The return of war to the European continent has come as a profound, if delayed, shock to the west. No one, just a year ago, could have imagined that it would come to this. A Europe struggling with its financial and economic woes is caught off guard by Ukraine’s turmoil and Russia’s role in that. Now, we have the immediate flashpoint in eastern Ukraine, which the Minsk declaration announced by the leaders of France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia, aims to address. And then there is the long view, the wider picture to be grasped: and that concerns Europe’s future and its long-term security. For what we are witnessing is a truly adefining moment for how the continent may look like in the 21st century, in a context where the transatlantic bond is significantly weakened. The key question revolves around how Europe will deal in the future with ensuring a stable security architecture on its territory, capable of preventing more bloodshed and thus ensuring it can defend its interests in a changing world. There are far more, and far deeper, unknowns here than in how the ceasefire will hold out in eastern Ukraine. For years, Europe built its common project with a Kantian view of the world For years, Europe built its common project with a Kantian view of the world — the Venus syndrome (with the US as Mars), as described by Robert Kagan: a continent incapable of envisaging war because for so long it lived under the postwar US security umbrella. Without the transatlantic link enshrined by Nato, Europe has no defence and security policy of its own to speak of. The EU may have forces in the Balkans, in Africa, even off the coastofSomalia, but it has neither a doctrine nor any deployable joint forces capable of ensuring the safety of Russia’s neighbours if the worst-case scenariowas to unfold. So far, Europeans have not given themselves the financial resources to do that, and money is short at a time of economic recession and budget-slashing. So American involvement in Europe is still very much the thing to watch. But it is striking that as European leaders met in Minsk, the Obama administration formally submitted to Congress a proposal for authorising military force against Islamic State (Isis) anywhere in the world (not explicitly limiting the effort to Iraq and Syria). This is in tune with the recently released US national security strategy. This road map does not cast US leadership in terms of containment, even if Russia is back as a threat. It is essentially focused on a global vision whereby security is achieved through partnerships. As outlined recently by Susan Rice, Obama’s national security adviser, the list of US priorities comes in the following order: terrorism, nuclear proliferation, pandemic diseases, climate change, trade and global growth, equality, Africa, China, the Middle East. The US openly identifies Asia as a region which will define the course of the 21st century. Obama’s final years in office are going to be ever more “globally” focused, not Europe-centred. This puts the Europeans in an awkward place: possibly for the first time since the second world war, they will have to sort the continent out more or less on their own. “But there is Nato!”, many will say. Nato has indeed beefed up some of its capabilities in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis. But the fact that debates continue about Nato’s ability to enact Article 5 of its treaty (the all-for-one, one-for-allsecurity guarantee set in place for itsmembers) is testimony to how shakythe transatlantic bond has come to be perceived. Equally, much has been said about the divisions between Europeans and Americans over the Ukraine crisis — for example, over arms shipments to Ukraine. The main point of agreement has that there would be no western military intervention in defence of Ukraine, which is not a member of Nato. And Europe and the US have coordinated tightly in forging sanctions against Russia, although some say European unity on sanctions was only reached under US pressure. Others point to the role of the continent’s strong-woman, Angela Merkel. It was also hard not to notice that sanctions were only really agreed after the downing of flight MH17 (298 dead, two-thirds of them European), which horrified public opinion. But overall, Europe’s own divisions have been glaring and will almost certainly continue to be. A post-American Europe must define itself and the principles it wants to uphold These factors have influenced the Russian strategising. With all the attempted mind-reading over Vladimir Putin’s psychology, one thing can be said for sure: Russia is playing the long game. This was spelt out yet again by its foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, in a speech in Munich a week ago. “The events of the past year [in Ukraine] have confirmed the validity of our warnings regarding deep, systemic problems in the organisation of European security.” Russia, he added, had long proposed a common economic and humanitarian space, stretching “from Lisbon to Vladivostok, a space based on the principles of equal and indivisible security”. That is very true. Since 2008, the year of the outbreak of war in Georgia, Russia has been trying to push a security framework that would give Moscow a veto over the strategic choices of European states as well as some of Nato’s actions. In a nutshell, a dilution of the transatlantic alliance. If you follow this logic, it is likely that the Ukrainian crisis was brought to boiling point by Russia because it gets everyone scrambling to try for an answer to Russia’s bigger and older strategic demands over European security. That is the chapter that has now been reopened, 40 years after the Helsinki Final Accords and 25 years after the Paris Charter, which laid the foundations for a peaceful post-cold war order in Europe. Europeans must seriously tackle this question — not just ponder whether Merkel is the right person to lead them. Roughly put, a post-American Europe must define itself and the principles it wants to uphold. This also counts because in the long run, Europe is not the only issue. After the second world war and into the 1970s, organisations and rules were set up to ensure the continent’s security. Europe is the only part of the world affected by the war that has benefited from such overarching arrangements. In Asia, there are alliances but multiple territorial claims, and no regional security organisation. What happens in Europe raises questions not only about our wellbeing and stability, but in an interconnected global environment, about world governance as a whole. What Putin obtains in his attempts to get Europeans to compromise over Ukraine’s independent strategic choices, including its links with the EU, will be followed closely by China and others. By violating European security rules, he is hoping to renegotiate them. On this, the Minsk agreement has opened the way to talks, but without delivering any answers. guardian.co.uk (c) Guardian News & Media Ltd, 2015
