A master innovator, Saudi King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz introduced a fresh mechanism to smooth over succession concerns, when he issued the order that appointed Muqrin Bin Abdul Aziz, the youngest surviving son of the founder, as heir to heir apparent Prince Salman Bin Abdul Aziz. Although the second deputy prime minister position was traditionally perceived as the station to move on to the heirship, the innovation consisted of a written variable, which specified that it “shall not be amended or replaced by any means”. It further clarified that its contents were approved by the monarch and his heir apparent and could not, or ought not, be reinterpreted. Moreover, the order precluded any emendations by the Allegiance Commission that, presumably, supported this selection.

Historians of the Kingdom will long study this rare document for its precedent-setting contents and while it smoothed over potential rough-edges in putative family struggles over succession, its intrinsic value resides in the fact that it ensured a stable process, which was the ruler’s primary objective. Of course, and in time, nothing prevents a future King Salman to rely upon this precedent to designate the heir to Prince Muqrin, from among the next generation of Al Saud family members. This explains why Prince Salman affixed his signature to the royal order even if protocol and his own allegiance to his sovereign were sufficient. In other words, the heir apparent was uniquely positioned to add his own innovation to the succession process by eventually selecting the individual from the next generation that would rule Saudi Arabia.

To be sure, senior members of the ruling Al Saud family were amply aware that the time to pass the torch to younger princes was imminent, given that most of the surviving sons of King Abdul Aziz were advanced in age. While Saudi rulers seldom abdicated, there were concerns that such a possibility ought not to be ruled out, especially if the monarch determined that he could no longer govern effectively. Although such an outcome was remote, and the subject of interminable rumours by wannabe analysts, the dynasty was sophisticated enough to take every necessary precaution to preserve the country’s stability in a region subjected to political discord.

Naturally, what remained to be determined were the identities of potential candidates from the new generation, now that all Al Saud family members older than the heir to the heir apparent were essentially sidelined. At 68 (born on September 15, 1945), Prince Muqrin’s appointment technically marginalised several of his brothers and nephews although it greatly enhanced opportunities for others. Of course, commoner Saudis with ties to senior officials worried about being shunned too, which was not surprising.

In fact, King Abdullah and Prince Salman promoted several of their sons by entrusting them with key ministries or governorships, including princes Mit’ab Bin Abdullah, who now heads the national guards, Abdul Aziz Bin Abdullah, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Turki Bin Abdullah, the Deputy Governor of Riyadh, Faisal Bin Salman, the Governor of Madinah, Abdul Aziz Bin Salman, the Deputy Minister of Petroleum, and Sultan Bin Salman, the Secretary General of the Supreme Commission for Tourism. Other key personalities worthy of attention included princes Turki Al Faisal, the former head of general intelligence, Salman Bin Sultan, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Saud Bin Sultan, the Vice-Director of the Saudi intelligence agency, Mohammad Bin Fahd, the former governor of the Eastern Province, Mohammad Bin Nayef, the Minister of Interior, and Saud Bin Nayef, the Governor of Eastern Province. This distinguished list illustrated the calibre of younger candidates for the key position with additional responsibilities for those who were passed over. It was worth noting that what distinguished the Al Saud from most other Arabian Peninsula ruling dynasties was the plethora of members serving in various civilian and military capacities, which meant that qualified members who did not become heir, were still entrusted with critical tasks.

Moreover, and while observers calculated that the latest decisions amounted to cutting an internal deal to present a united front when the Arab world was aflame, what occurred was nothing more than a progressive development to avoid dynastic squabbles. In as much as the Muqrin appointment was duly approved by the Allegiance Council that was first created by King Abdullah in 2006 to supervise the succession process, one assumed that some, if not all, of its members were consulted by the ruler before the joint order was issued. Regrettably, the Council was not seen to be at the vanguard of the succession matter to date, although that was a sign of deference rather than competence.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the March 27, 2014, royal order was its timing as it was made public a day before US President Barack Obama visited the Kingdom. Whether King Abdullah wished to take advantage of this trip to press upon foreign powers not to intervene in internal Saudi matters was impossible to determine. Suffice it to say that Washington pundits who opined that certain junior members of the ruling family were “potential rulers,” displeased the Al Saud in general, and the monarch in particular. Interestingly, and despite his ailing health, the King once again illustrated how he exercised his will-to-power.

Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is the author of Legal and Political Reforms in Saudi Arabia (London: Routledge, 2013).