February 22, 2008 marked the 50th anniversary of the Egyptian-Syrian Unity, which is viewed as the first unique model of unity in modern Arab history.

Egypt and Syria were merged into a united state, called the United Arab Republic under the leadership of the late president Jamal Abdul Nasser after a popular referendum in both countries and amid strong pan-Arab sentiment.

The union was widely welcomed by the Arab people because Nasser was seen as a popular hero figure throughout the Arab world following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the Suez War of 1956.

The Egypt-Syria unity, which was seen as an initial step towards creating a pan-Arab union, did not survive long and was dissolved after less than three years of its creation. The union was not a result of military invasion or geographic or political domination of an Arab state over the other.

It was not forced upon Syria through a military coup or political pressure by a dominant Syrian party either.

In fact, the union was not either forced by Cairo but came upon a request from then Syrian president Shukri Al Kuwatli with considerable popular support for the union with Nasser's Egypt. This raises a question: Why did this unique unity experiment fail and where did the defect lie?

Definitely, the problem did not lie with the unity's idea or its objectives but with the ways it handled its domestic, political, economic, security and social affairs.

Any human activity or experiment requires that its foundation, objectives and means be integrated. But, this was not the case with the Egypt-Syria unity.

The foundation was there, as the unity was created with popular consensus in both countries and with strong pressure and support from the Syrians in particular.

The failure of the unity experiment had nothing to do with the objective itself -mainly meant to unite Arab countries.

Inherent flaw

The defect lay with the means and ways that were used to achieve the unity and make it a successful one. The merger of two Arab countries that have no common border, and have differences in their social and economic infrastructure as well as in political experiences, was wrong. This mistake led to the growth of negative sentiments.

The most important thing is that Syria - the Northern Region of the united republic, was under the authority of Egyptian Ruler Marshal Abdul Hakim Amer.

Amer's priorities and wrong ways of handling security and political issues were negative elements that encouraged the separation later. The wrong practices and improper means of handling the Northern Region's affairs led to a negative atmosphere and the emergence of separatists who carried out a military coup in Syria that led to the separation in 1961.

This was a tough lesson for Nasser. However, he refused to use military force to keep the unity and preferred to smoothly withdraw from it.

Although the use of military force was justified legally and militarily, he preferred the unity of Syria over the union.

He realised that any military interference against the separatists would lead to a civil war in Syria and a bloody Syrian-Egyptian struggle.

Nasser, the historic Arab leader, chose the political defeat of an important unification project and his personal defeat to preserve the unity of another Arab country and prevent a civil war and bloodshed even if this was for a noble Arab cause.

Of course, the separation did not happen due to domestic factors and the negatives of the experiment, but with the support of great international powers, which were divided between the Eastern and Western blocs. These powers agreed to fight the United Arab Republic for different reasons.

Both the communist and capitalist camps (Moscow and Washington) were against this unity, even though the Soviet Union and the United States were themselves united entities with histories of fighting rebels and separatists.

Pain of separation

Nasser benefitted a lot from the unity experience, and this is why a few years after the separation he refused to repeat this experience without the necessary preparations.

Neither his nationalist sentiment, nor his personal political interest made him approve unity between Egypt, Syria and Iraq in 1963 after the Al Baath party assumed power in Syria.

Nasser had many deep intellectual and political discussions with the leaders of Syrian and Iraq, in which he stressed the importance of providing the necessary factors for unity before beginning to achieve it.

This is the stand he took when he turned down a merger with the governments of Libya and Sudan in 1969, despite the many common factors between the three countries. Nasser only accepted the announcement of the Tripoli Charter, which stipulated many stages before reaching complete unity.

However, Nasser passed away on September 28, 1970, on the ninth anniversary of the separation, which took place on the same day in 1961, and after exerting tremendous efforts to put an end to the Jordanian-Palestinian conflict and maintaining Arab solidarity.

Although half a century has passed since this experience, we still look back at it, especially when the Arab current status not only suffers from conflicting governments, but from disintegration of national unity and regional and international attempts to mark the borders between Arab countries with blood.

The 1950s were years of national liberation and calls for unity between Arab nations, but the current stage is that of foreign domination and inter-Arab conflict, which only serves the interests of foreign greed.

The 1961 separation was a political crime against the Arab nation and its future and a factor that contributed to the 1967 defeat, yet it was caused by errant methods, despite the proper ideology and targets.

This makes us wonder. What would the situation be like now, when methods, ideologies and targets are defective? And, what will be a magnitude of such a crime when the establishment are not the only partly at fault, but visions and leaderships as well?

Sobhi Ghandour is the director of the Arab Dialogue Center in Washington.