With the creation of the United Nations Security Council at the end of Second World War, five members — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the US ­— graduated to a permanent status to impose order based on international law. It was a given that member-states that joined the UN would accept these norms and, more important, that the P5 would uphold them too. Of course, that was not to be because of an ingrained fault, the veto power, which remained the organisation’s Achilles’ heel. How could the international community survive and prosper when its P5 nucleus talks the talk but fails to walk the walk?

Because the spoils of war included the enslavement of defeated populations or the massive looting of treasures in ancient times, the Second World War victors devised a plan to uphold principles that included, inter-alia, international peace and security, though limited peace and security were its real accomplishments. From the Berlin Crisis that launched the Cold War to the War for Iraq, the Council stood as a premier theatrical platform, even if most of its agreements were reached in smoke-filled backrooms along the Hudson River in New York City.

To be sure, the council enjoyed notable successes and suffered ignominious failures, but its genius was to provide a venue for the P5 to sort out differences as they surveyed and absconded global spoils. Yet, that behaviour was tolerated as long as the P5 members stood above the fray and, at least, pretended to advocate international law.

By now, it should be obvious that the pretending is gone, as the following recent cases amply illustrate.

China, for instance, has repeatedly threatened to invade and occupy disputed islands — called Senkaku by Japan and Diaoyu by China — in the East China Sea, asserting that Beijing would defend its territorial sovereignty. Tokyo, for its part, affirmed that Chinese patrol ships routinely violated Japanese territorial waters. Of course, the consequences of any error will be serious and may even involve the US because of a defence treaty with Japan. Yet, beyond the sovereignty question, what interested China first and foremost were the rich minerals and oil resources in the region, since China considered most of the South China Sea as falling within its own sphere of influence.

When the Malian government asked for foreign military assistance to re-take the northern region occupied by several insurgent groups in early 2012, France opted to launch operations against the Islamists, even if African Union troops — mostly from Chad [now withdrawn], Nigeria and Togo, among others — joined in, starting in January 2013. Conditions in Mali were complicated and involved both tribal and religious considerations, although Paris did not demure when its interests were threatened. Any secessionist movement, as the case of the Tawareq separatists illustrated, which threatened to change the imposed order, was categorically rejected. In other words, while peace agreements did not end the fighting, part of the reason for these types of military incursions was to prevent a redrawing of borders, or to tolerate any redistribution of wealth among indigenous populations whose interests did not always coincide with those of the foreign protectorate entity.

Russia was equally guilty of a breach of international law after the March 21, 2014, annexation of Crimea, internationally recognised as being part of Ukraine. By creating the Republic of Crimea, which Moscow administered alongside the federal city of Sevastopol, Russia effectively broke one of the cardinal rules of the post-Second World War settlements to respect and accept the territorial integrity of a UN member-state. The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine further illustrates that the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, is not an astute student of international law, since troops without insignias, the installation of puppet rulers in “liberated” zones, the holding of a disputed referendum and assorted other violations amount to little more than a coup d’etat. Comically, Russia rejected the “annexation” label, though Putin had no compunction to ask for talks about “statehood” in the eastern Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine.

While Russia and the US cast the most vetoes at the Security Council, Britain was third with nearly 32 such votes — the most recent in 1989 to stifle a Panamanian request to condemn a US invasion. Most British vetoes concerned African matters, especially those dealing with South Africa and Namibia, although its most critical veto was cast on June 4, 1982, over the Falklands crisis. London dispatched an armada to the South Atlantic after Argentina invaded and occupied the Islands on April 2, 1982, and while Britain was legally justified to liberate its territory, the area’s rich mineral and oil deposits were additional motivations to risk blood and treasure. A mutually acceptable maritime settlement was not impossible to reach although the war, by a stronger power pitted against a weaker one, rallied the masses.

Washington’s involvements in Iraq stood as yet another example of a strong entity that crushed a weak satrapy. Despite the hoopla and theatrical warmongering, there never were any doubts that the US would not prevail on the battlefield, even if it mismanaged the political rationale that justified this incursion. On February 5, 2003, the then US secretary of state, Colin Powell, held a vial of white powder as he addressed a Security Council plenary session to argue in favour of military action. His reliance on anonymous Iraqi defectors, which led him to affirm that “there can be no doubt that Saddam Hussain has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more”, was a lie. It breached international law and weakened global security.

Like all history, contemporary developments confirm that the first rule of power is to keep it, while the second one is to deny it to others. One wonders when human concerns for peace and stability will prevail instead of encouraging chaotic and dangerous situations that only add to the daily misery. In the post-Second World War era, global responsibilities were entrusted to the P5 precisely to ensure order, although many assumed that the world’s leading powers would start with themselves. That was not the case, which is why we should not be surprised when leaders orchestrate wars and offer their subjects to burn on the altar.

Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is the author of the forthcoming Iffat Al Thunayan: An Arabian Queen, London: Sussex Academic Press, 2015.