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Earlier this month, the Camp David presidential retreat hosted a key US-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit. Holding the summit was not as easy as US President Barack Obama had expected.

Four out of the six Gulf leaders did not attend. Although Washington and Riyadh had earlier announced that King Salman Bin Abdul Aziz would visit Washington and meet Obama before the Camp David summit, the Saudi monarch did not show up. He sent, instead, Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Nayef.

The denial by Saudi Arabia that the King’s absence implied displeasure with US policies did not conceal the growing gap of trust between the two long-standing allies.

The Iran nuclear agreement, expected to be concluded by the end of next month, and the subsequent US-Iran rapprochement, is not the only source of concern for the Arab Gulf states. Iran’s attempts to fill the vacuum resulting from the dwindling US influence in the Middle East is ringing alarm bells throughout the Arab Mashreq.

At Camp David, reflecting this anxiety, GCC leaders requested security guarantees to keep Iran at bay, should sanctions be lifted as a result of the anticipated nuclear agreement.

Iran has already started to take advantage of the positive atmosphere surrounding the talks over its nuclear programme by arming itself with more advanced weapons. Russia has already agreed to resume a deal to deliver S-300 surface-to-air defence systems to Iran if the UN decides to lift its ban on arms sales to Tehran.

Indeed, Obama has agreed to sell the GCC countries more advanced defence systems; but refused to sign a mutual defence treaty with the Arab Gulf states fearing that that would alienate Iran.

Insensitive

“I want to be very clear,” Obama stated following the two-day summit, “the purpose of security cooperation is not to perpetuate any long-term confrontation with Iran or even to marginalise Iran.” The most the US is thinking of is to grant the Arab Gulf states the status of a “non-Nato allies”, which allows them to obtain assistance and training only given to Nato members, but does not stretch to mutual defence.

Clearly, during the summit, Obama was insensitive to Arab Gulf states’ concerns. His key motive for holding the summit was to secure the backing of the GCC for a possible agreement with Iran next month, or to at least stave off strong opposition from them.

Although the summit’s final statement achieved some of what the Obama administration wanted — the Gulf states agreed that “a comprehensive, verifiable deal” was in their security interests — Obama was unable to secure unconditional Gulf backing for the proposed agreement, nor even for the Lausanne framework agreement.

Obama admitted as much when at the end of the summit he said that he discussed the details of the potential Iran nuclear deal with Arab Gulf leaders, but did not ask them to sign up to it. According to Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir, it was too early to know if the final agreement with Iran would be acceptable.

Iran's regional ambitions

It has become absolutely clear that Obama’s main concern is to seal a nuclear deal with Iran that would eventually turn it into a full partner in the war against Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant).

To this end, the US seems willing to overlook, even if just some of the time, Iran’s destructive regional policies. Ironically, the Obama administration seeks the help of the Arab Gulf states to sell this policy to a sceptical Congress.

On top of that, Obama wants the Arab Gulf states to refrain from pursuing policies that may upset Iran; even if Tehran is wreaking havoc across the region and undermining the very national security of the Arab Gulf states.

In Syria, Obama opposes any escalation against the regime of Bashar Al Assad. In Yemen, it is no secret that Obama was not very enthusiastic about the Saudi-led military intervention to stop the Iran-backed Al Houthi militia from taking over the entire country.

It is well-known that the US pressed for the five-day ceasefire that the Saudi-led Arab alliance announced from May 12-18 in Yemen. The final statement of the Camp David summit called for the perpetuation of the ceasefire and a shift from military operations to a political process.

The US is also lobbying in favour of including Iran in the search for political solution in Yemen; and to the dismay of the Arab Gulf states sees Tehran as part of the solution, not part of the problem, in Yemen.

All these policies must have increased the fears of the Arab Gulf states over the true intentions of their presumably biggest ally. It is also because of these very policies that the GCC countries must from now on rely on their own capabilities to protect themselves and face Iran’s hegemonic ambitions.

Dr Marwan Kabalan is a Syrian academic and writer.