Because Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini expressed a visceral abhorrence of the Al Saud ruling family, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran went from lukewarm to unflappable, which enlarged the gulf separating the two neighbouring countries. Are the two countries on the threshold of a new era?

After 1979, and especially during annual Hajj contacts, Iranian pilgrims defamed the holy city of Makkah by organising political rallies there instead of adhering to prescribed religious ceremonies. What separated them was ideological — to uphold Sharia in carefully tailored norms versus revolutionary zeal — that, and this must be openly acknowledged, ensured catastrophic confrontations throughout the Muslim World. To be sure, ties improved drastically under presidents Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, two men with whom Saudi King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz could communicate with relative ease. The Saudi monarch’s repeated efforts to forge similar working relationships with president Mahmoud Ahmadinajad and, especially, Ali Khamenei — before the latter became the “Supreme Guide” — were less successful. Both Ahmadinajad and Khamenei went out of their ways to distort intricate contacts as the Kingdom shielded itself from Iranian interferences in Arab affairs. It was, consequently, safe to argue that Riyadh and Tehran stood at opposite ends of the spectrum, which played havoc in regional diplomatic ties that covered the gamut.

Notwithstanding sharp political differences, especially over Iraq and Syria, Saudi-Iranian officials adopted conciliatory tones with the election of Hassan Rouhani, who opened a new page in 2013, even if the Iranian president’s hands were somewhat tied by Khamenei. Riyadh congratulated Rouhani and expressed its desire to restart interrupted conversations, invited Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to visit, and patiently waited. Although the Rouhani/Zarif wagon made stops in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the UAE, neither chose to go to Saudi Arabia even if Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal extended a formal invitation.

A few months ago, Al Faisal declared: “Any time that [Zarif] sees fit to come, we are willing to receive him. Iran is a neighbour, we have relations with them and we will negotiate with them, we will talk with them,” he hammered. A few weeks ago, Deputy Foreign Minister Hussain Amir Abdollahian went to Riyadh, where he discussed the growing extremist threats throughout the region and, equally important, to set the parameters of an eventual meeting between Al Faisal and Zarif, which occurred in New York last Monday.

Since this was the first foreign minister-level encounter after the Rouhani election, observers were giddy of the change, with many perceiving a possible thaw in relations between the two rival powers.

Following the New York meeting, Zarif opined that the talks could indeed lead to improved relations, affirming: “Both my Saudi counterpart and I believe that this meeting will be the first page of a new chapter in our two countries’ relations.” The Iranian News Agency, Irna, reported that Al Faisal referred to the advances made by militants in Iraq and Syria and reportedly said: “We are aware of the importance and sensitivity of this crisis and the opportunity we have ahead of us. We believe that by using this precious opportunity and avoiding the mistakes of the past, we can deal with this crisis successfully.”

Nonetheless, and unlike thaws between any two bitter rivals, this one goes beyond the quest for regional influence and includes ideological schisms. Indeed, one could envisage potential coolings of the political and military struggles under way in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and, from Riyadh’s perspective, in neighbouring Bahrain and Yemen — all of which can only be positive. Still, how could the two sides narrow differences with Tehran, adamant that its interferences in Syria’s Civil War would persist? Naturally, from Iran’s standpoint, it was the Saudi kingdom that encouraged Sunni militants, although that was akin to putting the cart before the horse.

There was little doubt that Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran long supported competing factions in Arab countries, though what the Iranians seldom recognised was that they were mere intruders, because they were not Arabs. Yet, by insisting on their religious credentials, Iranian leaders added fuel to the sectarian fire, which was further enflamed by Syrian President Bashar Al Assad who, to his immense credit, fluctuated between sectarianism and cultural emancipation, but who failed to either gain the upper-hand or to persuade the vast majority of his population to back him.

Equally important was Saudi Arabia’s perceptions of what Iran fomented among Bahraini Shiites — as well as the sect’s minority in the Eastern Province — which carried grave consequences too. Iran’s determined quest for a nuclear capability, whose primary target is the kingdom, further fuelled suspicions. Can Saudi leaders now remain idle when Iran pursues such goals? Can they accuse Iran of being “an occupying power” in Syria and simply watch the destruction of an entire nation? Can they merely hope that Iran commits itself to lower tensions, end the quest for weapons of mass destruction, and embark on peaceful ties instead of standing up to unabashed hegemonic aspirations.

On Tuesday, President Rouhani congratulated King Abdullah on the country’s 84th National Day as he called for an expansion of cordial relations between the two Muslim countries in all arenas, hoping for success and prosperity. Time will tell whether the current thaw will have an impact on the coalition fighting extremists throughout the region though those who are salivating a putative Saudi pivot towards Tehran over Syria, or a Saudi accommodation with pro-Al Assad forces, are probably on banned chemical substances. The dramatic meeting between Al Faisal and Zarif on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly was a good omen. It was a meeting of minds not the making of a new alliance, with the ball now in Iran’s court, to work with moderate Arab states and distance itself from extremists.

Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is the author of the forthcoming Iffat Al Thunayan: An Arabian Queen, London: Sussex Academic Press, 2015.