The prized trophy is Iran

When the Iranian opposition disclosed details about Iran's nuclear programme in 2004, it thought it was contributing to undermining the position of the Islamic regime in Tehran.

Taking into account the jubilant mood of the neo-cons in Washington after the re-election of President George W. Bush, it was thought the disclosure of this secret would automatically lead to a US confrontation with Iran.

However, the whole plan proved counter-productive. Iran's position has never been as strong as it appears today and the West, which has until recently been threatening to further isolate Tehran, is offering it all sorts of incentives to freeze its nuclear enrichment. This includes security guarantees, ending its isolation and bringing it back from the cold.

Iranian leaders may have brilliantly manipulated the US difficulties in Iraq, the increasingly deteriorating popularity of Bush at home and their carefully knitted regional alliances to get the Americans to talk to them. But, Iran's points of strength are tactical as well as temporary. Hence, there is much more to the anticipated US-Iranian dialogue than the nuclear programme and the other regional differences.

Ever since it lost the Shah of Iran, who was once described by Henry Kissinger as "one of America's best, most important, and most loyal friends in the world", Washington has been trying to win Iran back or at least prevent it from forming alliances with competitors and rivals in the region and beyond.

Concerned

In the early days of the revolution, Washington was mainly concerned about a Communist infiltration into Iran. It suspected that the Soviets were trying to exploit the state of anarchy to bolster the position of their allies and ultimately install a puppet government in Tehran.

To prevent the Soviet Union from taking advantage of the situation and to prove its good intensions towards the new government, Washington sent a CIA officer to give a briefing in Tehran in which he presented satellite photographs and other evidence of Iraqi invasion preparations against the Islamic government of Iran.

The US decided also to increase the level of contact with Iran. Subsequently, president Jimmy Carter's national security adviser arrived in Algiers and held talks with Mehdi Bazargan, Iran's first post-revolution prime minister, and offered to recognise the new Iranian regime.

Indeed, Americans were to be disappointed soon by their initial readings of the Iranian events when their embassy was stormed by Iranian students and their diplomats were taken hostages.

For the past 27 years, US policy towards post-revolution Iran was that "if it was not possible to win Iran back then nobody else should win it. This pattern of thought is still as valid today as it ever was with one small different detail: China has replaced the Soviet Union as Washington's main rival in the Gulf region. It is widely believed that the key reason behind invading Iraq was to prevent China from establishing a foothold in the oil-rich Gulf region.

Since 1993, China recognised the limits of its oil reserve and the fast expansion of its economy. Subsequently, Beijing started looking for external resources to satisfy its oil requirements.

Attractive for China

The abundance, proximity and quality of Middle Eastern oil made it particularly attractive for China. Hence, in 1997, Beijing singed a deal to develop the Al Ahdab oil-field in central Iraq and in the following year it began negotiations for the Al Halfayah field. The two Iraqi deals were hindered, however, by the US invasion, forcing China to look for other resources.

Therefore, in September 2003, it approached Iran and signed a $70 billion deal to supply it with oil and gas for the next 30 years. This deal turned China into one of Iran's major clients and affected Chinese policy towards the Iranian nuclear programme.

Washington believes that an oil-for-security formula is developing between Iran and China; wherein the former would guarantee uninterrupted oil supplies at reasonable prices in exchange for Chinese nuclear technology and political support. This tacit alliance between Tehran and Beijing, Washington fears, could develop into a mutual defence pact.

If relations between the two countries reach this strategic level, it would complicate Washington's strategy not only in the Gulf region but world-wide. Washington decided, henceforth, to move quickly to stop China from getting closer to Iran at this particular juncture.

The result was an offer to bring Iran back from the cold and open a dialogue that would ultimately end in renewing the special relationship the US once enjoyed with the Shah. If this fails, Washington would not hesitate to use military action to stop Iran drifting eastward.

Dr Marwan Al Kabalan is a lecturer in media and international relations, Faculty of Political Science and Media, Damascus University, Syria.