Leaders from 28 countries, with a collective population of around one billion, are preparing for a landmark two-day Nato summit, starting today in Poland, that will map the way ahead for the military alliance. Coming hot on the heels of the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote, the member states will seek to underline the unity of the western alliance in the face of an emboldened Russia and a wider suite of security challenges.
While the summit has a broad focus, which includes Afghanistan and the Middle East, top of the agenda is Russia. Following Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, and the wider destabilisation of Ukraine, Nato’s relationship with Russia is at one of its lowest points since the end of the Cold War around a quarter of a century ago.
Biennial summits of the military alliance can become key moments in its evolution and decision-making. For instance, the first post-Cold War summit of the military alliance was held in London in 1990 and included measures for enhancing relations with Central and European countries — many of which have subsequently become Nato members.
Some 26 years later, there is genuine alarm in certain quarters about the West’s capability to respond to what is perceived as a significantly enhanced Russian security threat. Earlier this year, for instance, a Rand Corporation report concluded that without a Nato force of seven brigades in the Baltic states, a Russian force could potentially reach Riga (the capital of Latvia) and Tallinn (the capital of Estonia) within two-and-a-half days, which would leave Nato facing a very difficult predicament of military escalation, or acceptance of the new status quo.
While Nato disagrees with the conclusions of the Rand study, General Sir Richard Shirreff, who was deputy supreme Allied commander Europe from 2011-14 (the highest commanding officer in Nato), has also warned of the possibility of a war between Russia and Nato. In his assessment, this nightmare scenario could be triggered by a decision by Moscow to invade one or more of the Baltic states.
Whereas Russia is estimated to have increased defence spending by some 80 per cent between 2008 and 2014, the corresponding figure for Nato countries collectively was a decrease of around 20 per cent, although there have been small increases in defence spendings since then in some European Nato states and Canada. This burden-sharing issue is a particular sore spot for the United States, which accounts for around two-thirds of total Nato defence spending, and US President Barack Obama will urge allies at the summit to meet guidelines of 2 per cent of gross domestic product expenditure upon defence, which most are failing on right now.
In the face of an emboldened Russia, a number of specific measures will be announced in Warsaw. The most eye-catching of these is the enhancement of Nato forces in the eastern geography of the alliance with four battalions, led by the United Kingdom, US, Germany and Canada, to be rotated in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
This will be buttressed by measures to boost defence capabilities and the resilience of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova through a range of political and practical support. Moreover, Nato will also continue to work closely with Finland, Sweden and Georgia, including working to enhance security in the strategically important Baltic Sea and Black Sea areas.
Security challenges
In the wake of the UK’s Brexit vote last month, that will probably see the nation leaving the European Union (EU), Nato members will be keen to emphasise the unity of the western alliance, especially in the face of what is seen as Moscow’s revanchism. Nato has cooperated with the EU on a range of security challenges for many years, including currently in the Aegean Sea to help tackle the migrant and refugee crisis. At the summit, Nato intends to unveil measures demonstrating an even higher level of reciprocal cooperation with Brussels in areas like hybrid and cyberthreats and increasing maritime security.
Outside Europe, the future of the military alliance’s operations beyond its borders is also very much on the agenda. The rationale is that, especially in the face of turmoil across the Middle East and North Africa, Nato needs to continue to project security and stability outside its member countries.
For instance, the alliance is looking at what direct support it could potentially provide to the more than 60 country-strong Global Coalition to Counter Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), including deployment of AWACs surveillance aircraft in Iraq and Syria. Outside the Middle East, the Libyan unity government has also requested for Nato’s help in tackling Daesh in that country.
The issue of Nato assuming a new role in the fight against Daesh is one which the presumptive Republican presidential nominee in the US, Donald Trump, who had previously described Nato as “obsolete”, appears to strongly support. He recently asserted that the alliance “is going to have to be either readjusted to take care of terrorism or we’re going to have to set up a new coalition, a new group of countries to handle terrorism because it is out of control”.
In Afghanistan, meanwhile, agreement is expected soon to sustain Nato’s presence through 2020 in the face of a Taliban menace that now controls more territory in the country than at any time since the toppling of the regime led by Mullah Omar in 2001 by US-led forces. Under President Ashraf Gani, Nato support is primarily directed towards training, advising and assisting the approximately 350,000-strong Afghan police and military forces, which may otherwise disintegrate.
Taken overall, Nato will use the summit to reconfigure its response to Russian actions in Ukraine; double down on cooperation with the EU; and also agree to a new framework of activity beyond its borders, including potentially in tackling Daesh. This will give the military alliance important new strategic direction for the next five to 10 years in a rapidly changing international security environment.
Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE IDEAS (the Centre International Affairs, Diplomacy and Strategy) at the London School of Economics.
