India's current military strategy is the product of various factors, not the least of which are its assessments of US military intervention decision-making. It therefore is critical that regional experts better understand the complex inter-relationship between India's strategic thinking and US military operations in places such as Iraq, Libya and Yemen.

For example, military strategists could view four key takeaways from Libya as negatives for US-Indian strategic relations: 1) The current US administration is reluctant to prosecute military interventions without broad international coalitions; 2) Nato prosecuted its air campaign against Libya with insufficient force and consequently failed to quickly achieve strategic paralysis of its adversary; 3) Non-western powers are now hesitant to accept US foreign policy statements at face value; 4) Overthrow of Gaddafi reinforces the importance of weapons of mass destruction for strategic leverage.

These raise important questions: Will Indian strategists view the administration's perceived willingness in Libya to sacrifice immediate military advantages for long-term diplomatic ones as limiting US situational options and battlefield effectiveness elsewhere? Will this in turn undermine India's confidence in the US to undertake emergency bilateral action in support of their core security interests in the event of a crisis?

Such issues may best be answered by way of historical digression as Indian assessments are probably as influenced by the Bush administration's decision-making on Georgia as the Obama administration's on Libya.

This is because the US decision not to project force in Georgia clarified that world opinion remains a key determinant of US military intervention decision-making, especially on matters falling outside core American interests.

Pakistan and China

For Indian military strategists contending with long-standing tensions with Pakistan and intermittent disputes with China, Georgia should focus analysis on a derivative issue: How confident can India be that America will be willing and able to support bilateral emergency military action in defence of Indian national security interests regardless of world opinion?

One of the challenges in answering this question is that Indian and American strategists must first agree on what determines an emergency requiring American military intervention. To some US analysts, Indians have a difficult time distinguishing this point. The 2001 Indian Parliament terrorist attacks are a good example. While America condemned the attacks and supported the Indian government, it should have been clear the US was not going to support a military response.

Given such basic challenges, Indian military strategists must wonder if their security interests would be best served by developing or acquiring advanced military assets sufficient to prosecute a strategic, unilateral military campaign against any Asia-Pacific rival. In India's case, this would require achieving strategic paralysis against an adversary with capabilities comparable to the most advanced non-US power.

While such an endeavour would be difficult, especially given ongoing domestic insurgency threats and regional military modernisation programmes, some analysts argue it is feasible if India made them a long-term national priority. Unfortunately, becoming a regional hegemony requires far more than just re-prioritisation of national interests.

Regional hegemony

India would first need to rethink its ground-centric military, which allocates disproportionate budget to the army at the expense of the navy and air force — the services most capable of achieving strategic paralysis in modern warfare. It also would require a re-conceptualisation of the enemy from Pakistan to China in order to position defence expenditure in-line with achieving regional hegemony.

Such challenges will prevent India from emerging as a regional hegemony despite the fact that India may attempt to make limited, ad hoc investments in state-of-the art air and sea platforms. This ultimately reinforces the long-term military importance of a strategic relationship with the US for the foreseeable future.

That said, past US military interventions (in Libya, Georgia, Somalia and Afghanistan) suggest a strategic relationship between India and the US will not be easy. The Pakistani nuclear programme and arsenal, which could represent an existential threat to both countries, serves as case and point.

With New Delhi within range of Pakistani missiles, India's definition of clear and present threat almost certainly departs remarkably from America's. For strategists on both sides, closing such gaps will be a key requirement for a functional strategic partnership.

After Libya, the question is whether such gaps will close or widen. Ultimately, the answer may depend not only on past but also future US engagement around the Arab Spring.

 

Lt Gen (Retd) Michael Dunn is the president and CEO of the Air Force Association and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Eddie Walsh is the Pentagon (accredited) correspondent for The Diplomat and founder of The Asia-Pacific Reporting Blog.