On January 18, Israel launched another air strike inside Syrian territory, this time targeting a convoy of Iranian and Hezbollah leaders in the town of Quneitra. The attack resulted in the deaths of six Hezbollah commanders and an Iranian general who was part of the convoy. On January 28, Hezbollah responded by hitting an Israeli military patrol in the Sheba’a Farms on the border between Lebanon and Palestine, killing two Israeli soldiers.
In the ten-day period between the Quneitra attack and the Sheba’a operation, there was speculation about whether Hezbollah would respond or choose to remain silent. With Hezbollah’s deep involvement in the Syrian conflict, most analysts expected that Hezbollah would avoid opening a second front. Past experiences also favoured a no-retaliation behaviour. After all, Hezbollah had failed to respond to the assassination of Emad Mughniyeh, its most important military commander, in a car-bombing in Damascus in February 2008. No action was also taken when Hezbollah accused Israel of being behind the assassination of Hassan Al Laqqiss, another leading Hezbollah commander, in December 2013 in Beirut. In addition, Israel has frequently struck at Hezbollah’s targets in Syria, most recently on December 7, 2014, when Israeli fighter jets bombed missile dumps said to belong to Hezbollah close to the Lebanese border inside Syria.
The latest attack was, however, different. The Quneitra raid caused deep embarrassment for the Hezbollah leadership, particularly since it took out six of its field commanders — foremost among them being Jihad Mughniyeh, son of the Hezbollah military leader assassinated by Israel in Damascus seven years ago. The attack also came just three days after a TV interview with Hassan Nasrallah, wherein he vowed to respond to any Israeli aggression, even though Hezbollah was fully occupied with the conflict in Syria.
On the Iranian front, the loss of a senior general in the attack required a response. Embroiled in a tense confrontation to defend its sphere of influence throughout the region, Iran could also not afford to ignore the targeting of Hezbollah, which constitutes its major investment in the Arab Mashreq. Hence the measured and restrained response, which was designed to show that Hezbollah was not powerless in the face of Israeli attacks, while at the same time preventing the situation from spiralling towards a full confrontation.
In choosing to respond in occupied Lebanese territories (the Sheba’a Farms) Hezbollah not only ensured that its response would not lead to wider conflict with Israel but also avoid criticism by its Lebanese opponents who have always blamed Hezbollah for dragging the country into external conflicts serving regional interests and not Lebanese ones. The response also took into account the position of Hezbollah grass roots — as they would be the prime victims were the situation to escalate further.
Very sensitive point
Hezbollah’s response was also strategically timed. It came at a time when the world’s attention, the US’s in particular, is fixed on two main issues in the region. First and foremost is the war against Daesh (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), in which Hezbollah and the rest of the Iranian axis are major players. The second focus is on the nuclear talks with Iran that have reached a very sensitive point, to the extent that US President Barack Obama threatened to use the veto against tougher sanctions that the Republican-dominated Congress might try to impose on Iran. An Israeli escalation against Hezbollah is thus unlikely to secure American support, particularly when it may undermine efforts to reach an agreement with Iran.
From an Israeli perspective, having made it clear to Hezbollah and Iran that their attempt to create a military presence in the Syrian Golan Heights constituted a red line, Israel was not in a position to allow an escalation. Entering into an all-out confrontation with Hezbollah would upset the balance of power in the Syrian conflict that currently allows neither party to win.
It seems then that none of the parties in the recent crisis stands to benefit from an escalation. That was the message Nasrallah conveyed when, during the mourning for the Hezbollah commanders, he said that Hezbollah “does not want war, but does not fear it”. Reuters pointed to a message from Hezbollah to Israel, delivered by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil), indicating that it did not seek an escalation.
This does not necessarily imply, however, that the two sides have agreed to return to the post-2006 rules of engagement. It is almost certain that Israel will continue to exploit Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict to weaken it, particularly as Hezbollah continues to bleed not only in human and material terms, but also morally as a result of its guns being pointed at a people in revolt against a tyrannical regime.
— Dr Marwan Kabalan is a Syrian academic and writer.
