Iran nuclear talks: Will there be a compromise?

With a self-imposed March 31 deadline to agree on the fundamental structure of a final nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France plus Germany) looming, activities and talks in Geneva have been ramped up.

Between February 20 and February 23, intensive talks at different levels, including discussions between US Secretary of State John Kerry and his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, were conducted in earnest.

At the conclusion of this round of negotiations, both Kerry and Zarif expressed progress but said more work must be done.

Several key issues remain contested, including the number of operative centrifuges for uranium enrichment, the limit of enriched uranium’s stockpile to extend Iran’s “break-out” period, which refers to the duration in which Iran could produce a nuclear bomb, demanded by the US to be at least one year, and the length of strict controls over and oversight of Iran’s nuclear programme. Reportedly, a 10-year regime is now being discussed.

Regardless of the finer details, an agreement on these issues would in Iran be celebrated as a victory against the West, in particular the United States, which finally conceded to Iran the right to enrich uranium. Tehran has clamoured for this issue for more than a decade.

Nevertheless, the pace at which sanctions should be lifted appears to be the stumbling block at this point.

This month, Iran’s Supreme Leader, who according to the country’s constitution has the last word regarding all three branches of government, has taken contradictory stances with regard to current developments. His statements merit deeper observation.

In a February 8 statement, in stark contrast to his earlier stance of consistent pessimism towards the outcome of the talks, he said, “Negotiation means that the two sides should try to reach a common point.”

This statement and others, such as, “I consent to an agreement that is workable”, were perhaps the first time that Iran’s leader clearly elaborated on his willingness to compromise on the nuclear issue.

These statements raised hopes among Iran experts that the US-Iran conflict over Tehran’s nuclear programme was nearing resolution.

However, 10 days later, Iran’s leader reverted to his pessimism. On February 18, in a speech delivered in a different tone, he remarked, “I believe, even if the nuclear issue goes on according to what is dictated by them” — meaning the West led by the US — “the sanctions will not be lifted, as they [the West] are opposed to the principle of the Islamic Revolution”.

Two theories may explain these differing positions.

The first is that his comments are part and parcel of standard negotiating tactics.

With uncharacteristic verve, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei may be intentionally conveying the message to both Iranians and foreigners that Iran is prepared to settle the dispute. He intends to disarm those inside and outside of Iran who accuse him of an adopting an obstinate and uncooperative approach.

In his February 8 speech, he further noted that Iran has acted reasonably during the course of negotiations and has refrained from a stubborn, irreconcilable position.

He said, “The Iranian side has done whatever it could to reach an agreement... It has stopped developing enrichment machines... and has stopped producing 20 per cent uranium, which is a great feat... because negotiations required it.”

Iranians, he remarked, “have closed the Arak Factory... [and] have closed — for now — Fordo [the underground uranium enrichment facility], which is one of the best innovations made by our domestic forces”.

Some observers in Tehran maintain that this approach is aimed at isolating US hardliners and Israel from the other five world powers that are in negotiations with Iran, especially in light of Netanyahu’s imminent March 3 speech before the US Congress.

The second theory maintains that Khamenei’s February 18 statements are aligned with his long-standing worldview that sees the ultimate goal of US foreign policy as being regime change. This theory signals a manifestation of a deeper problem, and explains that Khamenei is likely preparing the Iranian public for bad news: the failure of talks.

In negotiations, Iran insists on the removal of all sanctions at once, something the US is fiercely opposed to.

Before Kerry arrived in Geneva on Sunday, Zarif told Iranian state media that “some western countries, the United States in particular, see sanctions as an asset, a lever to exert pressure on Iran. As long as this thinking persists, it will be very hard, difficult, to reach a settlement”.

Some, particularly in the US Congress, may argue that Iran has no choice but to surrender. Otherwise, under pressure from sanctions and the drop in oil prices, Iran’s economy may head towards collapse.

But the flaw with this argument is its assumption that political decision makers always make their choices solely based on facts and logical calculations.

The reality is, however, that perceptions and misperceptions of decision makers heavily influence their decisions.

What if, for example, Khamenei, right or wrong, is convinced that Iran, with the support of its people, is capable of withstanding US pressure? His relentless advocacy of the “resistance economy” makes this explanation quite plausible. What if the Iranian leadership, as the Revolutionary Guards argue, believes that Iran “has been able to create the required crack on the body of sanctions” and that “it does not appear that the created crack is repairable and it is highly unlikely, if not impossible, to return to the past situation”?

Furthermore, what if the Iranian leadership perceives that regional conditions, and the fact that the US needs Iran’s cooperation in the war against extremists, are in its favour and that it can exploit the opportunity to impose its demands on the other side? What if they believe that if no deal is struck with Iran, Tehran will have the upper hand by expanding its nuclear programme further, and that the US would not be in a position to enter a third costly war? Consider this after their experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in the former US defence secretary Leon Panetta’s words, where he said that a third war would “consume the Middle East in a confrontation and a conflict that we would regret”.

A congressional expert once told this author that if Obama has legitimate assurances that Iran would not develop nuclear arms, he would waive the most damaging sanctions, including easing sanctions on oil exports (if not totally removing them) and those crippling Iran’s banking system.

With such high stakes, will the US and Iran reach a historic compromise? The answer will appear as the March 31 deadline approaches.

Shahir ShahidSaless is a political analyst and freelance journalist writing primarily about Iranian domestic and foreign affairs. He is also the co-author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, published in May 2014. He lives in Canada.