided outright civil wars but, as the still unsettled Lebanese model illustrated, others may fall into its agonising paradigm. This may well be the fate of Syria, and it behooves Arab Summiteers in Baghdad to advise their absent Syrian counterpart to reinvent himself, lest Damascus go through decades of bloodshed.
There are those who deride the rise of Islamists, alleging that the Arab Spring is a failure, and that the sky is about to fall over our heads. No such fear exists although the Arab world faces decades of tension as nascent political equilibriums emerge in just about every country. While Middle Eastern societies certainly harbour underlying cultural and religious currents that ought not be obfuscated, no Islamist tidal wave is about to sweep the entire region and no massive takeovers are around the corner. Rather, and even if democratisation is a painfully slow process, what is most likely in the cards is a generational transformation. One that aspires to create wealth for 500 million Arabs by 2025 in a relatively free environment, in societies that value liberty, and that will accommodate everyone, including Islamists.
Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.
