Bravura aside, Hezbollah finally accepted the primacy of the state, which must be considered a huge victory for Lebanon. To be sure, the country is still not out of the proverbial woods and may still disintegrate into several statelets, though Prime Minister Tammam Salam saved it from imminent disaster. Indeed, Salam’s government produced a modified draft of its sacrosanct ministerial statement that clarified the role of the state, the acceptance of decisions that emanated from the 2012 national dialogue sessions and, last but not the least, Beirut’s unwavering backing of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

Without exaggeration, these dramatic and unprecedented reversals were nothing short of a complete Hezbollah acquiescence, topped by the party’s failure to re-legitimise the “resistance”. Indeed, the nuance was subtle but important, because party tenors harked for months on end that the “army, people and resistance” triptych could not be altered in any way, shape or form. As it turned out, it was simply put in abeyance with Saad Hariri, the leader of the Future Movement, boldly claiming that “the ministerial statement does not give any legitimacy to the use of arms outside the framework of the state, its army, and its security and military institutions, or in implicating Lebanon in foreign wars”.

Whether Hariri’s many compromises led to this moment was far less important than the end results. As the son of the assassinated former prime minister still feared for his life and practised his craft from outside the country, he nevertheless recorded an unabashed victory, since Hezbollah implicitly accepted that there was no longer any room for freelance militias who decided for the state. Naturally, while Hariri and his March 14 backers twirled the ministerial statement to their liking, Hezbollah and its March 8 devotees provided their own spin. In light of the most recent document, which will receive overwhelming parliamentary support (perhaps as many as 114 votes out of 128), it was interesting to hear Mohammad Raad, a leading Hezbollah deputy, assert that the party supported “the cabinet whose policy statement has been finally ‘liberated’ and which included its commitment to the right of the resistance to confront occupation and its attacks”. Less than 24 hours earlier, the same Raad had opined that the March 14 alliance’s insistence not to include the “resistance” in the new cabinet’s policy statement, amounted to doing Israel’s bidding.

In the event, lawyers and linguistic sycophants pored over the actual text to decipher what it actually contained and offered several interpretations as to the use of certain letters of the alphabet that were presumably used incorrectly, which allegedly changed the meaning of the disputed word — “the resistance” versus “the right of the people to resist Israeli aggression”. In a moment of added drama over the weekend, Kata’ib Party (the Phalange) officials requested an amendment of a key clause, threatening to withdraw from the cabinet should the document be submitted to parliament for a vote of confidence, unaltered. According to Labour Minister Sejaan Azzi, this was required to avoid what he called a “dangerous ambiguity [surrounding] the role, position, sovereignty and authority of the state in relation to national decision-making”. Hastily arranged meetings last Monday and Tuesday between former president Ameen Gemayel, head of the Kata’ib Party, and his son, deputy Sami Gemayel, with Salam apparently clarified matters to avoid any resignations.

To his credit, Salam clutched from Hezbollah’s jaws “the unity of the Lebanese state and its exclusive authority in issues related to the general policy,” which included Beirut’s responsibilities to safeguard “the country’s sovereignty, independence and the safety of its sons”. Not too shabby for a scorned leader whose patience proved essential during nearly a year-long period of assessments and appraisals.

Ironically, those who banked on Salam’s collapse were surprised by his preferences, which revolved around the state and only the state. In fact, those who discarded him as a temporary fix — to preside for a very short period of time since his government would resign as soon as a new president was elected — may yet be surprised, given existential differences over the identity of the individual who would succeed President Michel Sulaiman. Moreover, and as both Sulaiman and Salam planned to reconvene the suspended national dialogue that, for better or worse, remained the only forum for serious exchanges amongst antagonists, there was room for optimism. Remarkably, few objected to such a gathering, which further reflected critical changes under way within the body politic as everyone prepared for the next battle — the presidential elections.

In March 2014, Hezbollah accepted the primacy of the “state”, while Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea went out of his way in a recent interview with the pro-Hezbollah Al Akhbar daily to avow that he too was ready to engage in a “serious dialogue” with his foes. There were no words to adequately describe how such transformations could occur over such a short period of time that, irrespective of one’s leanings, highlighted mammoth flexibility. Bewildered observers shook their heads. Was Lebanon poised to live through a new dawn? Was this hapless country capable to shed some of its contradictory policies practised by so many freelancers? Could Beirut field a genuine government that actually pretended to respect itself? Was Lebanon finally ready to become a state?

Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is the author of Legal and Political Reforms in Saudi Arabia (London: Routledge, 2013).