The Netherlands plays host on March 24-25 to the third biennial Nuclear Security Summit (NSS). More than 50 international leaders, including US and Chinese Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping, respectively, will focus on measures to enhance security of nuclear material stockpiles and facilities across the world.
The summit at The Hague has assumed added international importance because of the fact that Obama has asked fellow G7 leaders (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom) to convene during the two days to discuss the situation in Ukraine. It is likely that issues on the agenda will include coordinated new waves of sanctions against Russia. The downturn in relations between Russia and the West is highly unfortunate for the summit given that Moscow is such a pre-eminent player in global attempts to counter the nuclear terrorism threat. Indeed, this issue first came prominently on the international radar screen following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, when major concerns were raised about safeguarding the former Communist state’s extensive nuclear weaponry.
More recently, the urgency of tackling this agenda was given added impetus by the September 2001 attacks in the US. This was widely interpreted as a ‘wake-up call’ about the possibility that a terrorist group could detonate a small nuclear weapon or a radiological dispersal device (a so-called ‘dirty bomb’), in a major urban area. The NSS process began soon after Obama assumed office when he asserted that nuclear terrorism represents “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security”. In the same speech in Prague, he gave a very ambitious deadline to “secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years”.
While this deadline will not be achieved, there has been progress in reducing the number of countries with access to Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and plutonium since the NSS process began in 2010. For instance, enough HEU for some 3,000 nuclear weapons has been ‘down-blended’ in Russia and the US, 12 countries have returned their previous stockpile of HEU back to the country of origin (mostly to the US and Russia); a significant number of former nuclear facilities across the world are now both HEU and plutonium free; more countries have adopted international requirements for nuclear security; and almost 20 countries have launched a counter nuclear smuggling initiative.
However, as the Dutch summit will underline, this global effort remains very much a work in progress. As of late 2013, for instance, some 30 states from Europe to Asia, including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Pakistan had at least 1kg of HEU in civilian stocks. Moreover, since 1993, it is reported that there have been some 16 confirmed cases of theft of HEU and/or plutonium documented by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database, most of them occurring in the former Soviet Union. While the conventional wisdom is that the probability of a major nuclear terrorism event is very low, the consequences would be so dramatic that it remains a major preoccupation of the international community. According to the Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group, detonation of even a small handful-sized amount of plutonium in a nuclear device could kill or wound hundreds of thousands of people in a densely populated area.
And, the ensuing chaos would also probably spiral outwards, overwhelming medical facilities and causing major domestic and international travel problems. It could also trigger a significant macroeconomic shock by undermining consumer confidence.
Given the difficulties of terrorist groups obtaining weapons-grade material, perhaps the bigger danger is a ‘dirty bomb’ attack in a major city. Here, the complexity of the operation would be reduced as conventional explosives would be used to spread radiation from a radioactive source. Such radioactive sources are relatively widely available, including at hospitals. Only last December, law enforcement authorities in Mexico discovered a vehicle believed to have been stolen by thieves which contained radioactive medical materials that could have been used to power a dirty bomb.
Given the scale of work that is still needed to realise Obama’s agenda, three ambitious, overarching goals have been identified by the Dutch for the summit. These build upon the achievements in the 2010 and 2012 NSS meetings in Washington DC and Seoul respectively, namely: Reducing the amount of dangerous nuclear material in the world; improving the security of existing nuclear material and strengthening international cooperation on this agenda.
Specific goals include ratification of the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material by more countries to ensure that the amendment enters into force as soon as possible; more frequent reviews of state security structures by the IAEA; national registration and protection of highly radioactive sources (e.g. medical equipment); and a greater role for industry in nuclear security to enhance the security culture and existing regulations.
Even if the Dutch summit proves a success, a very significant body of work will be needed in the next two years before the next and probably final NSS in Washington DC in 2016. This latter occasion will coincide with Obama’s last year in White House and it is likely that he will want to ensure the strongest possible outcome so that nuclear security becomes a key part of his presidential legacy. As well as initiating the NSS process, Obama has signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NEW START), which will see Moscow and Washington reducing their deployed nuclear arsenal. The US has also reached a preliminary nuclear deal with Iran.
The ultimate success of the NSS process is likely to be determined by several key factors, including resources, international cooperation and also whether NSS can be institutionalised after 2016 so that the agenda continues beyond Obama’s presidency. On the first issue, government budgets across much of the world are still being cut back following the 2008-09 financial crisis. In the US, for instance, Obama has asked for some $305.5 million (Dh1.12 billion) for the US International Material Protection and Cooperation Programme for Fiscal Year 2015 (which begins on October 1, 2014). This is $114 million less than what was given by Congress to the same programme in fiscal 2014.
Similarly, for the US Global Threat Reduction Initiative, Obama has requested some $108 million less in fiscal 2015 than a year earlier. The purpose of this initiative is to help stop terrorists from securing access to nuclear and radiological materials.
Secondly, it is clear that even stronger international cooperation is needed, especially between key actors like Russia, China and the US. In this respect, much may depend upon how broad and long-lasting the freeze in relations proves between the West and Russia following tensions over Ukraine.
Thirdly, given that it is unlikely that the NSS agenda will be fully realised in the next two years, it is key to look beyond Obama’s presidency. While the NSS process could yet be renewed beyond 2016, it will be important where possible to anchor ongoing efforts into long-standing mechanisms, including the IAEA, so that the successes of NSS are institutionalised as much as possible for the future.
Andrew Hammond was formerly a Senior Geopolitics Consultant at Oxford Analytica, and a Special Adviser in the UK Government of Tony Blair.
