Fifteen years after the collapse of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, the country stands at a critical crossroads. While fragile gains have been made since the regime’s final fall, on December 9, 2001, the nation faces a daunting array of security, political and economic risks, despite the fact that more than a £100 billion (Dh462.53 billion) has been spent by the United States alone in the country.
The biggest challenge, exacerbating all other problems, is the country’s internal security situation with insurgency from Taliban militants having spread to more than 30 of 34 provinces. Since 2009 alone, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has recorded some 23,000 conflict-related deaths and 41,000 injuries, with some 70 per cent of the people living in major cities, residing in makeshift camps, according the Norwegian Refugee Council.
In the midst of this chaos, many Afghans are leaving the country. In 2015, alone, more than a quarter of a million refugees and migrants arriving in Europe were from the country, second only behind Syrians, according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
US military officials, who remain engaged in what has become Washington’s longest military intervention since Vietnam (with previous support from countries ranging from United Kingdom, Canada, South Korea, to Australia), recently asserted that the balance between the Taliban and Afghan-government led forces is effectively a “stalemate”. This despite the foreign military losses by the end of 2014 which amounted to some 3,500 killed and 33,000 wounded with US personnel accounting for the majority of these casualties.
The continuing foreign force presence includes around 8,500 US military personnel and, while most Nato troops left in 2014, Washington will — subject to changes from the incoming Donald Trump administration — keep these officers in the country through at least the end of 2017. The international force remains vital for ensuring training and cohesion for the approximately 350,000-strong Afghan police and military personnel (which have day-to-day responsibility for security in the country) which may otherwise disintegrate.
Fears have been repeatedly raised that the current foreign force (now less than a 15th of the previously 150,000-strong combat presence) is not big enough. US Senator John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has for instance said that the international drawdown have left the country vulnerable to an upsurge in Taliban violence.
Hence, the reason why another priority of the Afghan government has been advancing currently-stalled reconciliation and peace talks with the remnants of the Taliban regime that collapsed in 2001, a process where influence of neighbouring powers — especially Pakistan — could be key in facilitating any eventual deal. While any agreement looks a long way off, the government did secure a similar deal with the armed opposition group of the Hezb-i-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in September.
On the economic front, the news is not good either, despite the massive foreign aid committed to the country, including a fresh $15.2 billion (Dh55.90 billion) pledged in September by the international community for the next four years. Reconstruction has been slow, unemployment remains above 40 per cent, and well over a million Afghans are internally displaced in the country, with well over three million more refugees believed to be in Pakistan and Iran.
While it is estimated that Washington has spent around $110 billion on Afghan reconstruction since 2001, more than the cost of the Marshall Plan that helped rebuild Europe after the Second World War, this has not been optimally spent. It is reported, for instance, that around 80 per cent of the funds have been given to US organisations in military/ security and maintenance contracts and consultancy projects.
It is also clear that, after 2001, the economy has not been diversified enough from drug exports such as opium and heroin, despite the fact that the country has abundant natural resources — gas, minerals and oil — with an estimated value of some $3 trillion. A related problem is corruption with Transparency International ranking Afghanistan as the third most corrupt state in the world.
In the midst of this difficult picture, there remains cause for optimism, not least because numerous fragile gains remain in place from the unseating of the Taliban regime in 2001. One, qualified, success is the country’s fledgling democracy.
Despite the problems afflicting the country, the country’s national unity government has also survived more than two years after a landmark power-sharing agreement was reached in 2014 between President Ashraf Gani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, the former foreign minister. This followed a disputed presidential ballot between Gani and Abdullah when up to a million votes were thrown out for fraud.
The creation of the national unity government, and the election of Gani, represented the first democratic transfer of power in the country’s history. While there have been significant tensions between him and Abdullah, that could yet explode in the next presidential election, the fact that the national unity government has not collapsed has helped consolidate the power and legitimacy of the new post-Taliban political system.
Other gains include Afghanistan’s accession to the World Trade Organisation and wider moves to revive economic links with the outside world, including the modern Silk Road, a new rail route connecting the country to China and Central Asia, and an electricity grid project across Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Pakistan.
Meanwhile, there are greater number of children (especially girls) enrolled in schools — reportedly some ten million; greater recognition of women’s rights and spread of technologies such as the internet and cell phones across the country.
Taken overall, the country is facing a major crossroads 15 years after the fall of the Taliban regime. While fragile gains have been secured since that important moment, there is, nonetheless, a prospect of significantly greater political, security and economic instability if the reconciliation process with the remaining remnants of Taliban forces cannot be advanced soon.
Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE IDEAS (the Centre for International Affairs, Diplomacy and Strategy) at the London School of Economics.
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