Last week, The New York Times uncovered a plan prepared by the Obama administration to bolster the American military presence in the Gulf region. The plan is designed to avoid a vacuum resulting from the withdrawal of the US military forces from Iraq by the end of this year. The reinforcement includes, according to the US newspaper, the positioning of new combat forces in Kuwait and other Arab Gulf countries "able to respond to a collapse of security in Iraq or a military confrontation with Iran".
After the failure to reach an agreement between Washington and Baghdad to permit as many as 20,000 American troops to remain in Iraq beyond 2011, analysts and commentators began to speculate about whether the Obama administration — under pressure to bring troops back home before the start of the elections season — may have decided to leave Iran's influence unchecked. The revelation was an attempt by the US administration to calm these fears and to affirm its long-standing commitment to Gulf security.
In fact, as the US troops prepare to leave Iraq, America's Arab allies, particularly Gulf states, have grown more wary about Washington's policies and intentions in the region. On the one hand, they feel that the US has betrayed them when it failed not only to bring about more stability to the region after the invasion of Iraq but has also benefited Iran. Instead of containing and deterring Iran, US policy has in fact contributed to strengthening Tehran's regional influence and failed to deal with its nuclear ambitions. On the other hand, Arab Gulf States feel that they can no longer rely on the US to ensure their security and well-being. While most Arab Gulf states oppose a military strike against Iran, fearing that it would backfire, they nonetheless believe that by leaving Iraq the US is in effect surrendering to Iran. All in all, "no faith in Washington" is the simple answer that one would get from Arab officials in the Gulf when asked about US policy.
The US has, for sometime, been aware of the lack of trust on the part of its Arab allies; hence it tried to bolster their morale, assuring the Saudis in particular that it would not fail them should they face major external threats. It is quite unclear if the announced plan would be enough to serve this purpose. Most Saudis still bitterly remember the empty US assurances during the disturbing events of the Iranian revolution. In 1979, the Carter administration dispatched several military units to the Gulf. However, the Saudis discovered, the F15 fighter planes, sent to bolster their security after the fall of the Shah, were in fact unarmed.
The Obama team understands fairly well the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia for US national interests and the damage that has been done by the policies of the Bush administration to the strategic partnership between Riyadh and Washington. Most foreign policy experts in Washington would emphatically admit that the US faces major problems in fixing its relations with its allies in the region in general. There is however a sense of urgency concerning the restoration of the strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia.
The theory, which has guided US policy during the invasion of Iraq, reckoning that a friendly Iraq would replace Saudi Arabia as US strategic partner in the Gulf after the events of September 11, has all but evaporated. Washington believes today that there is no chance that Iraq would emerge as a stable strategic partner, and it is now clear that any degree of partnership will be limited and constantly subject to the uncertainties of Iraqi politics.
Moreover, energy experts believe that the US will remain directly dependent on massive energy imports well beyond 2030, and equally dependent on a global economy fuelled by Gulf oil. The flow of oil, gas, and petroleum exports not only requires the security of key exporting states; it requires the security of regional pipelines and shipping routes. This makes Saudi Arabia's national security a critical priority for the Obama administration. "The US has valuable relations with Egypt, Israel and Jordan. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman all offer key bases and strategic facilities. Only one state, however, has the geographic position, military forces, strategic depth, and common interests to be a key strategic partner in the Gulf. The US needs Saudi Arabia as much as Saudi Arabia needs the US", Anthony Cordesman, former US national security council member and director of the influential Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), argued in a recent study.
Given the huge investment of the US in the region and the extent of its interests, it is very unlikely that Washington would leave the Gulf at the mercy of a rival power, be that Iran, China, Russia or any other nation.
Dr Marwan Kabalan is Dean of Faculty of International Relations and Diplomacy, Kalamoon University, Damascus, Syria.
