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Apparently there are two Americas. Political pundits sometimes talk about “red” and “blue” America. Red America won with a vengeance — and those are probably exactly the right words — “with a vengeance”. This was the loudest possible message to the political establishment, or at least the Democratic part of that establishment, that red America is really angry and wants to “throw the bums out”.

Not only did they easily elect Donald Trump, who won most of the battleground states, but they also kept both the Senate and House of Representatives in Republican hands, very much limiting any checks on Trump’s power and ensuring at least one conservative appointee to the Supreme Court.

So, what does this mean? It will mean four years of uncertainty. Clinton was a much more predictable candidate, with years of a record on domestic and foreign policy. Trump has virtually no record on policy except for the few details he has offered as a candidate. Indeed, his identity as an outsider was essential to his win. He is very likely to pursue the type of anti-trade, anti-immigration economic policies that he based on his campaign on. He is also likely to pursue his plan to cut taxes, though traditional conservatives who hope to see a reduction in government spending as well may be disappointed.

Foreign policy will change drastically from that of Barack Obama’s presidency. Again, Trump had no foreign policy record until his campaign rhetoric began. Nonetheless, a few things are clear. He campaigned strongly on the basis of an anti-trade platform, promising to “entirely renegotiate Nafta” [North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement] or “terminate it”. He is very likely to seek to renegotiate other trade deals, too, but is likely to find it very difficult to persuade other trade partners to agree, so the long-term viability of these deals is in doubt. The Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal is essentially dead, but that was probably true regardless of who won.

In other areas of foreign policy, things are very uncertain — not just because Trump’s approach is uncertain, but also because we have less information than usual about his foreign policy advisers, although it is likely now that more Republicans with foreign policy experience will offer their services, if he wants them. He has repeatedly expressed admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin and is likely to reach out to Russia to try to improve relations and work more closely in Syria.

In general, Trump is likely to possess a totally different vision of the US role in the world than Obama and Clinton and even other Democratic and Republican presidents for the last few decades: A zero-sum world of winners and losers, a contractual approach towards alliances based on allies providing certain benefits to the United States (such as cash, more preferential trade deals or defence contracts) in exchange for the perceived privilege of American protection or support and no concerns about some regimes’ human rights treatment.

His approach to the Middle East will be based much more narrowly on fighting terrorism and possibly on oil interests. He has criticised the attack on Mosul to push out Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), saying that it should have been a surprise attack. America’s fight against terrorism will be less restrained by concerns about alienating allies and hurting civilians, and by efforts to undermine the terrorist narrative of the West versus Islam. Trump has said he would “bomb the expletive out of” Daesh and has said he would “take the oil” in reference to both Daesh and Iraq, though it is not clear how he would do this without a large-scale occupation that Americans are unlikely to support. The Iran nuclear deal is certainly in danger from US moves to undermine it, which would offer opportunities to the Iranian factions who opposed it as well.

Americans and the world should prepare for four years of major uncertainty. But Trump would probably like that — he has expressed the view that being unpredictable is useful in business and negotiating. We will find out if that applies to governing, too.

The election demonstrated how tightly divided the US is. While Trump won more than the minimum required 270 electoral votes (Trump’s tally was 290), in several states, with big electoral vote counts, the vote was very close, with Clinton winning a bigger share of the overall popular vote. While many media commentators talked about the rural-urban divide, with rural voters supporting Trump and urban voters supporting Clinton, that is far too simplistic. Many Trump and Clinton voters live in small cities, exurbs, suburbs, mixed together. They will have to try to find a way to get along, but this be will hard. Trump supporters will celebrate the election as an epic win, believing that they have won back their country. But many who voted for Clinton — possibly half or more of the final popular vote tally — will believe that they have suddenly lost their country, or wonder if the country as they knew and loved it ever existed in the first place.

America is in the midst of an identity crisis that will last long beyond this election. The fault lines lie in different places, including generational, class, education and racial gaps, but there is no single clear dividing line, because this is as much about beliefs and worldviews as it is about belonging to a specific social group. Do you think the 1950s in America were a golden age of economic opportunity, family stability, and social order; or were they a dangerously hypocritical era of repression of women and African-Americans that swept private and public problems under the rug? Do you think that European and Judeo-Christian culture and values lie at the heart of what makes America great; or do you think that secular values that people of any faith, race, ethnic group, and background can choose to subscribe to is what makes America unique? Do you see America’s changing demographics as a threat or an opportunity? Do you view the world as a zero-sum game in which the US must be strong, assertive, and place its interests above concerns about humanitarian values and alliances; or do you think that America’s interests and values are best served by primarily cooperative economic and political engagement with the world?

Americans’ answers to these and some other questions now help determine which side they’re on in an increasingly polarised identity war.

As president, Trump is likely to continue playing on these divides, as he did as a candidate. There probably will be initial rhetoric about healing America and being the president for all Americans, but those who voted against him are unlikely to believe that without a significant shift in his public attitudes and policies towards women, immigrants and ethnic/racial minorities. The reality that he won using his particular brand of rhetoric will also encourage other politicians, probably in both parties but certainly among Republicans, to adopt a similar approach to politics.

Trump’s supporters want him to break the Washington establishment, in the hope that something better will arise from the ashes. They will now find out if something better or worse comes out of this historic and unique election.

Kerry Boyd Anderson is a writer and political risk consultant.