The options are bad in Afghanistan. America could cut its losses (2,400 American dead, $1 trillion spent) and depart — but that would eventually lead to another Vietnam moment, with helicopters lifting off the roof of the US Embassy. Another approach would be to return to a robust Nato-led operation with 150,000 troops doing the actual fighting, which was the size of the force when I ran the Afghan war as Supreme Allied Commander in 2009-2013. But there is no appetite for that level of commitment on either side of the Atlantic and, frankly, the entire world wrestles with profound Afghan fatigue.
So we are left with the option that excites no one: A very modest increase of troop strength (probably 4,000 United States forces and an equal number of allied); a “conditions-based approach” without a specific withdrawal timeline; and a revitalised regional strategy that puts more pressure on Pakistan. Sounds a lot like what was proposed in 2013 as America drew down its military forces by 90 per cent and significantly cut foreign aid to Afghanistan. And yet the US President, Donald Trump, calls this a “new approach”. Will it work? What should America really be doing?
Let’s begin by clarifying America’s objectives, which are actually fairly simple.
First, the US wants to avoid a return to the essentially ungoverned state in Afghanistan constructed by the Taliban, which permitted the rise of Al Qaida and led to the 9/11 attacks. Given the presence of Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and the return of warlords in northern Afghanistan, the centrifugal pressures are rising. America needs to maintain a sort of minimalist governance structure to prevent a void and the creation of a base from which to strike for the US and its allies.
Second, America desires a modestly successful democratic government that can partner with Washington in dealing with geopolitical challenges in South Asia and Iran. The government of President Ashraf Gani, while far from perfect, gives America such a partner.
And third, over time, the mineral wealth (estimated at $1 trillion, including lithium and rare earths) may give Afghanistan a chance to become an important trading partner in the region and with the US.
The key elements of Trump’s strategy are broadly correct. A narrow focus on the “art of the possible” is critical, given the significant fatigue of both the US and the international security/donor community over the problem of corruption in Afghanistan. There is a slightly better-than-even chance that, with the programme outlined in the US president’s speech, America will achieve the basics: A weak but functional central government; reasonable border control (with frequent tactical failures); an economy that continues to grow at 3-5 per cent annually; control over the Taliban insurgency; basic security in 70 per cent of the country (in terms of population); and with the fighting being done by Afghan soldiers, not coalition troops.
Here’s how to get there, building on the ideas in the President Trump’s speech:
n Push Nato back into the game. Every US soldier or marine that heads to Afghanistan must be matched with a non-US coalition soldier. It will require US Secretary of Defence James Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to put serious pressure on the rest of the coalition to support doing so.
n Increase the strategic messaging. America’s public stance, going back to the administration of former president Barack Obama, has been “we can’t wait to get out of here”. Trump’s campaign rhetoric significantly increased the volume and intensity of that message. That has led directly to the resurgence of the Taliban. But building on Trump’s speech, Washington needs to seize on the “conditions-based, not timeline-based” message and hammer it home — both in Afghanistan and in other capitals.
n Get Russia back on side. After years of being mildly helpful in Afghanistan (because they hate the narcotics flow affecting their 1,000,000+ addicts), the Russians seem to be now playing both sides. America should make the point to Moscow that here is an opportunity, at relatively low cost, for the two nations to cooperate and that it is in their interest to do so — they don’t want an ungoverned space churning out drugs on their immediate southern flank.
n Use the India card to pressure Pakistan. The sticks are similar: Washington needs to tell Islamabad if it doesn’t help America solve the cross-border haven issues, then Washington will begin even closer cooperation with New Delhi. This will be a delicate dance, to say the least, but it’s worth trying.
n Increase the Afghan Special Forces. The 25,000-man force already does the vast majority of the actual fighting in Afghanistan. And with an additional 8,000 US and allied troops, America can put more emphasis on their training, organisation, planning, and deployment. The Taliban — in terms of actual fighters — are not a vast army; the Special Forces, if increased in size, can handle them. This will be a crucial military element if America is to be successful.
The new strategy is hardly new, and sometimes the best Plan B is to work harder and smarter at Plan A. Kudos to the president’s generals for landing him on a glide path that makes strategic and tactical sense, albeit an option that is merely the least-worst next move in the long-running great game of Afghanistan.
— Washington Post
James Stavridis is a retired four-star US Navy admiral and Nato supreme allied commander who serves today as the dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University
