Did Desert Shield Lead to Desert Hate? A Case Study of Anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabia, by Michael Schmid, Anchor Academic Publishing, 120 pages, £51.99
An aspiring young German scholar who earned a masters degree in North American Studies at the Free University of Berlin and a second one at Indiana University in Bloomington, Michael Schmid sets out to offer a short analysis of potential Arab and Muslim anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabia.
He concludes that rather than being exclusively anti-American, extremists are opposed to their own leaders, are anti-“other”, and opportunistic in their hatreds. He dismisses the notion that while anti-Americanism, which he defines as “a methodical, systematic and genuine rejection of policies and/or culture uniquely attributed to the United States in any shape, way or form” (p. 8), may appeal to some analysts, it was too facile and in need of refutation.
Concentrating on Osama Bin Laden, Schmid boldly states that “it is inaccurate to characterise Bin Laden as anti-American and [to even] identify the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia[,] as the cause for Bin Laden’s supposedly anti-American conversion” (p. 74).
Rather, the author asserts, Bin Laden felt betrayed that the ruling Al Saud family did not take him seriously and rejected his offer to defend the Holy Cities from a putative Iraqi invasion and occupation in 1990. Moreover, Schmid maintains that Bin Laden could not forgive the Al Saud for chastising opposition leaders such as Safar Al Hawali and Salman Al Awdah, the so-called “awakening Shaikhs”, for demanding various political reforms (p. 74-75).
Although he quotes several non Saudi Shaikhs, men like Ali Al Faqir and Mohammad Rakan Al Durmi — two Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members (p. 55) with known anti-American views — the author buttresses his arguments more by concentrating on Bin Laden’s core beliefs. In fact, the most interesting and entirely rationale explanation provided here to explain the events that unfolded, is Bin Laden’s “disgust at the Al Saud” for not bringing him in the decision-making process.
“Bin Laden was proud of his Saudi heritage,” writes Schmid, “and the fact that he was not permitted to follow his calling and defend the holy sites of Makkah and Madinah against the apostate attack by Saddam Hussain enraged him.” He continues: “The decision by the Al Saud clan that officially negated Bin Laden’s status as a Saudi citizen added fuel to the fire of revenge” (p. 75).
Schmid acknowledges that Bin Laden was not consistent, though avowing that he was less concerned with “principles and values of the group [that one presumably leads, rather] than with practical and tactical issues” (p. 79), may be a stretch of the imagination. In the event, the author identifies the reasons why Bin Laden chose to attack the United States, starting with an unsuccessful attempt to “topple the apostate regimes in the Arab/Islamic region”, followed by prolonged assaults in Saudi Arabia that would presumably weaken Al Qaida, and completing his circle for practical economic reasons (p. 80).
These formulations implied, according to Schmid, that Bin Laden did not perceive the US as “the true enemy of Islam or that his hatred of American [did not] surpass that of the Saudi regime”.
Instead, he buys into the notion that fighting America was easier, which was questionable to say the least. Still, he emphasises the point that Bin Laden’s “dispute with the Saudi royal family was not solely about Americans entering the country or America itself, but about the accumulation of violations to Islamic law, domestically and internationally, over the years” (p. 81).
Several scholarly tomes pretended to decipher Bin Laden’s perceptions and while few provided definitive assessments, there can be little doubt that Bin Laden perceived the United States as a nemesis. What he objected to were too long to list here but contained, inter alia, that country’s unique cultural domination of most of this planet, as well as overwhelming economic and military powers.
Still, while many around the world objected or envied America’s supremacy, few resorted to terrorism. Many more maintained safe distances, while a vast majority of nation-states sought enduring alliances to protect their interests and benefit from American technology. What few could deny was that Bin Laden learnt how to use the opportunity of the 1991 US troop deployments in Saudi Arabia to mobilise his base.
Where Bin Laden erred, and Schmid makes references to this towards the end of his short study, was to underscore his brethren’s phobias of foreigners (any foreigner), disappointments with believers in Saudi Arabia, aversion to the Saudi ruling family, and disregard of the Kingdom’s liberal movement. Naturally, the deployment of nearly half-a-million US troops, including women and Jews, to participate in the liberation of Iraqi-occupied Kuwait, was a sore point.
After 9/11, however, Bin Laden’s anti-Americanism, whether as reactions to the American presence in Saudi Arabia or within the broader Muslim World, was no longer a private affair. It became a global concern, which meant that Riyadh and Washington were called upon to salvage critical ties.
Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian is an author, most recently of, “Legal and Political Reforms in Sa‘udi Arabia” (London: Routledge, 2013).
