The US and UK are very different countries, but the forces behind the UK vote to leave the EU (Brexit) and the rise of Donald Trump to be the Republican nominee for the US presidency have significant similarities. Both countries are experiencing an identity crisis that tends to divide people into two camps, though the dividing lines are sometimes fuzzy.
One group — which wanted the UK to stay in the EU and which opposes Trump in the US — demographically tends to be younger, better educated, and more urban or suburban. It tends to embrace the economic and social processes of globalisation, or at least sees it as an inevitable trend that one should manage rather than resist. This group enjoys or at least accepts diversity at home, including immigration and engagement abroad. Its identities can be complex, but are less nationalistic (though not necessarily unpatriotic) and tend to be a mix of more global and local identities. This group is comfortable with the major social developments of recent decades, particularly the roles of women and attitudes toward homosexuality and gender issues. They tended to have a generally positive view of the future, at least before Brexit and Trump.
The other group — which voted for the UK to leave the EU and supports Trump in the US — demographically tends to be older, less educated, and rural or living in smaller cities and towns. This group views globalisation and the economic transformations of recent decades as threatening; some have indeed lost out to free trade and technology, while others are fine economically but fear the social processes of globalisation. They view growing demographic diversity at home as threatening, and hostility toward immigration has been the defining trait of both the Leave campaign in the UK and the Trump campaign in the US.
They tend to be suspicious of engagement abroad and identify strongly with a national identity (mostly English in the UK, though sometimes British, and a form of hyper-patriotism in the US). This group is often concerned about shifts in women’s roles and acceptance of homosexuality (more so in the US than the UK) and wants to defend what they view as traditional social norms and values. (Interestingly, while Trump is disdainful of women’s rights, he has tried to woo the gay community, but many of his followers oppose gay rights.)
Unstoppable trend
A key underlying factor driving the differences between these two groups is their attitudes toward change. The pro-EU/anti-Trump group is comfortable with change. Most of its members view economic and social change as positive — or at least as an unstoppable trend, thinking that one is better off getting on board the train of change rather than standing foolishly in its way. Unsurprisingly, this group includes demographics that are more likely to be adaptable — to have the youth, education, means and attitude to cope successfully with change.
The anti-EU/pro-Trump group angrily rejects change. This group wants to return to an idealised past — defined vaguely but to which they have a strong emotional attachment — in which England was great and America was great. There is a reason why the Leave campaign’s slogan “take back our country” and Trump’s slogan “make America great again” resonate so strongly — they hold out the promise that you can successfully roll back globalisation, immigration, social change and economic transformation. Indeed, they suggest that going “back” to something better is not only possible but easy, as long as leaders “tell it like it is” and voters turn out. Unsurprisingly, this group consists of people who are less likely to be adaptable — who lack the energy, inclination, means or positive vision of the future needed to embrace change.
The demographic divide between older and younger generations is one key factor behind this division between those who are comfortable with recent change and those who reject it. The US and UK have ageing populations, which increasingly provides an electoral advantage to older generations, further enhanced by their tendency to turn out to vote in greater numbers relative to younger people.
This demographic reality played an essential role in Brexit and is a key factor in the US elections. In the UK, polls and regional voting results make it clear that older generations — over 50 and especially over 65 years old — voted strongly to Leave the EU, while younger people — under 50 and especially under 25 years old — voted strongly to Remain.
In the aftermath of the vote, young people in the UK, especially in London, have expressed widespread outrage and a sense that older generations, who will not live long enough to experience the long-term consequences of Brexit, have stolen their future. As Laila Woozeer, a young relative of mine living in London, wrote on her blog, “It just feels like a slap in the face. A cold, isolating slap in the face to the young, to the mobile, to the non-whites.”
The generational divide in the US is more complex but still exists. Multiple recent polls by different sources show voters under 50 years old choosing Hillary Clinton over Trump. While the polls disagree somewhat on voters over 50 years old, it is clear that older voters, especially over 65 years old, are more likely than younger voters to support Trump.
Of course, in both countries, there are other divides — particularly those based on regional, income and educational differences. There is also a strong anti-establishment trend. But why do both countries have a clear political divide between older and younger generations? It comes down primarily to differences in identity and attitudes toward change.
Younger generations, especially in the UK and to some degree in the US, tend to have a more global identity, existing alongside with their local and national identities. Many young Brits feel European as well as English/Scottish/Welsh/Irish. Older Brits are far less likely to relate to a European identity. In the US, Trump recently blasted “a leadership class that worships globalism over Americanism.” This also matters in continental Europe, where Marine Le Pen, of France’s National Front (FN), has said the new political divide is between “globalists” and “patriots”.
Attitudes toward change are also essential. Younger generations mostly embrace social changes and are better able to adapt to economic change. Older generations often find this bewildering or even threatening and long for an idealised past in which their communities were more homogenous, gender roles were clearly defined, and economics supposedly worked better. The Leave campaign and Trump campaign resonate with older voters partly because they appeal to this sentiment. The problem is that younger people do not share that longing for the past. Many younger people see the flaws in the past, such as racism, few opportunities for women and a feeling that society’s past emphasis on a “stiff upper lip” covered up many crimes.
The generational divide in politics is unfortunate. On an individual level, older family members are often generous and loving toward their children and grandchildren, and younger family members often feel deep love and gratitude toward their elders. Older generations offer a vast store of knowledge and a useful perspective on life and modern history. They often sincerely believe that they are voting in ways that will help ensure a better future for their descendants. But perhaps older leaders and voters should consider what type of a future the young want, before deciding it for them.
Kerry Boyd Anderson is a writer and political risk consultant.
