On April 27, the Los Angeles Times, quoting an unidentified American official, reported that the US is ready for a deal with Iran to enrich uranium up to 5 per cent “if its government agrees to the unrestricted inspections, strict oversight and numerous safeguards that the United Nations has long demanded”.

According to the official, the administration believes that “Iran is unlikely to agree to a complete halt in enrichment” and, therefore, “an unconditional demand that it do so could make it impossible to reach a negotiated deal to stop the country’s nuclear programme, thereby avoiding a military attack”.

The report, later questioned for its accuracy by the State Department, has been widely misread in the US. Specifically, even if we were to assume that the quotes reflected the Obama administration’s true position, they do not suggest that the US has decided to allow Iran indefinite uranium enrichment at any percentage on its soil.

Rather, the quotes indicate that the US now hopes to stop Iran’s nuclear programme not by pressure only, but through negotiations as well. That is, the change in US’ policy is not strategic but tactical.

Tehran’s reading of the US’ true intention is particularly problematic. Its interpretation that the US will accept uranium enrichment to 5 per cent on Iranian soil indefinitely is inaccurate.  Tehran is also mistaken about its expectations that the US will lift many of the crippling sanctions. The US, we must add, is also misreading Iran’s readiness to accept key past US demands including unrestricted access to military sites and scientists.

Serious dispute

It is possible that both sides are intentionally misleading each other. Iran wants to avert war and relieve itself of some crippling sanctions by making certain compromises. It also needs time to reassess the endgame for its nuclear programme that has seriously harmed the economy and isolated Iran in the West. There is a serious dispute going on within the ruling factions as to the extent of compromises they should make and whether the US can be trusted on its recent softer talks.

The Obama administration has also reasons to reduce tension with Iran in the immediate future. Sanctions would still need more time to further harm the Iranian economy, and a flaring up of the dispute could potentially hurt Obama’s re-election bid. In that case, which could follow a failure of the upcoming negotiations in Iraq, tougher measures against Iran are expected and the war-mongers will have a louder voice then ever before.

Whatever its strategic plan, the US seems inclined towards an incremental approach that will make Iran halt its enrichment programme not immediately but at a near-future point. In the interim, it will impose acceptable conditions on Iran such as to halt enrichment beyond 5 per cent, freeze the spinning centrifuges, deactivate the Fardo plant, remove from Iran all enriched uranium beyond 5 per cent, accept intrusive and unrestricted inspections, and settle the transparency dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In return, the US is expected to offer Iran limited incentives such as providing fuel for the reactor in Tehran University and halting further sanctions including the planned EU sanctions on Iranian oil.  Obama may also use his executive power to relieve Iran’s Central Bank from sanctions, and the EU may persuade SWIFT to reinstate Iran. While Iran is expecting a bigger deal, even this much may not be offered given the overconfidence of Iran’s nemesis that sanctions are working.

Several deal-breakers could make the Baghdad negotiations fail. First is a possible call on Iran to give IAEA inspectors free access to its secret military production sites and to make its nuclear scientists available for interview by the IAEA. Iran has in the past insisted that the IAEA inspectors include western spies, and it strongly believes that its scientists were murdered because those spies revealed their identities to the assassins’ governments.

A second deal-breaker could be a mismatch between Tehran’s raised expectation for relief from sanctions and what it may actually be offered. Saeed Jalili, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, who is for the first time also directly representing the Supreme Leader, reportedly asked Catherine Ashton “a hundred times” that Iran expected major sanctions lifted. Given the factional dispute, the Iranian negotiators can only deliver the compromise expected by the US if they were to return home hands full.

Finally, Obama will also face powerful domestic and external obstacles to reach an agreement with Tehran. They will object to a deal with Iran that leaves it with any enrichment; they will most likely use the election campaign environment to portray Obama as weak and or appeasing to the mullahs in Tehran.

Hooshang Amirahmadi is a professor at Rutgers University and President of the American Iranian Council. Shahir Shahid Saless is a political analyst and freelance journalist.