Initially, everything looked simple. Some French troops would be sent to Central African Republic (CAR), further to a mandate delivered by the United Nations, in order to restore peace and democracy. The simple presence of French soldiers would immediately dissuade the belligerents — the Muslim ethnic groups from the North who conquered the capital last March (the so-called ‘Selekas’), and the terrorised Christian majority, which was ransomed and eventually killed in the dusty and sleazy back streets of Bangui. Then, the French troops would seize arms, mainly those of well-armed Selekas, and confine them into their barracks. As a consequence of violence being stopped, political elites would meet again, discuss and negotiate a framework for a new democratically-renovated country.
To sum it up in President Francois Hollande’s words, the French troops would interpose between belligerents, show total impartiality and be intransigent with all kind of violence.
The point is that it all went wrong.
To start with, French troops had to be rushed in haste after anti-Selekas militias (the so-called ‘Anti-balakas’), rushed on Bangui to try and take control of the city. They failed, but the reaction of the Selekas was immediate and ferocious — hundreds of Christians were killed on that occasion. The French troops thus started quartering the Selekas and stripping them off their arms — a first effect of which was to allow the Christians to take revenge and start ransoming on their turn Muslim shoppers, eventually killing them as well, which of course led the Selekas to get out of their camps at night to seek revenge. Lastly, the international community progressively took notice that there were no more a state, police or army; and a country 1.2 times bigger than France could hardly be controlled by 1,600 soldiers, though not including ill-prepared African units — with the exception of Chadians whose nationals, however, make up one third of the Selekas they are supposed to control.
Why, thus, did France decide to go into such a mess? To avoid genocide, it is said. Fine, but is it France’s role to fight alone against genocides which are committed here or there? Did fellow-European states feel concerned about the on-going developments in CAR? Apparently not. Nordic and German shopkeepers have just explained they would not pay a dime. The Dutch sent a few helicopters, the Belgians a little bit of logistic support and the Polish some aircrew. The British did not feel concerned — not their zone. As for the Germans, they just would not pay, a habit with them.
One month and 2,000 slaughtered people later, what can France now do in a country where its limited troops have no clear mandate, no clear mission and no enemy? A place where there is no state and negotiating parties are limited to imams, pastors and priests? A battlefield made up of a mix of winding alleys and bushy savannah, where population is possibly both a human scud and hostage, and where arms circulate in large quantities in the hands of people whose only common feature is that they do not wear any uniform?
Troops on site are clearly insufficient. Beyond the French presence, the other African components of a needed military order are either inefficiently trained (the bulk of the multi-African MISCA force), too limited in number (the rest of the former FACA Central African Republic Army), or inclined to favour one camp over another: The Chadians, who incidentally also are France’s best allies in the nearby Mali conflict. The only likely event for the French troops is to get caught in the crossfire and be held responsible for whatever happens because they did not move in front of what is developing into an ethnic and religious conflict. Or their possible move into one direction will be considered as hostile behaviour versus the other camp. As retired French General Dary puts it, it is going to be “long, complex and difficult” for France, not to mention the cost after European grocers have already declined to open the cash-drawer.
That is why the time has come to ask the right question: Is it compulsory for the international community to try and halt possible genocides wherever they occur? If the answer is no, then the best thing to do is to let Africans kill themselves quietly, discreetly. If on the contrary, some kind of shame would be felt in answering negatively, then there is no other road than going back to the UN, acknowledge the need for an international safekeeping mission, organise it as quickly as possible and plan for the cost of it to be borne by the international community. Sixteen hundred soldiers will never pacify a 30 million population alone. The fact might have disrupted some New Year’s Eve dinners — after all, don’t the Syrians spend Christmas in the cold and the rain and Palestinians go on languishing and rotting in filthy camps? Yet, maybe it was not necessary to start 2014 that way.
Luc Debieuvre is a French essayist and a lecturer at IRIS (Institut de Relations Internationales et Strategiques) and the FACO Law University of Paris.
