The European Union (EU) was founded on the guarantees and stability of the bipolar world order of the Cold War era. Today, the bloc is faced with the reality that the one-polar world configuration, which resulted from the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the implosion of the Soviet Union, is steadily moving in a multilateral management, multi-polar direction. Preparing for and adjusting to the realities of a modified inter-dependent global political economy, whose centre of gravity will eventually also evolve from its previous, uncontested leadership, is a challenge for the EU.
No doubt, the EU has come of age, actively trying to assert itself with a defined mission and growing self-esteem around the globe.
But a globally accredited trade and economic heavyweight representing more than 500 million citizens still needs to make a phone call to the White House when conflicts threaten to get out of control in its own backyard. That is not reassuring.
The security conundrum is not new. Due to the armed conflicts of the 1990s in the EU neighbouring Western Balkans — dreadful events where the EU was hamstrung by its limits on military action — there was an urgent need for a more independent military, but it failed to gain momentum. That is the past. The United States today insists that Europe must stand on its own feet and take a fair share in the burdens related to collective, transatlantic, security. Living up to the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration of Nato — committing to increased defence spending and investing in military capability — would be a start.
It is imperative to return to the geopolitical and geostrategic realities of the 1950s to understand Europe’s security over-reliance on the US.
Launching an integration project in the post-Second World War period meant that Western Europe had no other option than to work within the framework set by American sponsorship and the boundaries drawn by Soviet Communism, which had created a sharp US-Soviet confrontation, with a deterrent nuclear arms race.
Shielded by the large presence of US forces and the guarantees of the collective security umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato), the member-states of the then European Economic Community (EEC) did not appear to be keen to go further in their collective self-defence than a dormant Western European Union (WEU).
When the 1955 Warsaw Pact with Soviet satellite states ceased to exist as a collective military counter alliance in 1991, observers felt that the US-backed Nato (created in 1949) had accomplished its mission of keeping the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in.
The West had its Cold War victory, and Nato — which considers an armed attack on one of its members as an attack on all — could say it had been done without firing a single shot.
In the following years, weapons of mass destruction and global terror emerged as new threats, while Nato redefined its role as a western security alliance. New EU members from Central and Eastern Europe joined its fold and the alliance provided first-ever support in out-of-area conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.
In the meantime, the EU cautiously adopted provisions for a common security and defence policy, which became backed by a small rapid deployable reaction force and two 24/7 standby battle groups.
National defence budgets were trimmed and military personnel and hardware were scaled back due to the financial constraints brought about by the global financial meltdown. Moreover, the EU member-states — most of them members to Nato — continued to rely on the preparedness of the US and/or Nato.
An assertive Russia felt threatened by Nato’s eastern membership expansion and ramped up its military prowess, but when Russia redrew the geographical map of Europe by annexing Crimea from Ukraine, the EU had no option except to rely on increasing Nato forces in EU member-states near Russia.
A future disengagement from the US, the only credible international security force today, and principal Nato backer and financier, is a scary prospect for the EU.
After his meeting with Nato Secretary Jens Stoltenberg last April, US President Donald Trump ceased to describe the transatlantic alliance as obsolete. But he continued to insist that the Nato allies pay their fair share to keep nations safer in a more dangerous world. That remains the unambiguous message from Trump to political leaders in European capitals, whom he will meet later this month at the Nato summit in Brussels.
It is high time that the EU understands the reality and takes decisive action, instead of remaining content with its (insufficient) military capabilities.
Johann Weick is an expert in international trade policy, European integration and specialist in GCC-EU relations.
