Pakistan’s year-long campaign against militancy has resulted in all-too-visible relief for the public in more ways than one. From Karachi, the cosmopolitan southern port city, to the barren and inhospitable terrain of Waziristan on the Afghanistan border, fears of a bloody backlash have proven to be exaggerated. Once, the residents of these neighbourhoods lived in fear of getting caught in one of the frequent episodes of violent attacks, but not anymore.
Though major terrorist attacks still take place periodically, they have proven to be the exception rather than the norm. Still, the battle to permanently win back space that had once fallen into the grip of militants in parts of Pakistan is far from over.
Attaining a sustainable and permanent victory lies beyond just winning the immediate battle. Beyond the military victory lies the challenge of consolidating the gains and turning them into a plank for Pakistan’s future stability. The future will be decided not just by keeping up the push against militants, but more importantly, the extent to which these gains can be defended. That will indeed be the ultimate guarantor of Pakistan’s success.
Towards that end, the role of Pakistan’s civil institutions remains central in at least three fundamental ways.
First, it will be vital for the Pakistani state to re-establish its presence across the grass roots where many central aspects of governance lie in disrepair. Over the years, a continuous neglect of certain districts under successive governments has essentially meant that the writ of the Pakistani state across the country has severely eroded.
In today’s environment, key elements synonymous with the rule of law — such as day-to-day administration and vital elements of policing — appear to be only partially existent. Likewise, the extreme politicisation of key state institutions has only made Pakistan an increasingly dysfunctional country. In brief, the loss of independence of key government functionaries has been caused by growing ability of political players over time to intrude heavily in setting the direction of events.
In this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the ability of Pakistan’s most vital civil institutions to eventually take charge of areas that have been claimed back from militants, remains in doubt.
Second, Pakistan’s elected political representatives and the institutions they are assigned to run must play a central role in formulating a set of policies for the short, medium and long term. In the past year, while the military push has been sustained, the political push has simply not succeeded in keeping equal pace. In fact, Pakistan’s parliament in Islamabad has shown few signs of vigorously pushing for a comprehensive debate on security issues with a view to carving out a new policy framework to meet the challenge. In the absence of such a process, Pakistan’s progress against militancy has taken place in a vacuum and has not evolved into a brand new narrative. Ultimately, the political system and indeed the public have to back a new commitment in support of a change, if indeed that change has to be sustained permanently.
Blocking the rise of militants
Finally, a new way of thinking to defend the gains of the past year cannot be detached from tackling some of the gravest challenges that confront mainstream Pakistanis. More than one third of the country’s population lives in extreme poverty. It is within this segment that lies the tough challenge of blocking the rise of militants of the future. The growing challenge of militancy faced by Pakistan over the years has also highlighted the degree to which young men from impoverished homes have been drawn to join hardline groups. This movement has highlighted the degree to which there has indeed been a link between poverty and terrorism. This is where the centrality of economic policies towards stabilising Pakistan comes in.
In any discussion on stabilising the country, there must be an accurate assessment of Pakistan’s present-day economic direction and the ability to tackle the country’s large-scale impoverishment. For the moment, there is little hope of the present direction making a dent in large-scale poverty in a way that will lift Pakistan’s overall prospects for the future. As prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s government oversees a number of initiatives to build one large infrastructure project after another, such as fancy roads and modern bus services, the cause of elimination of poverty remains neglected. This is essential for a variety of locations, ranging from trouble spots in large urban centres like Karachi to the rugged terrain of Waziristan.
The writ of the state
Ultimately, a new way of thinking must evolve for Pakistan’s decision-makers who live with the risk of frittering away the recent military gains. Rather than celebrating the success of military operations, a comprehensive approach must consider the many aspects that have fuelled militancy in the past.
While commitment to a certain ideology has been the key to turning individuals and groups against the Pakistani state, there are other factors at work as well like the writ of the state, the ability of political leaders to carve out policies for the present and the future and the use of economic tools to prevent deprivation of individuals who may joint militant causes. Though it is hard to ignore the numerous sacrifices made by Pakistanis in fighting militancy, there can be no room for complacency. Although early signs in this ongoing fight are potentially promising, the battle is far from being conclusively won.
Farhan Bokhari is a Pakistan-based commentator who writes on political and economic matters.
