I've been an Arab all my life but today I declare myself a proud Turk" tweeted a friend of mine. As I retweeted her statement I thought to myself, so am I, and as soon as I saw my statement on the live feed I realised why I was jealous of every Turk. I realised that I wasn't particularly proud or jealous of Turkey's position per se, and I knew that every Arab nation felt that way.
And so I am not interested in why Turkey conducted itself in the manner that it did during the Flotilla crisis; that is a mediocre question. However, I find the endeavour to accurately understand the source of Turkey's capacity to conduct itself in the manner that it did very illuminating for a region plagued with proxies and puppets. I want to really understand what Turkey did from 1983 when then prime minister Turgut Özal instituted reforms that allowed the country to transform from an authoritarian, state-controlled economy to a market economy.
Sure, the world is changing. The economic crisis has put America's patronage of the world to the test, and China's capacity to refinance what the US would discontinue to support is the greatest proof of that. Turkey too has changed and has witnessed a democratic reform that could easily become reminiscent of the Ottoman Tanzimat movement. Some find irony in that it is Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP), that has initiated these reforms. But democratic reform and further leanings towards market economics are not only good for Turkey, but also for the AKP — which, though not outlawed, is clearly viewed as a fundamentalist party, in a Turkish context of course. AKP won 46 per cent of all votes in 2007, up from 32 per cent in the previous election that got them into office. Of the 46 per cent who voted for AKP, it is estimated that less than half are strong supporters of the party. So why is AKP in power? It is due to the lack of an alternative. In other words, AKP works. AKP also wants Turkey to become a soft power with a multi-directional foreign policy — you'd be hardpressed to find a Turk that disagreed with that policy.
The search for Turkey's capacity and will to take such a vocal position against Israel becomes more complicated when analysing its strong military ties to Israel. Beyond the elementary irritations that Turkey has with Israeli involvement in northern/Kurdish Iraq, Turkey and Israel have an iron-clad industrial-military pact. It is said that Turkey now uses more military technology from Israel than from America. These ties are unbreakable and relate to Turkish security concerns. Proof of this was a hasty Turkish statement at the outset of Flotilla-gate stating that a military trade deal would still go through despite this attack. Hence it is very much expected that while there won't be many Turko-Israeli war games in the Mediterranean with media aboard anytime soon, the technological cooperation will continue. Beyond that there isn't much to ponder in that relationship; over 65 per cent of trade between the two nations is military-based and the rest is negligible. It is said that of Turkey's exports in general, Israel accounts for just two per cent. Turkey's business partners are Germany, Russia, the US and fast-rising China. Recent meetings with Kuwait indicate an interest in catering to weary, post-crisis sovereign wealth funds in the GCC.
Repercussions unclear
Many have said that the price for restoring Turkey's relationship with Israel is removing the blockade of Gaza; I don't necessarily believe that to be accurate. One only needs to read Turkish statements, which have stressed that they address the current government and not the Israeli people who currently have one of the most out-of-sync governments in recent history. This coalition government, including the ‘who's who' of Israeli politics Likud's Benjamin Netanyahu, Yisrael Beiteinu's Avigdor Lieberman and Labour's Ehud Barak is hardly a stable one. Expect some Cabinet reshuffles even an early election is possible. Once there's a change in the government perhaps a realistic scenario would see Israel ending the blockade with guarantees from the international community that no weapons would be smuggled in. But one thing is for sure, Turkey and Israel won't be swapping visits of senior officials anytime soon.
The American angle is also very interesting. Obama for more reasons than being a Democrat of Muslim descent isn't able to openly criticise Israel for this and can at best call for ‘restraint'. Think Biden and and the Occupied Jerusalem colonies incident etc. And so it is very likely that the current administration is quite pleased with Turkey's stance on the Flotilla crisis. In fact, Turkey is probably emerging as the only candidate to serve as a custodian of the Middle East balancing Israel and Iran
I still find myself wondering why not a single state in the Arab world has been able to be as effectively critical of Israel as Turkey is. I also find the contrast between Turkey's success and what I consider to be Qatar's mixed result in executing a multi-directional foreign policy curious to say the least. Where do the Arabs go from here, and what can they learn from Turkey? Three things: diversify your economy so that you can discover your strengths; acquire multiple trade partners so that no single partner can dictate your foreign policy; and don't be rushed into building relations with other nations — good ones take time.
This incident will be remembered as Israel's Flotilla-gate, Turkey's Flotilla-day and Arab's Flotilla-shame. It is up to each nation to decide whether it wishes to live in shameful weakness or realise its ambitions, should it have any.
Mishaal Al Gergawi is an Emirati current affairs commentator.
