Special French Commando forces have recently arrived in Benghazi, Libya, to support local efforts in the fight against the expanding power of Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) in the oil-rich North African country. Given the growing concerns in western capitals about Daesh’s attempts to establish a foothold merely 300km off the European coasts and the possibility of taking over the major oil fields in the country, the French move was widely expected. Daesh has taken advantage of the state of anarchy — which prevailed after the 2012 legislative elections, the first to be held in the country following the toppling of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 — to try to establish strong presence in Libya. In fact, the inability of Libyan political and military factions to agree on a post-Gaddafi power and wealth-sharing formula contributed to Daesh growing power.
The adoption of the Political Isolation Law, which bans Gaddafi-era officials from holding public office, was the key reason behind the de facto partition of the country and the ensuing state of anarchy. The law was passed in May 2013, following pressure from the armed militias, which played key role in toppling Gaddafi. Eventually, recriminations and mistrust prevailed; armed groups feared that the political strata would attempt to “steal” their “sacrifices”, while politicians feared that the armed groups will try to impose their will at gunpoint. The Political Isolation Law was a watershed development in the Libyan conflict, ultimately leading to a greater sense of solidarity among the political groups who stood to lose from it, and the subsequent disintegration of the political alliance, which had previously been formed in opposition to Gaddafi. The country was hence divided between East and West; with each part claiming legitimacy and having its own parliament, government and armed forces.
Many other factors coalesced to create a conducive environment for Daesh to prosper; including the failure of the UN meditation to achieve national reconciliation and build a strong state capable of exercising its full authority all over Libyan territory; public disenchantment with the increasingly deteriorating economic conditions and the lack of security; and the disunity on the international level which was reflected in the Libyan political scene on the form of war by proxy. Amid this anarchy, Daesh emerged. In February 2015, a radical armed group which had earlier pledged loyalty to Daesh’s leader, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, broadcast video footage showing the execution of 21 Egyptian Copts who had been working in Libya. It was a shocking and ugly act of zealot violence in a country that has never seen such images before. Condemned worldwide, the incident drew attention to the presence of Daesh in Libya. Previously it was thought that the presence of extremist groups was limited to the militants of the city of Derna. The Daesh-affiliated militants subsequently seized the key coastal city of Sirte.
In light of the escalating US-led campaign in Syria and Iraq, the possibility of Daesh militants regrouping in Libya — particularly those of North African descent — has been touted recently as an increasingly likely prospect. In many ways, Libya provides an ideal environment for the growing of Daesh’s power: vast territories, the lack of a central authority, and the presence of large oil wealth.
Oil resources
A recent flurry of reports in the Western media have appeared; reflecting the rising fear in western capitals about the expansion of Daesh across the Libyan coast and over the country’s oilfields and installations at the Al Sidra and Ras Lanouf ports. If allowed to fall into Daesh’s hands, they would double the estimated value of Libyan oil resources which the group is presently believed to control. Daesh’s influence in Syria and Iraq would then look pale in comparison with what it could achieve once it seizes Libyan oil resources.
Whatever form the western military intervention will take to prevent Daesh from establishing strong presence in Libya, it would need to be justified on legal and political grounds. This explains the immense pressure which western officials placed on the Libyan factions to agree to the Sukhairat Peace Agreement. Yet, in light of the slow progress in the fight against Daesh in Syria and Iraq, the prospect of the Libya campaign looks quite unpromising. Other experiences have shown that combatting terrorism in the midst of chaos is a waste of time and efforts. Without domestic harmony, Libyans will not be able to challenge Daesh. Only if presented with a promising alternative will the people of Libya join the fight and nihilist destroy the forces of extremism. Otherwise Libya could turn into another failed Arab state and a haven for extremist groups such as Daesh.
Dr Marwan Kabalan is a Syrian academic and writer.
