As John Kerry’s self-imposed April 29 peace process deadline came and went, the US Secretary of State criticised both sides for its failure, warning Israel that it risked becoming ‘an apartheid state’, but saving most of his ire for the Palestinian National Authority (PA), indicating that the US may cut off funding in response to its ‘unhelpful’ reconciliation agreement with Hamas last week. If implemented, the unity deal will see the establishment of an interim PNA government of technocrats within five weeks and elections after six months.
The reconciliation of a warring people should surely be a welcome development, not least because a unity government is the only kind of administrative apparatus that could broker a realistic and lasting peace with Israel on behalf of all the Palestinians ... so why the long faces in Tel Aviv and Washington?
The reasons given — either untrue or illogical — include: “Hamas is an extremist organisation that has no place in government.” Yet, Naftali Bennett — the leader of Israel’s hardline ‘Jewish Home’ party who has argued unambiguously for the ethnic cleansing of “greater Israel” and is currently agitating for the annexation of the West Bank — is the highly influential Economics minister in the Benjamin Netanyahu administration and as “extremist” as they come.
A White House spokesperson complained that Hamas would not accept Israel’s “right to exist”. Hamas recently indicated that it was willing to compromise on this issue and would recognise Israel, but not as a “Jewish State”. Meanwhile, there are many in the Israeli government who refuse to recognise the right of the Palestinians to their own state — including members of Bennett’s party. “Hamas remains committed to violence”. Hamas has stuck to the cease-fire it agreed with Israel in 2012. By contrast, the Isareli army and the colonists persist in violent acts against Palestinians. In the past three months, 22 Palestinians have been killed and 120 seriously injured. In fact, the US and its client state object to Palestinian unity for the most basic reason in the book — that unity is strength.
The breakdown of the peace talks, despite the tireless efforts of Kerry, clearly demonstrates that the US is no longer fit for purpose as broker — a role is assumed for itself in the 1980s.
The US simply cannot get the objective overview that negotiations now require. While Israel is militarily superior to the Palestinians, the latter have moral rectitude on their side and this is widely acknowledged by the international community. The burgeoning Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement is testament to that.
The Israelis have cynically exploited the peace talks as a smoke screen for accelerating illegal colony building — 9000 housing units were added during the nine months of negotiations.
The US habitually threatens to cut aid to PNA if it strays from the prescribed route, but PNA President Mahmoud Abbas can always look elsewhere. The European Union has given its blessing to the unity deal, as has China; while the world’s fastest developing economy currently contributes just $1 million (Dh3.67 million) to the PNA’s coffers, its steadfast diplomatic support for Palestinian rights over the years may well produce increased funding were the US to withdraw its own.
The most potent threat to long-lasting reconciliation, however, arises neither from Tel Aviv nor Washington but from Fatah and Hamas themselves. Previous agreements — in 2007 (Makkah), 2011 (Cairo) and 2012 (Cairo and Doha) — failed to hold. Abbas, in particular, will come under immense outside pressure to back down; apart from financial threats. Let us not forget that Israel has assassinated scores of Palestinian political leaders over the years, including Yasser Arafat.
Nevertheless, this time, both Hamas and Fatah have powerful reasons to make the agreement work. Both are facing unprecedented crises, financially and politically, which would be eased by reconciliation.
Hamas has been hit hard by the ouster of former Egyptian president Mohammad Mursi and widespread anti-Muslim Brotherhood sentiment in the region and beyond. Egypt has upheld the Israeli siege of Gaza by demolishing smuggling tunnels and keeping the Rafah crossing closed. Reconciliation may help Hamas build bridges with the new regime and Cairo was among the first to welcome the move.
Serious intent on both sides is evidenced by the fact that Fatah prompted the move, that no external, Arab or foreign, mediators were involved, and that Gaza-based (rather than exiled) Hamas leaders have played an active role. Hamas’ weakened state means that Fatah is confident it can maintain its dominance of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.
Abbas’ failure to achieve anything at the negotiating table has seen his popularity ratings plummet. Reconciliation will allow Abbas to reclaim his legitimacy as Palestinian leader and bow out gracefully if, as he has indicated, he does not seek re-election. Much depends on Abbas. Is he genuinely ushering in a new era or is he simply using reconciliation as a threat to force Israel to make some small, irrelevant, concessions?
It is true that (having used the threat of doing so for leverage in the past) Abbas went ahead with applying for — and winning — non-member observer status for Palestine at the United Nations in 2012 and later joined 15 UN agencies in defiance of Israel and the US. He has yet to play the ultimate card in that pack — signing the Treaty of Rome, which will allow Palestine to bring war crimes action against Israel’s leaders in the International Criminal Court.
However, claiming legitimate rights and reconciling a people are not ‘concessions’ to be played with, offered and withdrawn. Has Abbas’ eagerness to please the US and Israel really evaporated? The PNA’s “security coordination” with Israel — which Abbas this week announced will continue — has seen it actively collaborate with the occupier against its own people. Shouldn’t it, instead, be seeking security cooperation with Hamas?
Abbas’ refusal to endorse resistance has been another enduring barrier between the PNA and Hamas. Yet, I was told by a reliable source that, at the recent meeting of the PLO central committee, Abbas was full of fighting talk, urging civil disobedience against Israel and the ignition of a third Intifada.
Is Abbas going to surprise us all by launching a final, one-man, guerrilla operation before he exits the political stage forever? We can but dream.
Abdel Bari Atwan is the editor-in-chief of digital newspaper Rai alYoum: http://www.raialyoum.com. You can follow him on Twitter at www.twitter.com/@abdelbariatwan
