The fall of the Yemeni capital Sana’a to Al Houthi fighters on September 21 marked a new political era for the war-stricken country. Ironically, Sana’a fell at a time when Yemen was preparing to celebrate the 52nd anniversary of the September 26, 1962 revolution, which toppled the Zaidi imamate and paved the way for the establishment of the Yemeni republic. Some in Yemen believe that the ultimate aim of Al Houthis is to reinstate the Zaidi imamate. The capture of Sana’a was, therefore, seen as one major step towards realising that dream. In this view, Al Houthi rebels used the talks sponsored by the UN special envoy to Yemen, which resulted in the signing of the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA), to buy time to realise their main objective — capturing the capital.
Others, however, believe that by taking control of Sana’a, Al Houthis were primarily trying to strengthen their hand so that they could gain a greater share of power than had been offered to them by the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) agreement, which was signed earlier this year. The PNPA demands the formation of a national unity government and ensured that Al Houthis will have advisers with broad powers to influence the Yemeni president’s decisions.
In this regard, it is stipulated that the Yemeni president is obliged to seek the consent of his advisers over the choice of the cabinet members. The PNPA stipulates also a re-examination of the make-up of the national committee to oversee the implementations of the recommendations of the NDC, another concession Al Houthis won while shelling the capital.
Regardless of what the Al Houthis were trying to achieve, the rapid fall of Sana’a came as a shock for many. After only four days of fighting, Al Houthi fighters defeated the forces of General Ali Mohsen Al Ahmar, commander of the first armoured division and defence adviser to President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Al Ahmar was supported by armed elements from the Islah party.
Many factors contributed to the decisive victory of Al Houthis in Sana’a, most important of which were: The weak position of Hadi vis-a-vis the different political factions and his inability to assemble a loyal military to enforce his will as president; the lack of cohesion within the Yemeni armed forces, some of whose commanders favoured Al Houthis — not for sectarian reasons, but due to the resentment they still feel over the restructuring of the armed forces, following the departure of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh; and last but not the least, the increased unemployment and poverty rates, which made most Yemenis support Al Houthis’ demands for lower fuel prices, fighting corruption and introducing profound economic reforms.
All of these factors coalesced into creating a state of political and security flux that presented Al Houthis with an opportunity to take control of the capital and then impose their will. Needless to say, the recent agreement falls short of offering a comprehensive solution to the Yemeni crisis, particularly in view of the fact that Al Houthis have so far refused to withdraw from Sana’a and hand their weapons over to the state. If anything, Al Houthis have been stockpiling more weapons after having looted the Yemeni army camps that fell into their hands.
As a result, Al Houthis will always be inclined to use force as long as they feel that there is an appropriate opportunity to win further concessions. They did that on Wednesday when they captured the Red Sea city of Hodeida, the country’s second most important port. Furthermore, the increasing political and social tension resulting from the occupation of Sana’a makes it difficult for this agreement to act as a formula for stability, particularly with the increasing sectarian polarisation and tribal divisions.
As the link between Al Houthi rebels and Iran becomes all too clear, the occupation of the Yemeni capital is interpreted by many as a major breach of Yemen’s national security. Hadi was very frank on this when he stated that Tehran wants to bargain Sana’a for Damascus.
To add insult to injury, an Iranian MP, Alireza Zakani, made a very provocative statement when he said that Sana’a had become the fourth Arab capital, after Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad, to fall to Iran, in a reference to Al Houthi seizure.
With the growing structural damage to the state institutions (civilian, military and security) it is very likely that we will end up with yet another failed state in the Arab world. In this regard, Zakani may not be quite wrong after all — Yemen has joined the “fiasco club”, which so far included Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
Dr Marwan Kabalan is a Syrian academic and writer.
