On July 12, an international judicial tribunal convened at The Hague will rule on a case brought by the government of the Philippines against China over Beijing’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. The government in Beijing is already laying the groundwork for an adverse ruling, sending subtle and not-so-subtle messages that the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Dutch city has no jurisdiction over the dispute and that any ruling it makes is therefore irrelevant.
This clear message from Beijing underlines its policies for the past five years, wherein it has increasingly become expansionist, building up reefs into full-blown airstrips and ignoring the competing territorial claims of regional nations other than the Philippines — Vietnam, Indonesia, Brunei, Cambodia and Japan. Indeed, this strategically important area is increasingly becoming a flashpoint between nations, with confrontations between vessels and patrol boats resulting in the deaths of fishermen and others.
During his historic visit to Vietnam in May, the President of the United States, Barack Obama, underscored Hanoi’s claim to islands now occupied by China. Over the past two years, tensions between Hanoi and Beijing have flared up over drilling rights. Obama too has lent his vocal support and given some surplus coastguard vessels to Manila to support its territorial claims. But he has also shown himself to be willing to risk Beijing’s ire, sending a missile frigate to sail by the islands to reinforce the principle of freedom of movement and navigation. When Beijing expressed its fury and turned up the bellicose rhetoric, Obama sent a flight of two B52 bombers over the atoll.
Clearly, whichever way The Hague panel rules, regional tensions in the disputed maritime waters won’t instantly dissolve. If anything, a ruling against Beijing will add to the resolve of the Chinese government that it will not be deterred in what it sees as its traditional and historic rights in the South China Sea.
But a ruling against Beijing will also unite the regional nations with competing claims that Beijing’s actions are unjust, illegitimate and illegal. Armed with the backing of an international court verdict, those competing nations may feel they are right to continue to confront — and provoke — China. That in itself may very well be an unwise course of action, given the propensity for violence.
The only way forward is for continued negotiation on bilateral and multilateral bases. In view of the potential volatility in the area, any other course of action is unwise, unwelcome and unwarranted.
