Handling Hamas with care

The recent appointment of George Mitchell as special envoy to the Middle East is no doubt a positive sign of President Barack Obama's commitment to the region, signalling that there will be immediate and direct American involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.

Mitchell, who was the architect of Ireland's Good Friday Agreement, is largely seen as an honest broker and a tough negotiator. He is a firm advocate of diplomacy, yet his success will ultimately depend on the authority he is given to accomplish his mission.

The full backing of the president and involvement of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton must be part and parcel of any outcome Mitchell can procure.

One of the most urgent issues that Mitchell must grapple with is what to do with Hamas, especially in the wake of the Gaza war. There are many right-of-centre Israelis who believe that Hamas - as an organisation sworn to Israel's destruction - is simply irredeemable and must therefore be destroyed.

These people are pursuing an unachievable goal, trying to obscure reality while losing sight of Hamas's changing circumstances and political fortunes. In fact, the same thing has been said about the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), but over the years the PLO has changed with the circumstances and time has come to choose a political solution rather than continuing senseless resistance.

The argument that, unlike the secular PLO, Hamas's ideology is religion-based and is not likely to change must be measured against Hamas's ultimate choice, which is political survival.

Hamas is a grass-roots movement and will not die a natural death. As the Gaza war has amply demonstrated, even Israel's colossal military power as compared to Hamas's has its limitations, as Hamas is deeply embedded in the civilian community.

They have become part of the Palestinian social fabric, especially in Gaza, and have shown tremendous capacity for clean governance and realism. They want to stay in power and ideally seek to capture power in the West Bank as well, but they also understand their limitations.

The Gaza war may have brought Hamas to the realisation that the political tide and events on the ground are mounting against them and that a change in direction may be necessary to remain politically viable.

The Gaza war has caused a serious split between Hamas's political leadership in Damascus, which has advocated further resistance, and the leaders in Gaza, who suffered the brunt of the Israeli onslaught and were looking to end the Israeli incursion as quickly as possible.

Other than protesting against the Israeli military campaign, no country, including Iran, has come to Hamas's aid, save sending some money, a fact that might just awaken Hamas to a painful realisation.

Egypt, which is determined not to allow an off-shoot government of the Muslim Brotherhood as a neighbour, put insurmountable pressure on Hamas to accept a ceasefire. In addition, Egypt continued to exert pressure on Hamas to establish a unity government with Fatah.

The recent meeting between representatives of Hamas and the Palestinian National Authority in Cairo offers a first positive sign, and the prospect of a reinvigorated political process.

Saudi Arabia, which is weary of Iran's ambition to become the region's hegemon, has been critical of Hamas's close ties to Tehran, accusing it of undermining the national security interests of the Arab states.

The Saudis are exerting quiet pressure on Hamas to abandon its Iranian sponsors and come back to the Arab fold. Adding to this mix is the fact that Palestinians in the West Bank remained restrained throughout the Gaza war, sending another ominous signal to Hamas of their determination to abandon violent resistance in favour of a political solution.

Concerted efforts led by the United States, the EU and Israel to interdict shipments of weapons by air, sea, and land through tunnels to deprive Hamas from rearming will likely add to the pressure on Hamas to modify its long-term strategy.

The question is how much of this leaves room for influencing Hamas's direction. The answer certainly lies in the level and the consistency of involvement of the US, EU, the Arab states and Israel in building a new structure of peace that will include Hamas based on the changing reality in Gaza.

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies.