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Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks during a graduation ceremony of Israeli naval officers in the northern city of Haifa September 2, 2014. A week after the guns fell silent in the Gaza war, Israel and the Palestinians seem to have little appetite or incentive for a return to U.S.-sponsored peace and statehood talks that collapsed five months ago. The parties themselves, Netanyahu's bickering governing coalition and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, are on a collision course over threatened Palestinian unilateral moves toward statehood and exploration of war crimes prosecution against Israel in the absence of direct talks. REUTERS/Baz Ratner (ISRAEL - Tags: POLITICS MILITARY) Image Credit: REUTERS

In her 20-page article ‘Friends of Israel’ in the New Yorker (September 1 issue), award-winning writer Connie Bruck sets the limitations of her subject matter. It is neither about the peace process, nor is it about the current confrontations and the sufferings of the people of Gaza. It is about whether the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (Aipac) is losing its influence. In the process, Bruck herself discovers a few things about the Palestine conflict. She writes that Aipac enjoyed widespread influence but when they pushed hard against a sitting US president, they came face to face with US President Barack Obama himself. Although they clashed constantly over policy issues, the Iran Sanctions bill, which was at stake, alarmed the White House because of the possibility that Aipac would endorse the new sanctions. It was finally put to rest when Obama, in his State of the Union address, used the occasion to warn Congress that he would veto the sanctions legislation. It was a colossal failure for Aipac.

On the other hand, in Gaza, Bruck wrote: “There were scenes of utter devastation, with hundreds of Palestinian children dead from bombing and mortar fire ... the United Nations was launching an inquiry into possible war crimes.”

Even before the fighting had escalated, the US government, which essentially financed the war, did not hide its growing frustration with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: “How will it have peace, if it is unwilling to delineate a border, end the occupation and allow for Palestinian sovereignty, security and dignity?” She quotes Philip Gordon, the White House coordinator for the Middle East, when he said in early July that “It cannot maintain military control of another people indefinitely. Doing so is not wrong but a recipe for resentment and recurring instability”. From the Palestinians to Iran, Aipac has taken the side of the prime minister of Israel against that of its own president. The Iran Sanctions Bill would have given Aipac control over the formulation of American foreign policy, a senior administration official told Bruck. “But this is American foreign policy that they were seeking to essentially derail. There was no other logic to it than ending the negotiations and the gravity of that is shocking.”

Back in Washington, two agents — Keith Weissman and former Aipac executive director, Steven Rosen — were arrested on charges of espionage. Part of their release agreement: The US government agreed to make some money available to the Palestinians. Weissman advised to send the money directly to Arafat. But Aipac officials supported a resolution in Congress to keep the money in America and demanded accountablity. The Oslo critics from the far right, including the current Israeli prime minister, were wedded to the idea that publicly, they must not attack the The Accords while privately, they could say what they wanted. “The idea was to cripple Oslo”, Bruck wrote.

Here are several points that need to be raised regarding the sincerity of Netanyahu. First, and foremost, we need to exercise caution before making any inferences. The documented record (available on YouTube) clearly reveals that Netanyahu was very much the principal instigator of what happened to Oslo. The Israeli premier even boasts of the fact that he deceived former US president Bill Clinton and was largely responsible for the failure of Oslo. Aipac is proud of its influence and the promotional literature does not hide that fact. They point out that a reception during its annual policy conference, in Washington “will be attended by more members of Congress than almost any other event, except for a joint session of Congress or a State of the Union address”.

On the other hand, at the beginning of the article, Bruck explained her limitations — essentially to raise questions about whether Aipac is losing influence, following their showdown with Obama.

It may be too early to speak about any loss of influence. Aipac lobbyists still have unprecedented access to the corridors of power. A former Aipac executive, Steven Rosen, used to boast that at any Senate hangout, he could take a napkin out of his pocket and have people sign their support. Bruck shows sensitivity when treating other aspects of the Palestine question, especially when describing scenes of devastation brought about by a frenzy of bombing.

As to the situation on the field, it is rather problematic, not the least because Israelis and Palestinians cannot agree on the number of Palestinians killed or the extent of “collateral” damage. Furthermore, independent verification by human rights groups is not permitted. Israel refused to let a group of human rights activists into Gaza. In the past, Israel had complained about how these human rights groups brought a certain view of the world, of international relations, and of how they should be conducted.

For the Palestinian reaction, Bruck went to Hanan Ashrawi, a moderate and articulate figure. The Palestinian lawmaker defended the behaviour falsely attributed to Hamas fighters, namely using the United Nations school to hide weapons. She pointed out that if Israeli pilots could pinpoint their victims for extra-judicial assassinations, then it should have also been easy for them to identify the people who had sought refuge inside the UN School.

Aipac has been actively engaged in promoting its policy agenda, undeterred by failure and the occasional lost battle, and it will be a mistake to write it off

Adel Safty is distinguished visiting professor and special adviser to the rector at the Siberian Academy of Public Administration, Russia. His book, Might Over Right, is endorsed by Noam Chomsky and published in England by Garnet, 2009.