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Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban gives his first international press conference on April 10, 2018 at the parliament building in Budapest, two days after his Fidesz party won the general elections. Image Credit: AFP

There is a right power struggle going on at the moment between Austria, Hungary and the European Union (EU). That’s in addition to the power struggle between Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and the EU — and the one between the Hungarian prime minister and billionaire George Soros.

But the power struggle between Vienna, Budapest and Brussels has led to a lawsuit, filed about a month ago to the European Court of Justice against the EU’s approval of a nuclear power plant in Orban’s backyard.

Austria, you see, is vehemently opposed to nuclear power not just in the Alps but anywhere on the continent of Europe. In early March, the European Commission — the cabinet-like level at the EU — said it was OK for the Orban government to borrow €10 billion (Dh45.3 billion) from Russia to pay for a critical expansion of the Paks nuclear plant just outside the Hungarian capital. The plant’s four nuclear reactors are of Soviet-era design — remember Chernobyl? — and account for 50 per cent of the nation’s power-generating capacity, supplying about 40 per cent of Hungarian’s everyday electricity needs. And as far as Austria is concerned, Paks is too big already and has a rather chequered history, with serious incidents in 2003, 2009 and 2016. As far as Hungary is concerned, the plant is too critical not to be upgraded — and the Russian loan would allow that to happen.

The Austrian energy sustainability minister, Elisabeth Kostinger, likens her nation’s plight in stopping the Hungarian expansion as a “David versus Goliath” struggle, adding that “nuclear energy must have no place in Europe”. And to affirm the Austrian appeal to the ECJ, Kostinger added: “We will not budge one centimetre from this position” — which made for a very quotable soundbite for Austrian broadcasters.

As far as Brussels is concerned, the €10 billion doesn’t break EU rules on state aid. Austria is disputing this, Kostinger confirms.

In its decision, the Commission adjudged that the project met EU rules on state aid, and again Austria disputes this. Vienna is also concerned that the plan to build two new reactors at the Paks site, which was agreed between Hungary and Russia in 2014, smacks of cronyism between Orban and his close Kremlin ally, Russian President Vladimir Putin. Both leaders are now basking in re-election victories, both have a decidedly different view of pan-Europeanism, and both see the benefit of exploring common ties and policies between Budapest and Moscow. That expansion work at Paks, for what’s worth, will be carried out by Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear agency — and what it’s worth is €12 billion, with Budapest coughing up the extra €2 billion up front.

For its part, during campaigning before last Sunday’s Hungarian general election, opposition parties criticised the awarding of the contract to Rosatom without holding an open tender. In 2015, the government used its parliamentary majority to keep the details of the deal secret for 30 years, something Orban’s Fidesz party said was necessary for “national security reasons”. Critics has seized on that phrase as code for concealing corruption.

Since the late 1970s, Austria has been fiercely anti-nuclear, starting with an unprecedented vote by its population that prevented the country’s only plant from providing a watt of power, arguing that atomic energy was unsustainable and high-risk. And while there is now a right-wing coalition in power in Vienna, it too remains still steadfastly opposed to atomic power.

After Sunday’s election, Orban could care little what his domestic critics think — nor those in neighbouring Austria, or in Brussels either. Fidesz secured more than 49 per cent of the votes cast, with some 2.6 million voting for the party and its Christian Democratic allies — roughly the same as the seven largest opposition parties combined. And now, it has a two-thirds majority in parliament, giving Orban an even freer hand than before to pursue even more authoritarian policies that those that have already rankled the EU and the Commission. So far, has reined in Hungary’s free media, imposed curbs on judges and has defied Brussels by refusing to toe the line when it comes to accepting refugees from Syria, Iraq and crisis-torn countries of North Africa. In his own words, Orban sees it as his mission to protect the Christian make-up of Europe from Muslim interlopers. His country has been deemed to be in contravention of the EU’s quota policy for those refugees, and during the campaign he suggested his new government would try to amend its constitution to stop those EU quotas.

His party is proposing a “stop Soros” law — a reference to billionaire financial and social-change proponent George Soros, a fellow Hungarian — that would allow the government to impose financial and other penalties on non-governmental organisations that assist asylum seekers and refugees.

During the Cold War, while Soviet know-how was being used to build that Paks power plant, an Iron Curtain kept Hungary forcibly removed from western Europe. Now, over the past three years, Orban has defied EU policies and built a razor-wire and steel barrier to keep those refugees from entering his country. His measures also include two “transit zones” at the Serbian border, barred to the news media, where those seeking refuge must pass. Only a single refugee can be processed at the two locations each working day — and that is just the start of a cumbersome process meant to make Hungary as unwelcoming as possible.

The next big power struggle Brussels will face is in figuring out exactly how to deal with a resurgent Orban and a Hungary that is determined to defy EU principles and policies. The nuclear option, as far as the EU is concerned, is to suspend Hungary, and as with all nuclear options, there’s no telling exactly where the fallout will be.

Most likely, the EU will continue to revert to its standard de facto policy process — do nothing for long enough until the problem goes away. In this case, that’s unlikely to happen for quite a while. Orban is just getting started, and something is going to give sooner, rather than later.