Rather belatedly, the White House is banging the drums of war and calling for a newly assembled international coalition to ‘degrade and destroy’ the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil). Only seven months ago, President Obama described Isil as a bunch of ‘junior varsity’ basketball players, imagining it was just another rogue Al Qaida off-shoot. That was before the ‘Caliphate’ was declared on an area the size of Britain and comprising five million inhabitants on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border.
Even after Isil had beheaded two American journalists and continued to spread like an inkblot through northern Syria seizing one village after another virtually unopposed, Obama appeared calm and unhurried, publically musing two weeks ago that ‘we have no strategy yet’.
French President Francois Hollande opportunistically seized the diplomatic lead. The national press had been preoccupied with polls suggesting he is the least popular President in French history amid blistering revelations from ex-partner Valerie Trierweiller’s newly published account of their years together. Now he could offer a new, more Napoleonic, version of himself as he flew to Baghdad and then co-chaired (with Iraqi President Fouad Massoum) Monday’s crisis conference in Paris which was attended by ministers from 20 nations. “The threat is global,’’ Hollande declared, “and the response must be global”. Ten Arab states have also agreed to join the international initiative.
In effect, there is now a global ‘coalition of the willing’ of 40 countries and the US has retrieved the mantle of leadership.
However, the coalition faces several immediate problems:
First, Isil is embedded in the midst of two full blown civil wars which presents unprecedented logistical problems. In addition, any military intervention against Isil automatically has wider political implications. In the case of Syria, operations inside the country could only take place with the tacit agreement of the Damascus regime, effectively rehabilitating Bashar Al Assad on the world stage. Militarily, too, it would benefit the Al Assad regime which most of the coalition countries have been working hard to unseat for the past three years. Despite — or perhaps because of — all this, the Paris conference failed to address the question of Syria.
Second, simply agreeing there is a problem is not a strategy; somehow the coalition has to transform itself into a viable, successful military alliance. Several countries have agreed to contribute air power, but Isil is a guerrilla army with few obvious targets for air strikes. Unlike Saddam Hussain or Muammar Gaddafi, the Isil leadership has no headquarters, no government offices and no presidential palaces; its leaders and fighters can easily conceal themselves in the concrete jungles of towns and cities where airborne attacks risk hefty, deeply unpopular, ‘collateral damage’.
Military experts concur that ground troops will be essential both to eliminate the enemy and to safeguard regained territory. Yet to date, no country has agreed to send significant numbers of its soldiers into an environment that would inevitably entail high casualties.
The US proposes improving the Iraqi army for the fight; but what can be done that was not already attempted during the ten years America was training Iraq’s 800,000 soldiers, spending $25 billion (Dh92 billion) in the process?
In Syria, the West would like to repeat the ‘Awakening’ process that (temporarily) routed Al Qaida in 2006, when Sunni tribesmen and villagers turned against the jihadis. Obama is considering allocating $500 million to train and arm the non-extremist opposition groups in order to deploy them against Isil. The problem here is that ‘moderate’ fighters have been defecting in large numbers to Isil which they perceive as ‘successful’, while those that are left are weary after three years of fighting. In addition, the Free Syrian Army — the largest umbrella grouping of ‘moderate’ opposition militias — has been plagued by in-fighting and allegations of corruption.
Third, key regional players are not on board. Iran was not invited to the Paris conference (presumably to avoid the wrath of regional rival Saudi Arabia), and Ayatollah Ali Khameni told the press that Tehran had rejected American overtures to discuss the crisis. Any solution without the participation of Iran (which is close to both the Al Assad regime and the government in Baghdad) is unthinkable.
Egypt is reluctant to deploy its strong and experienced army, as is Turkey, which possesses the second biggest army in the Nato alliance and a 560-mile border with Syria. Saudi Arabia possesses one of the region’s most sophisticated air forces but is not clamouring to contribute to the proposed war effort.
Turkey’s reticence is political and pragmatic. Fighting Isil would benefit (Alawite) Al Assad to whom (Sunni) Ankara is deeply opposed, not least for sectarian reasons. In addition, Isil is currently holding 49 Turkish hostages which it would not hesitate to execute, and has also threatened to destroy Turkey’s $20 billion tourism industry by committing acts of terror in key resorts.
Saudi Arabia’s position is even more complicated. It longs for the demise of Isil because it fears its own territories are on its wish-list; but at the same time, if it contributes to the war against Sunni extremists it will benefit its own regional nemesis, Iran.
Fourth, the coalition risks making Isil more popular and more powerful. Influential jihadist ideologues such as Abu Mohammad Al Maqdisi and Abu Qatada have so far been overtly opposed to Isil; now however, because they do not want to find themselves in the same trench as the West, they are revising their opinions and will communicate these to their many followers.
Fifth, there appears to be an intelligence failure in the West’s assessment of this new and unanticipated enemy. The CIA recently revised its estimate of numbers up from 10,000 to 31,500 but reliable sources suggest that 100,000 is nearer the mark, and rising. In addition, these are fighters whose dearest wish is to die on the battlefield.
So far, the coalition appears to lack not only a clear plan and strategy, but also any real commitment to military action which would see its troops exposed to risk. Without these things it is not really a coalition of the willing, but simply a coalition of the scared.
Abdel Bari Atwan is the editor-in-chief of digital newspaper Rai alYoum: http://www.raialyoum.com. You can follow him on Twitter at www.twitter.com/@abdelbariatwan.
