When a Pakistani provincial high court in Karachi last week finally lifted a ban on the country’s former ruler General Pervez Musharraf to travel outside Pakistan in no less than 15 days, that outcome once again posed a significant dilemma for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
The time frame given by the court is meant to allow Sharif’s government to decide if it will appeal against the verdict in the supreme court and block former president Musharraf’s exit, or finally concede ground on a matter where the government has fought a visibly futile battle to begin with.
Just days ahead of the latest turn of events surrounding president Musharraf, an audacious attack on Karachi’s international airport badly underscored the continued failure of Pakistan’s ruling structure in dealing with moments of crisis.
Though Pakistan’s army led the security forces successfully and killed all ten of the gunmen, the civilian administration responsible for managing the airport put up a pathetic show.
For instance, the case of seven low-income employees who were trapped inside a cold storage facility at the airport during the attack and remained alive for several hours before suffocating to death, was highly illustrative of Pakistan’s dysfunctional conditions.
Though the seven men were in regular contact on their cell phones with their family members after being stranded, the authorities in Karachi simply failed to assemble enough rescue equipment to safely pull them out and end their ordeal. The case hardly helps lift the confidence in the way Pakistan is being run.
Given this background, questions must be raised over Sharif’s ability to take charge of Pakistan at a time when there is an all-out battle lurking ahead for securing the country’s future. However, in the past year, the Sharif-led Pakistan Muslim League — Nawaz (PML-N) has neither shown the ability to devise a bold new set of policies to deal with security and economy related challenges, nor does the regime appear to accept its failure. As Nero remained oblivious when Rome came burning down, similarly, the Sharif administration is simply unable to appreciate the depth of Pakistan’s present crisis, even as the turmoil rapidly engulfs the country.
Going forward, Pakistan’s destiny can best be salvaged through a combination of short-term emergency measures, followed by long-term stabilisation steps to weave together a new future for the nuclear armed south Asian country. However, in his first year in office, Sharif has hardly helped lift Pakistan’s prospects.
Instead, a year after he emerged as Pakistan’s first politician to become the country’s prime minister for the third time, Sharif has neither come up with a convincing answer to the acute security challenges faced by Pakistan nor does he appear to have a credible solution to the multi-dimensional economic challenge faced by the nuclear-armed country. In spite of his credentials as a scion of a prominent business-cum-industrial family of Pakistan, Sharif’s government recently presented its first annual budget, which has been received by many as no better than just half impressive.
The emphasis surrounding the official economic policies appears to be hooked to undertaking large infrastructure projects like building new controversial bus routes and plans for train projects, in a country where people are suffering mainly on account of severe energy shortages.
At the same time, the ruling structure, in spite of jolts like the Karachi airport attack, appears eager to pursue hitherto unproductive peace negotiations with Taliban militants. Increasingly, it appears that the government’s resolve is neither in sync with the mainstream opinion across Pakistan nor with the reported sentiment within the army.
Given that the Taliban want to impose their peculiar worldview on Pakistan and given that they remain determined to press their point of view through the barrel of the gun, it appears almost impossible that there can be a successful negotiation between the militants and the Pakistani state.
Perhaps the only exception to this obvious point can be a bizarre situation where the government completely capitulates to the demands of the Taliban and practically turns over control of Pakistan to them.
Within this overall position of official lethargy, Sharif’s one obsession remains that of pressing ahead with tightening the screws on Musharraf. The two men have an obvious history, which continues to trigger bad blood between them. Though Musharraf was handpicked by Sharif for the powerful position of the chief of Pakistan Army, the General led a coup in 1999 which cut short Sharif’s tenure as prime minister. Sharif was arrested and subsequently exiled to Saudi Arabia from where he returned in 2007.
Many around the prime minister are eager for him to exact revenge on Musharraf. Yet, given Pakistan’s multiple challenges, this is no time for seeking revenge. The Pakistan Army needs to have a single-minded focus in fighting the Taliban.
In sharp contrast, if indeed a former army chief is placed in the dock, the army’s ability to keep up the focus will be heavily compromised. Indeed, for Pakistan’s present-day generals, the powerful reality of the prosecution of a former army chief potentially paves the way for prosecutions of men in uniform across the board.
Faced with an increasingly grim security outlook, Sharif needs to step back from his obvious obsession with prosecuting Musharraf and focus exclusively on meeting Pakistan’s challenges. The danger, however, is that the prime minister will not rise above his single-minded focus even when he is increasingly being compared to Nero.
Farhan Bokhari is a Pakistan-based commentator who writes on political and economic matters.
