Prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had deliberately projected the 30 March local elections in Turkey as a referendum on his rule. Results give his party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), about 45 per cent of the votes up 5 per cent from the last local elections with its principal challenger the Republican People’s Party (CHP) more than 16 percentage points behind. This has vindicated his claim that almost half the Turkish population supports him and his party despite the corruption scandals surrounding his government.
Some Turkish commentators seem puzzled by the fact that “half of the corruption claims [faced by Erdogan] in any other democratic country would be enough for the collapse of the government.” However, the election outcome is less puzzling when analysed in the Turkish political context.
Corruption had been an endemic part of the Turkish political system until the AKP came to power in 2002, and the party seemed to have a relatively clean record until recently. Turkish voters are therefore used to taking corruption claims in their stride.
The difference between earlier governments and that of the AKP is that the former were corrupt as well as economically inefficient, if not disastrous. The AKP government, even if corrupt, has delivered on the economic front with a very visible rise in the income level and standard of living of the average Turkish citizen.
Furthermore, the benefits of the past decade’s economic growth have percolated down to the previously disadvantaged segments of society, the “Black” Turks, whose economic and political demands and requirements had been neglected by governments led by the Kemalist elites. They were, and continue to be, seen by many in the Anatolian heartland as representatives of the “White” Turks from the western seaboard who had ruled the republic for much of its first 80 years, and with whom the CHP is identified. There are, therefore, significant class and regional divisions between the AKP supporters and its opponents. The regional division has been clearly reflected in the local elections.
But there is more to it than class and region. The divide between “Black” and “White” Turks corresponds quite closely with the observant and self-conscious Muslim majority and the so-called secular minority. The resentment of the former towards the latter, who had formed the traditional ruling class until 2002, is still palpable, as reflected in the following statement by a “Black” Turk on 30 March: “I am voting for the AKP because I’m terrified of what will happen if the CHP came back to power. We lived like peasants under their rule, walking on streets cleaning rubbish, hiding our wives at home because they wear head scarves. I don’t think the AKP is perfect, but there is a future under their rule for my grandchildren.”
Erdogan is a product and a representative of this divide, and it is the main reason why he is so reviled by the secular elite and, despite all his faults, loved by the descendants of the Anatolian peasantry. However, it is not only his religiously observant image that appeals to his followers. It is his combative personality the fact he does not hesitate to take on the entrenched Turkish elite as well as global powers that appeals to them as well. He personifies the desire of the majority of the Turkish population to demonstrate that they count both domestically and internationally; that they are autonomous actors both at home and abroad.
This is what sets him apart from the other Turkish Islamist trend, that which is represented by Fethullah Gulen, who portrays the “goody goody” face of Turkish Islam by presenting it as an essentially western religion principally engaged in interfaith and educational activities. No wonder Gulen, who lives in Pennsylvania, is popular in the West while Erdogan is perceived as the “bully from Kasimpasa”, the rough neighbourhood in Istanbul where he grew up. However, Gulen’s soft image does not cut much ice with the Anatolian voter, except for a committed cadre of Gulenists that form the Hizmet movement.
It was assumed that the latter were important allies of the AKP, and helped it secure victories in the past three parliamentary elections. However, as the latest elections demonstrate, the Gulen movement’s contribution was vastly overrated. When the two fell out over the past year and engaged in vicious attacks and counterattacks, it was assumed that this would detract considerably from the AKP’s popularity among its conservative, observant base. Nothing of that sort happened. In fact, the AKP’s share of the votes went up when compared with the previous round of local elections, demonstrating the near-total irrelevance of the Gulen movement to Turkey’s domestic politics.
An additional factor contributed to the AKP’s impressive victory: its main opponent, the CHP, has virtually no presence in the Kurdish areas in the east an south-east of the country. Even though a breakdown of Kurdish votes is not yet available, it would be safe to assume these were shared between the AKP and the pro-Kurdish BDP. The AKP must have also received a boost in Kurdish eyes because it has been seriously negotiating a settlement of the Kurdish problem with Abdullah clan and the PKK. The Gulen movement’s opposition to the AKP is also likely to have stimulated Kurdish voters to support the party because Hizmet is seen as opposed to Kurdish autonomy, and even to Kurdish cultural rights.
The AKP’s victory in the local elections does not, however, resolve the basic conundrum facing the party and the country: how can the norms of liberal democracy that ensure freedom of political expression be reconciled with the presence of a strong and popular leader who harbours autocratic tendencies? Commentators are assuming that this electoral victory will augment the authoritarian streak in Erdogan. However, if after being vindicated at the polls and, thus feeling secure, he is able to rise above the petty bickering of day-to-day politics and rein in his autocratic tendencies, he will be doing yeoman service to the cause of Turkish democracy.
— Guardian News & Media Ltd
Mohammed Ayoob is University Distinguished Professor Emeritus of International Relations, Michigan State University, and the author most recently of Will the Middle East Implode?
