Arab Gulf states were shocked by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (Jasta) in the United States. They were even more shocked when the Senate, by an overwhelming majority, overrode US President Barack Obama’s veto. This is the first time in his eight-year presidency that an Obama veto has been reversed by the US Congress. Some argue that this legislation will affect America’s relationships with the Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia.

However, the bill is not the cause but the symptom of an already deteriorating relationship. This situation extends beyond occasional friction and is more representative of an overall trend. This trend is a direct result of a negative image of Saudi Arabia in the American psyche and this trend is irreversible unless Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states take well-planned and long-term strategic measures to engage the American public and garner grass-roots support.

Signs of American estrangement have been showing for a while. Despite the fact that the US keeps stating that its alliances with Arab Gulf states still hold, facts tell a different story. During the first Gulf War, America rushed to rescue Kuwait following the Iraqi invasion. In contrast, today, the US is reluctant to take any active part in the war in Yemen, though Adel Al Jubeir, the Saudi Foreign Minister, has explained to the US that Iran is in Saudi Arabia’s backyard.

There are many factors leading to this disengagement. To start with, the US does not need Arab Gulf oil now the way it once did. In 2030, America is set to become a net exporter of oil due to the rise of shale oil.

The emergence of Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and its attacks on major western cities is another important factor. With Daesh’s rise, the military alliance with Saudi Arabia has become increasingly unpopular in the US. This, in spite of the fact that Daesh has conducted attacks on the Saudi mainland as well. Such a scenario has partially led America to look for new and alternative sources of energy and be less dependent on Middle East oil. This can be noticed in the presidential election campaign in the US. Various candidates have declared that energy independence is a national-interest issue. This is a departure from the doctrine of former president Jimmy Carter, who considered the protection of Arab Gulf oil, and not independence from it, as a national interest of America.

Large oil reserves

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, since the start of its relationship with the US, has relied on its strategic importance, given its large reserves of oil. It did not seek to create a bond with the US public at large or to build a grass-roots base that is sympathetic to Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states. Communication was confined to the US administration and highly-placed lobbyists.

Recently, Saudi Arabia launched a pro-Saudi lobby: Saudi American Public Relation Affairs Committee (Saprac).

However, Saprac is registered as a foreign lobby and has no domestic base. Saudi Arabia did not work on building indigenous support inside the US. A country like Armenia, on the other hand, makes a great deal of effort to create a bond between the diaspora and the country of origin in order to create a grass-roots base for it within the US.

The prospects of the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia are not very promising. This is due to the fact that the relationship has no depth and depends solely on the interests of the moment. The US relationship with Saudi Arabia has no roots in American soil.

Given that the geopolitical scene is changing, it is important to see how others have adapted.

Israel’s strategic value to the US emerged with the rise of the Soviet empire. With the looming threat of Soviet influence on the Arab world, Israel was promoted as a surrogate fortress to prevent Communism from reaching the oil fields in the Gulf. This was Tel Aviv’s strategic value to Washington.

However, by the time the Soviet empire collapsed, the Israelis had already worked on an alternative plan. They had worked on building a grass-roots base, with an indigenous lobby supporting Israel. They cemented a relationship that cannot be uprooted by the winds of strategic changes.

Today, Saudi Arabia will find it difficult to maintain its special relationship with the US unless it creates support domestically within America. In this respect, Saudi Arabia needs to engage the Arab-American community at large as there are very few Americans of Saudi origin.

This is a complex, long-term task that involves many intricacies, but it is the way to create an indigenous support base that will be resilient to geopolitical changes.

Dania Koleilat Khatib is the author of the book The Arab lobby and the US: factors for success and failure, by Routledge UK. She is a political adviser at Al Istishari Al Strategy for economic and future studies, Abu Dhabi.