Divergent perspectives on the regional situation and honest differences of opinion on the end-game in Afghanistan have frequently caused strains in Pakistan-U.S relations in recent years.
A series of unforeseen events---- CIA agent Raymond Davis’ killing of two Pakistani citizens in Lahore, unilateral American military action on May 2, 2011 to assassinate Osama bin Laden, NATO’s air attack on Pakistani frontier check post of Salala in which 24 Pakistani soldiers perished--- put the relationship on a roller coaster.
Given the importance of continued cooperation between Islamabad and Washington during the highly delicate phase of winding down the decade-old conflict in Afghanistan, it was a legitimate expectation that the two capitals would rise to the requisite level of statesmanship. Regrettably, both sides have conspicuously failed to do so.
Pakistan’s troubled participation, through a last minute invitation to President Asif Zardari, in the 25th NATO summit in Chicago (20-21 May) that was to take far-ranging decisions on NATO’s military campaign in Afghanistan has left many questions unanswered. In fact, the summit ended with much uncertainty in Pakistan whether there was still a difference of positions on the terms and conditions on which the long suspension, after the Salala incident, of ground lines of communication (GLOCS) —the overland transit routes for supplies to NATO-ISAF forces in Afghanistan--- would finally end.
The massacre at Salala created a huge problem for the pro-West government in Islamabad that tried to deflect the popular backlash by seeking guidelines on resetting relations with the United States from Parliament.
Two reports by parliament in quick succession sought to pave the way for re-opening the blocked routes only by attaching conditions such as a public apology by the United States and a fairer financial compensation for the wear and tear of the Pakistani infra-structure estimated at billions of dollars over the last decade. Implicit in parliamentary debates was the resentment at the United States using reimbursement of expenditure incurred by Pakistan, known as Coalition Support Funds, as a lever of manipulating Islamabad’s policy.
Parliament had deliberated better ties with the United States under a dark cloud of public anger at greatly increased drone attacks on targets inside Pakistan during the Obama presidency. So it also asked for their termination. Periodic leaks from Washington that these attacks had often been mounted with complicity of Islamabad made things worse for the Pakistani government.
In retrospect, Pakistan government’s decision to follow parliament’s recommendations appears to have been bold but difficult to sustain. If Islamabad expected face-saving gestures from Washington, it met disappointment as the United States ruled out an apology for Salala deaths, refused to pay the much higher transit fee demanded by Islamabad and, above all, initially linked an invitation to Asif Zardari to the summit to a prior re-opening of the blocked routes.
Islamabad had doubtless raised hopes of an imminent re-opening of GLOCS but then deferred it for reasons not yet explained. President Obama received President Karzai but not President Zardari; the American media projected it as a deliberate “snub”.
Pakistan had stayed away from the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan held on 5 December 2011 because of the Salala tragedy. Unfortunately, it was prevented from playing any significant role at the Chicago summit. It does not augur well for peace in Afghanistan because NATO put its seal of approval on various elements of the plan to wind down the conflict with only a highly dysfunctional peace process in hand: namely, combat operations end by mid-2013; the NATO-led combat mission closes by the end of 2014; a new post-2014 non-combat mission to train, advise and assist the ANSF takes over end-2014. France will, however, pull out by the end of this year increasing pressure on other Europeans to rush for the exits.
Transferring security and counter-insurgency operations to the Afghan army so soon may be an illusion as battle-hardened Taliban and assorted war lords still dominate large territories. A likely scenario is that of a chequered landscape dotted with a few well -defended cities and impregnable NATO fortresses surrounded by a turbulent countryside. If this situation degenerates into one or more sub-regional civil wars, Pakistan would face a grave security threat.
President Zardari has had no reservations about assisting the United States in developing a credible peace process; the real obstacle is the divided counsel in Washington. From the very beginning, Zardari has endeavoured to establish a relationship of trust with President Karzai promising strong economic cooperation with post-conflict Afghanistan.
Quintessentially, President Zardari’s current dilemma springs from his failure to persuade Washington that Pakistan should be an autonomous partner and that Washington should respect its reading of the regional situation and its national interest while disposing the fate of its war-ravaged neighbour.
Pakistan has a 2500-kilometre long border with Afghanistan straddled by the same tribes and ethnic and linguistic groups. Islamabad should be able to re-open the supply routes soon and also settle the transit fees but its ability to help shape events in Afghanistan favourably for the concerned parties seems to have received a body blow.
Tanvir Ahmad Khan is a former foreign secretary of Pakistan.
