Under an agreement between Egypt's Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (Scaf) and various elements of the opposition, it was agreed that parliamentary elections will take place as scheduled on November 28.
However, the Scaf demanded that the presidential elections be postponed from April 2012 until April 2013. The Scaf proposed that the military hold onto executive powers, while the newly-elected upper and lower houses of the Egyptian parliament formulate a constitution.
When the military first came to power in February, it promised to hand power to civilian government within six months. The Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition groups soon accused the military of being unwilling to give up power. The military they argued can't be trusted to implement real democratic reforms.
Despite the fact that the opposition's grievances are very real and legitimate, they also tend to be idealistic and impatient. Egypt is a big country, with many divisions in society.
The new waves of enthusiasts want the country to change 180 degrees in no time. Meanwhile, marginalised political fractions, such as the Brotherhood, are keen to capitalise on the momentum and not let a historical moment to increase their powers slip through the cracks.
There are also the optimistic youth who want to see their country transform to a full democracy. The enthusiasm of the youth for democracy is to a big extent driven by their belief that a democratic political system will naturally lead to an improvement in their economic situation and job prospects.
Currently, the demonstrators and the military are going back and forth, entangled in a cycle of partial concessions, protests and so on. The problem with this scenario is that it doesn't allow time for change to take its course. The military is being cornered and pressured to make quick decisions, just to appease the protesters.
Instability
This is not to say that the political hegemony of the military is not a problem. It is indeed a serious issue that does need to be addressed, but making overnight demands is not the right way to transfer the decision-making to civilian control. There are crucial questions that need to be answered regarding the best way to move forward. These issues require a great deal of time, and will need to be revised again and again before reaching an acceptable form.
The next period will be marked by instability, disorder and economic difficulty. This will be the case whether or not the military is in power, because the key issue is a discrepancy between unrealistic expectations of ordinary Egyptians and reality.
The protesters and their sympathisers believed that the removal of former president Hosni Mubarak would automatically bring with it an improvement in their financial situation. Their inevitable dissatisfaction will cause more protests regardless of who is in power.
There will be calm only if a sense of security and stability is maintained and the economy improved; which are both unlikely in the short -term.
The ‘losing' side, whether the opposition or elements of the old regime have a reason to cause instability to legitimise the other side. This is because accepting defeat, and allowing the ‘losing' side to partake in the government, is characteristic of a mature democracy, which Egypt is not and will not be overnight.
Similarly, a change in power doesn't typically lead to economic prosperity in the short term. On the contrary, Egypt in transition is untapped territory for investors and the tourism industry will take time to recover.
This is not to say that Egypt can't overcome this setback. Indeed it can and will emerge even stronger and more prosperous. But in order to get there, we shouldn't forget that real and meaningful change takes time to implement.
Dina Khanat is a political analyst and Adjunct Professor, Humanities and Social Science, at Zayed University.
